The role of sleep in consolidation of multi-item bound representations by Shaw, John
The Role of Sleep in Consolidation of Multi-Item Bound 
Representations 
John James Shaw 
MSc 
 
This thesis is submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for 
the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
Lancaster University 






 This thesis has adopted the alternative format approach, thus chapters 2-5 have 
been written in the style of journal articles suitable for submission.  Each of these 
chapters is independent and contains a review of the literature that is relevant to 
the data presented as well as a discussion relating the findings to the wider 
literature while Chapter 1 will provide a broader introduction to all of the work 
undertaken in this thesis and identify the key research questions and aims. 
 In accordance with both department and university guidelines on alternative 
format thesis submission each chapter includes a full bibliography as well as a 
consolidated bibliography at the end of the thesis.  At the beginning of each paper 
there is a title page containing the paper title, its submission status, followed by 





Table of Contents 
Prologue ……………………………………………………………………………….. i 
Table of Contents ……………………………………………………………………. ii 
Declaration ……………………………………………………………………………. iv 
List of Tables …………………………………………………………………………. v 
List of Figures ………………………………………………………………………… vi 
Dissemination of Data ……………………………………………………………… vii 
Acknowledgement …………………………………………………………………… ix 
Dedication ……………………………………………………………………………… xi 
Thesis Abstract …………………………………………………………………….. xii 
1.  Literature Review ……………………………………………………………… 1 
1.1 Overview .………………………………………………………………………. 2 
1.2 Consolidation .………………………………………………………………… 3 
1.2.1 Origins of Consolidation theory …………………………………………… 3 
1.2.2 Contemporary Theories of Consolidation ……………………………….. 5 
1.2.2.1 Complementary Learning Systems Theory …………………………… 5 
1.2.2.2 Consolidation Through Reorganisation ………………………………… 8 
1.2.3 Conclusion ……………………………………………………………………… 9 
1.3 Representations in Memory ………………………………………………. 10 
1.3.1 Formation of Conceptual Representations ……………………………… 11 
1.3.2 Role of Conceptual Representations in Supporting Episodic Memory 12 
1.3.3 Consolidation of Bound Representations ………………………………… 17 
1.3.4 Maladaptive influence of Conceptual Knowledge in Consolidation …. 20 
1.3.5 Conclusion ……………………………………………………………………… 23 
1.4 Sleep’s Role in Memory Consolidation ……………………………….. 24 
1.4.1 Theories of Consolidation within Specific Sleep Stages ……………… 26 
1.4.1.1 Dual Process Theory ………………………………………………………. 26 
1.4.1.2 Sequential Model of sleep stages ……………………………………… 27 
1.4.1.3 Active System Consolidation Model …………………………………… 28 
1.4.2 Sleep Architecture ………………………………………………………….. 29 
1.4.3 Sleep’s role in consolidation: Abstraction and Integration ………… 34 
1.4.4 Role of Pre-existing Conceptual Knowledge in Sleep ………………… 40 
1.5 Overview and Objectives of the Thesis ……………………………… 41 
Chapter 2: The Role of Culture in Binding of Actions, Objects, and 




Chapter 3: The role of sleep in Binding of Actions, Objects, and 
Scenes in Visual Long-Term Memory 
44 
Chapter 4: The Role of Sleep in Consolidation of Multi-Item Events 
and Differing Levels of Retrieval 
45 
Chapter 5: Lateralised Sleep Spindles Relate to False Memory 
Generation 
46 
Chapter 6.  Thesis Discussion 47 
6.1 Summary of Chapters ………………………….…………………………………. 47 
6.2 Theoretical Contributions ………………………….……………………………… 50 
6.2.1 Differences in Consolidation by Item Modalities …………………………… 52 
6.2.2 Differences in Specific Composite Recognition: An Action/Object 
Distinction 
53 
6.2.3 Role of Sleep in Consolidation of VLTM Based Bound Representations 58 
6.2.4 The role of sleep in false memory generation ………………………….…… 61 
6.2.5 Sleep Architecture in False memory generation ………………………….… 62 
6.3 Methodological Limitations ………………………….…………………………….. 65 
6.4 Future Directions ………………………….………………………………………… 67 
6.4.1 Role of Culture- Does a pictographic language help? ……………………... 67 
6.4.2 Binding of Objects and Actions, why the gap? ……………………………… 67 
6.4.3 Role of schema in visual false memories ………………………….…………. 69 
6.4.5 Replication of the nap study in an overnight paradigm …………………… 69 
6.5 Thesis Conclusion ………………………….………………………………………… 70 
Consolidated Bibliography ………………………….……………………………… 71 
Appendices  





The thesis contains original work completed solely by the author under the 
supervision of Professor Padraic Monaghan and Dr John Towse, and has not been 
submitted in the same form for the award of a higher degree at this institution or 
elsewhere.  
 
Name:  John Shaw 
Signature:   
Date:   19/05/2018 
 
This research was supported by a teaching studentship from Lancaster 
University Psychology Department.   
v 
 
List of Tables 
Chapter 2. 
Table 2.1. Table showing the total participants in each study by culture and 
ethnicity. 
Table 2.2. Summary of the Linear Mixed Effect Model for the Action-Scene 
Recognition Task. 
Table 2.3.   Table showing mean proportion of objects recognised and average 
familiarity rating by culture. 
Table 2.4.  Table showing total participants in each study by culture and ethnicity. 
Table 2.5. Summary of the Linear Mixed Effect Model for the Action-Scene 
Recognition Task. 
Table 2.6.  Table showing the average proportion of items correctly recognised for 
Western and East Asian cultures split by Task and foil type.  SE in parentheses. 
Chapter 4. 
Table 4.1. Table displaying the average recall for each item modality by session.  
Recall defined as ratio of information recalled from session 1 in session 2. 
Chapter 5. 
Table 5.1. Proportion identified as ‘Seen-Old’ (SE in parentheses) for each word 
type, by hemisphere, and sleep or wake group.  (LVF- Left Visual Field, RH- Right 
Hemisphere, RVF- Right Visual Field, LH- Left Hemisphere). 
Table 5.2. Mean duration stage 1, stage 2, SWS, and REM sleep in minutes ± 1 
SEM. 
Table 5.3. Correlation coefficients between recognition accuracy, and proportion 
of total time slept in each sleep stage. 
Table 5.4. Correlation coefficients between overall, LH and RH unseen lure false 
recognition with individual electrode sleep spindle density in sleep stage 2. 
Table 5.5. Correlation coefficients between seen-old and unseen-new recognition 
with lateralised sleep spindle density in sleep stage 2. 
Table 5.6. Discriminability as measured by A’ (SE in parentheses) and response 
bias as measured by B’ (SE in parentheses) by memory type, hemisphere, and 






List of Figures 
Chapter 1. 
Figure 1.1.  Standard model of Complementary Learning Systems. 
Figure 1.2.  Dog smoking pipe. 
Figure 1.3.  Image depicting standard sleep stage activity over a single night. 
Chapter 2. 
Figure 2.1. Exp 1. Image demonstrating the study and test phase of the object-scene 
composite recognition task. 
Figure 2.2.  Exp 1.  Object-scene Relational Binding:  Graph showing the average 
accuracy for each culture by type of foil. 
Figure 2.3. Exp 2. Image demonstrating the study and test phase of the action-scene 
composite recognition task.  
Figure 2.4.  Exp 2.  Action-scene Relational Binding:  Graph showing the average 
accuracy for each culture by type of foil.   
Chapter 3. 
Figure 3.1. Exp 1. Image demonstrating the study and test phase of the action-scene 
composite recognition task.  
Figure 3.2.  Exp 1.  Sleep’s role in action-scene Relational Binding: Graph showing the 
average accuracy for each group by type of foil. 
Figure 3.3.  Exp 2.  Sleep’s role in action-scene Relational Binding in Repeated 
Viewing: Graph showing the average accuracy for each group by type of foil and graph 
showing the average accuracy for each experimental group compared across 
Experiment 1a and experiment 2. 
Figure 3.4 Exp 3. Image demonstrating the study and test phase of the object-scene 
composite recognition task. 
Figure 3.5.  Exp 3.  Sleep’s role in object-scene relational binding: Graph showing the 
average accuracy for each experimental group. 
Chapter 4. 
Figure 4.1.  Graph depicting mean number of details recalled for each Item modality 
split by group. 
Figure 4.2.  Graph depicting mean number of details recalled for each Item modality 
across sleep and wake groups. 
Chapter 5. 
Figure 5.1.  Proportion of words endorsed as ‘Old’ by word type for sleep and wake 
groups by hemisphere. 





Dissemination of Data Contained Within Thesis 
Journal Publications 
Shaw, J.  J., & Monaghan, P.  (2017).  Lateralised sleep spindles relate to false 
memory generation.  Neuropsychologia, 107, 60–67.  
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2017.11.002 
Papers presented at scientific meetings 
Shaw, J.  J., & Monaghan, P.  (January, 2017), The Impact of Sleep on the 
Binding of Actions, Objects and Scenes in Visual Long-Term Memory: Can 
repeated viewings help?, SARMAC XII, Sydney, Australia. 
Shaw, J.  J., & Monaghan, P.  (August 2016), The Impact of Sleep on the Binding 
of Actions, Objects and Scenes in Visual Long-Term Memory, BPS 
Cognitive Section Annual Conference, Barcelona, Spain 
Shaw, J.  J., & Monaghan, P.  (July 2016), The Impact of Sleep on the Binding of 
Objects and Scenes in Visual Long-Term Memory.  PsyPAG Annual 
Conference, York, United Kingdom 
Shaw, J.  J., & Monaghan, P.  (July 2016), The Impact of Sleep on the Binding of 
Actions and Scenes in Visual Long-Term Memory UK Sleep, Memory, and 
Language Meeting.  Lancaster University, United Kingdom 
Monaghan, P., Shaw, J.  J., Ashworth-Lord, A., & Newbury, C.  (January 2015), 
Lateralised False memories after a period of sleep.  Royal Holloway 
University, United Kingdom 
Posters presented at scientific meetings 
Shaw, J.  J., & Monaghan, P., (July 2017), Left Hemisphere Sleep Spindles Protect 
Against False Memories, Cardiff University Brain Research Imaging Centre 
Workshop, Cardiff, United Kingdom 
Shaw, J.  J., & Monaghan, P., (May 2017), Left Hemisphere Sleep Spindles Protect 
Against False Memories, Experimental Psychology Society Reading 
Meeting, Reading, United Kingdom 
viii 
 
Shaw, J.  J., & Monaghan, P.  (January 2016), The Impact of Culture on the 
binding of Actions, Objects and Scenes in Visual Long-Term Memory, 





It is only as I sit down to write this section that I realise how many people 
have helped me though this thesis.  First, I have to acknowledge and thank my 
supervisor, Padraic Monaghan.  It is hard to believe that it has now been over 4.5 
years since I first came to your office on the advice of Mark Howe to discuss a 
possible PhD project that merged my interest of false memories with sleep.  I can 
honestly say I could not have dreamt for a better supervisor, from your gentle 
nudging of me to go beyond my comfort zone to what can only be described as 
your scary knowledge of near enough everything, thank you for everything that 
has gotten me to this stage.  I would also like to acknowledge and thank John 
Towse, my second supervisor, for all the input in various meetings and annual 
reviews.  Next, I must thank all the various members of Padraic’s lab group, of 
whom there are too many to name individually.  Although the majority of you 
have no interest in sleep I always appreciated the comments and the outside 
perspective, it’s helped shape the thesis to what it is now.   
To all the various people in the department who have made my 7+ years 
at Lancaster the best of my life, I cannot thank you enough.  To Christiana and 
Pei who have managed to put up with me in the office for the last 3 years, thank 
you for making it a joy to come into the office and work on the PhD, few people 
can say that yet you’ve made that happen.  To Lauren, it’s crazy to think that we 
went from UG through to PhD and although you decided to leave it, please know 
that sharing an office with you helped keep me sane in those first few years when 
I was in early for testing and you were already there from going to the gym, it 
was nice to know somebody was suffering early mornings as well. I’d like to 
specifically thank Calum Hartley for all his support dating all the way back to 2012 
when I was a second year and you were the Stats GTA; it’s weird to think that it’s 
been that long.  Thank you for so much more than the advice on the PhD and 
academia in general, but also for the constant chats about FUT, football in 
general, dinosaurs, and pretty much any random topic we thought of. Having 
somebody next door to talk to about things unrelated to psychology helped more 
than you could know.  I’d also like to specifically thank Chloe Newbury-  I’m not 
sure how much I would have been able to take if I was the only sleep researcher 
in the department so to know someone else is doing it to share our various 
frustrations, from the leaky roof in the sleep lab through to participants deciding 
not to show up for the 10pm session, thank you for sharing that grief.  Thank you 
for also sharing the confusing looks as someone in Padraic’s lab group talks about 
various linguistic theories that we have never heard of.  Those rare chances 
x 
 
where we can bamboozle them with sleep/false memory theory were worth the 
near-constant confusion! 
A very special acknowledgement and thank you to Michelle To and Penny 
Lewis, my Viva examiners. Due to outside influences the time between submission 
and the Viva was only 17 days, including 5 of them being in a strike. I can’t thank 
you enough for powering through the thesis in that time. Despite all I was told 
before hand you both made the viva one of the most enjoyable experiences of the 
PhD. It was a complete joy to talk about my research and at no point did it feel 
like an ‘exam’, and for that I thank you.  
Outside of Lancaster but remaining in academia I’d like to acknowledge the 
contribution of Scott Cairney for teaching me how to use polysomnography, and 
Justin Wood for very kindly sharing the action-scene/object-scene stimuli, without 
either of these people the thesis would have looked a lot different. 
To Natalie, thank you for everything you have put up with during the 
thesis.  From the long hours testing at 7am-10pm through to looking after me 
after I managed end up on crutches for 8 months from two separate incidents in 
the run up to submission, you have done so much for me I will never be able to 
pay back.  You were more integral to the success of this thesis than you will ever 
be able to realise and that I will ever be able to show. 
To my Mum, none of this would be possible without your encouragement 
and support throughout all my life.  For all the times you have asked me how 
‘College’ is going, or asking me when I will break up for the term (never), thank 
you. Your support throughout all of this has kept me going and knowing how 
proud you are of me is one of the most amazing feelings.  
Finally, to my Dad.  It is one of my biggest regrets that you can’t be here 
to share this achievement because it is as much a culmination of your 
achievements as it is mine.  Thank you for all the times you pushed me to do 
more, from the massive amounts of Lego building (That I’ve since learned was a 
ploy to get me to be an engineer), through to trying (and failing) to take up 
foreign languages, your enthusiasm for me to achieve so much is something that 
I can only fully appreciate now that I can look back and see where it has taken 
me.  Above all else, thank you for sitting down and talking with 10yr old me when 
Grandad was diagnosed with Alzheimer’s disease to explain what was happening 
when others told me not to worry.  You started a love of a subject I didn’t even 
know existed at the time and for that I am eternally grateful.  I know you would 














In memory of John Anthony Shaw (1946-2006) 







A wealth of literature has demonstrated that in terms of memory 
representations, items are not encoded equally.  In part this has been suggested 
to be affected by conceptual knowledge, with items with pre-existing conceptual 
knowledge easier to encode and thus, more salient in subsequent representations. 
However, it is not known how this may affect different item modalities such as 
actions, objects, people, and locations.  As such, this thesis seeks to understand 
the factors that can affect the different item modalities in multi-item memory 
representations primarily focusing on the role of sleep, which has been 
demonstrated to be beneficial for memory consolidation.   
In paper 1 the role of culture (Western v East Asian) was examined in 
differences in bound memory representations, focusing on object-scene and 
action-scene pairings. It was observed that culture was not a factor for action-
scene pairings but Western participants were significantly more accurate than 
East Asian participants for object-scene pairings. Furthermore, object-scene 
recognition was significantly more accurate than action-scene recognition across 
both cultures, suggesting a difference between actions and objects in ease of 
recognition. 
In paper 2 this was expanded to see the role of sleep in consolidation of 
action-scene/object-scene pairings. As with paper 1 object-scene pairings were 
significantly more accurate than action-scene pairings in immediate testing, and 
object-scene recognition experienced a benefit of sleep, with accuracy higher in 
the sleep group than the wake group. This difference was not replicated in the 
action-scene task. 
Paper 3 sought to apply the previous results to a practical situation, that of 
eyewitness testimony as the existing literature has revealed that within 
eyewitness testimony participants are susceptible to errors of binding at retrieval. 
Across the two sessions we observed a significant difference in item modality, 
xiii 
 
with action details recalled to a higher level than object, location, and people 
details but there was no effect of sleep/wake.   
Paper 4 moved away from visual memory and instead focused on the role 
of sleep on conceptual knowledge using the DRM paradigm.  Participants were 
trained on 12 DRM wordlists and then were assigned either to a short-term wake 
group or a nap group monitored with polysomnography.  At retrieval, sleep 
significantly increased lure-unseen acceptance compared to the equivalent period 
of wake, providing evidence of sleep promoting false memory generation.  
Furthermore, RH spindle generation relative to LH spindle generation was 
significantly correlated with false recognition of lure-unseen words, suggesting a 




Chapter 1.  Introduction 
Chapter Summary 
This chapter provides a review on the background literature that will be 
explored in the thesis.  Within the literature three key concepts will be 
approached.  First, the role of the hippocampus in consolidation of memory and 
the theoretical perspectives within the current literature.  Second, the theoretical 
perspectives behind why memory distortions can occur, and third, the role of 
sleep in memory consolidation.  Finally, this chapter will provide an overview of 
the studies to be featured in the thesis.  
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CH1. Literature Review 
1.1 Overview 
Imagine you are at Blackpool beach. You look out over the sea. The water 
has a murky-green colour as it mixes with the sand. Dark clouds are rolling in 
bringing rain. You notice a few seagulls and the differences between them. One 
has different colouring, is much smaller while the others are pristine white despite 
the water. One seagull suddenly swoops down and attacks a fish but stops once 
realising it is just a shoe. In our everyday life we see incredibly complex visual 
scenes with hundreds of details to encode ranging from the item-specific details 
(colour, size) to the whole image. Even more, there are several item modalities to 
process: the objects in the scene, the location, the actions performed, and the 
people present. There is a growing body of evidence for our understanding of how 
we can process these, with pre-existing conceptual knowledge playing an 
important role and in a separate strand of research that item modalities are not 
equally consolidated either in quantity or fidelity of the representation. Recent 
literature suggests a role of the hippocampus in this form of processing (Horner & 
Doeller, 2017), yet one area of the literature that is relatively unexplored is the 
role of sleep in consolidation of these bound representations. Within the literature 
there is much evidence of the beneficial effect of sleep on consolidation of 
information including both declarative and procedural (see Diekelmann & Born, 
2010; Rasch & Born, 2013). More specifically, during sleep it is suggested that 
memories are reorganised from high-fidelity, highly-contextualised hippocampal-
based episodic representations to a more conceptual, decontextualised 
neocortical-based representation. Moreover, having pre-existing conceptual 
knowledge has been demonstrated to expedite this consolidation process (van 
Keresten et al., 2010a, 2010b, 2013a, 2013b, 2014). There is an issue though, 
how may this shift in representation from contextualised to decontextualised 
affect the episodic representation, and can conceptual knowledge influence this? 
The purpose of this thesis is to explore the role of sleep in the consolidation of 
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bound representations of differing item modalities and what factors may affect 
this. In the following section I will first address the various literature regarding 
consolidation theories then link that to research literature emphasising an 
important role of both conceptual knowledge and hippocampal activity. After that 
I will discuss the role of sleep in consolidation and highlight where there is a gap 
in the literature that this thesis sets out to fill. 
 
1.2 Consolidation 
1.2.1 Origins of Consolidation Theory 
The topic of memory consolidation is amongst the oldest within psychology 
with early studies on consolidating dating back to the late 1800s. By consolidation 
I refer to the established concept that after learning memory representations can 
be strengthened after they have been formed. In pioneering research, Ribot 
(1882) observed a number of patients reporting retrograde amnesia following a 
brain injury whereby they could recall information from their childhood but events 
temporally close to the event were unknown. From this Ribot proposed a temporal 
process of memory where memories become fixed as time progresses and 
gradually become resistant to post-event trauma (Polster, Nadel, & Schacter, 
1991). The field was expanded upon by Müller and Pilzecker (1900) who built 
upon Ribot’s theory and applied it to healthy adults (for a summary, see Lechner, 
Squire, and Byrne, 1999). Within their monograph, Müller and Pilzecker reported 
40 experimental conditions, focusing on participants learning lists of non-word 
pairs within a fixed period of time with cue-based associative memory tested after 
a short delay. It was observed that recall of the non-word pairs was impeded 
when participants immediately learnt a second list after the target list compared 
to an equivalent period of non-learning delay. Furthermore, if the gap was over 6 
minutes between word lists, participants’ recall suffered no impairment on either 
list, leaving Müller and Pilzecker to suggest consolidation occurred after initial 
encoding, and any extra material presented before consolidation could be 
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complete can act as interference to this consolidation, reducing subsequent recall. 
While the literature expanded in the early 20th century with studies seeking to 
replicate Müller and Pilzeckers’ (1900) results, it was fraught with issues. Buxton’s 
(1943) review highlighted a lack of standardisation across the field with many 
studies failing to account for confounds associated with repeated testing or type 
of stimuli used. As such, within cognitive psychology interest in consolidation 
gradually declined with contemporary theories of memory assuming an 
unimportance of consolidation processes (see Brown & Lewandowsky, 2010 for a 
full review), instead preferring concepts such as interference or decay (Wixted, 
2004, 2005) to account for difference in memory retention over time. 
Yet within cognitive neuroscience consolidation is broadly accepted as a 
key process in memory. In a seminal paper, Hebb (1949) suggested a biological 
mechanism for consolidation of memory, proposing the dual-trace mechanism of 
memory that acknowledged the dichotomy between short term and long term 
memory. Within the Hebbian theory consolidation relied upon repeated activation 
of cells after stimuli offset thus allowing neuronal associative connections to 
strengthen in the absence of presented stimuli, neatly summarised as ‘neurons 
that fire together, wire together’, marking a shift in the literature towards an 
associative based consolidation model that had previously been suggested 
(James, 1890, Bartlett, 1932). Furthermore, Hebb’s studies marked a shift in 
approach to consolidation from cognitive observation to biological events 
underlying consolidation. From this two types of memory consolidation were 
considered; cellular consolidation focusing on stabilisation of changes in synaptic 
efficiency via long-term potentiation and long-term depression occurring within 
hours of encoding (Frankland & Bontempi, 2005), and systems level consolidation 
whereby memories can be subject to change after the initial cellular consolidation. 
One such theory that adopted the ideas proposed by Hebb was the work of Marr 
(1970, 1971) who proposed a model of neuronal consolidation that occurred over 
several days. Marr suggested memories are initially stored in a simple memory 
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store that is unable to be related to existing memories and in order to overcome 
this, these simple memory representations are transferred from the simple 
memory store (that Marr suggested to be within the archicortex), to the 
neocortex. Of particular relevance to the thesis, Marr emphasised this transfer 
occurs mostly during sleep.  
 
1.2.2 Contemporary theories of Consolidation 
The work of Hebb (1949) and Marr (1970, 1971) has since been used as 
the foundation for modern consolidation theories, resulting in theories containing 
a strong biological and cognitive framework. Within the literature supporting 
consolidation they can be split into three key models, The Complementary 
Learning Systems model (CLS; McClelland et al., 1995; Squire, 1992), the 
Multiple Trace Theory (MMT; Nadel, Samsonovich, Ryan, & Moscovitch, 2000), 
and the Transformation Model of Consolidation (TMC; Winocur et al., 2010). While 
each model may differ in specific processes, there is a consensus across all 
models regarding two key aspects. 1) that memory can be split into two forms of 
representation- episodic and semantic/conceptual (hereafter termed conceptual 
representation), 2) that the hippocampus and the neocortex are integral to these 
representations. In the following sections I will first describe and review each 
model of consolidation, highlighting the strengths and weaknesses in contrast to 
the other models and then discuss the different representations. 
 
1.2.2.1 Complementary Learning Systems Theory 
Building upon the word of Hebb (1949) and Marr (1970, 1971), the 
Complementary Learning Systems model of consolidation is perhaps the most 
widely known and researched amongst the literature (Squire, 1992; McClelland et 
al., 1995). Within the CLS model the hippocampus encodes sparse, non-
overlapping, contextualised representations that are resilient to subsequent 
interference (episodic) while the neocortex is a more flexible system, featuring 
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highly-overlapping, decontextualised representations that are susceptible to 
change over a period of time (conceptual), and through an interleaving of 
experiences, avoids the issue of catastrophic interference at reactivation: 
neocortical representations are long lasting while hippocampal representations are 
temporary. Within the model the neocortical representations are often initially 
represented quite poorly, with only weak connections existing between 
representations (Murre, 1996; Meeter & Murre, 2004a, 2004b), suggested to be in 
geographically disparate areas (Alvarez & Squire, 1994), and are relatively “slow”. 
This key characteristic of it being the slow learning system is suggested to be 
essential to long term consolidation, with McClelland et al. (1995) emphasising 
the importance of this store as essential to ensure that prior knowledge is not 
overwritten by incoming information thus impairing subsequent retrieval, a 
phenomenon termed catastrophic interference and previously demonstrated in 
artificial intelligence (Ratcliff, 1990). As such, within the CLS model consolidation 
occurs as repeated hippocampal reactivation reinstates the disparate neocortical 
associations further strengthening them until the point where the episodic 
memory within the neocortical representation is a replication of the original 
hippocampal representation and as such, the latter is no longer required and 
gradually decays (Figure 1.1). 
 
   
       Time 
 
Figure 1.1. Standard model of Complementary Learning Systems. The model assumes two distinct 
memory systems, a hippocampal-based fast learning store and a neocortical-based slow learning 
stores, with both occurring in parallel. Over time through repeated activation the hippocampal store 
seeks to strengthen the neocortical connections until the hippocampal representation is no longer 









Within the literature there is substantial support for the CLS model, with 
evidence in both human and animal studies. Within human studies the model is 
demonstrated mainly in studies on amnesic patients with hippocampal or 
parahippocampal lesions, primarily through hypoxic patients (loss of oxygen 
resulting in neuronal damage), of which the hippocampus is particularly 
vulnerable. In one of the most famous studies in the literature Scoville and Milner 
(1957) reported patient HM suffered retrograde amnesia following removal of 
parts of his hippocampal system in order to manage epilepsy. More recently, 
Yonelinas et al. (2002) examined recall (hippocampus based) and recognition 
deficits in 56 participants who suffered mild hypoxia that was primarily limited to 
the hippocampal region. In an initial test of recall compared against recognition 
hypoxic participants overall demonstrated significant retrieval impairment of 
studied material compared to aged matched control groups, suggesting a deficit 
an overall deficit in retrieval. Furthermore, recall, which relies upon the ability to 
acquire and process memory within the hippocampus, exhibited significantly 
greater deficits compared to recognition, which could rely upon perirhinal based 
familiarity judgement. Moreover, covariation between recall, recognition, and 
severity of hypoxic event was examined using a structural equation model and 
revealed that hypoxic severity, thus hippocampal damage, predicted the degree in 
which recollection, but not familiarity, was impaired. Similarly, Aggleton et al. 
(2005) reported a similar pattern in participants who suffered hippocampal 
atrophy due to complications of meningitis. In patients where the damage is 
restricted to the neocortex, a reversal is observed: patients tend to exhibit a 
degradation of conceptual knowledge while episodic memories remain intact 
(Graham, Becker, & Hodges, 1997; Snowden, Griffiths, & Neary, 1996). In a 
healthy population, Takashima et al. (2009) utilised fMRI to observe hippocampal 
and neocortical activity in a spatial location task at immediate recall and after a 
delay of 24h. Comparing the two timeframes, immediate recall demonstrated 
greater hippocampal activity than neocortical but this imbalance reversed at 24h, 
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with hippocampal-neocortical connectivity also decreasing by the second testing, 
supporting the suggestion that hippocampal representations are not as essential 
over time. 
 
1.2.2.2 Consolidation Through Reorganisation 
However, there is a growing body of evidence that contradicts key points 
of the CLS model. Since patient HM several studies have observed no temporally 
graded retrograde amnesia, suggesting no memory impairment, or a complete 
memory impairment, in some cases lasting decades (Bayley et al., 2006; Manns 
et al., 2003; Nadel, Winocur, Ryan, & Moscovitch, 2007), a result not compatible 
with CLS. As such, alternative models of consolidation have since been promoted. 
Nadel et al.’s (2000) Multiple Trace Theory (MMT) suggests differing roles for the 
two systems similar to the standard consolidation theories (SCT), memories are 
initially encoded in both the hippocampal and neocortical, with the neocortical 
representation considered to be highly-semantic and context-independent while 
the hippocampal representation is suggested to be a high-fidelity, contextualised 
representation of an episodic memory. Repeated reactivation of the hippocampal 
representation leads to multiple distinct traces created for the episodic memory, 
ensuring a long-lasting representation while also promoting common information 
for integration within the neocortical semantic network. Once the semantic 
representation is strong enough, these decontextualised memory traces no longer 
require hippocampal activation to be retrieved but the specific episodic memory 
still required the hippocampal-cortical connection.  
Evidence for the MMT can be seen in studies of the dissociation between 
episodic and semantic memory. For example, there are reports of amnesic 
patients that show temporally ungraded impairment for episodic memory 
(Rosenbaum et al., 2001; Steinvorth et al., 2005). In a case study by Warrington 
and McCarthy (1988) a patient with severe retrograde amnesia was able to retain 
words that had occurred after hippocampal damage, e.g., ‘shuttle’ and 
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‘thatcherism’, demonstrating that retrograde amnesia did not impair semantic 
memory, suggesting a dissociation between the episodic and semantic memory. 
Using fMRI, Davachi, Mitchell, and Wagner (2003) observed hippocampal and 
perirhinal activity in participants at both encoding and retrieval within an item 
recognition task and observed that encoding activation in the hippocampus and 
posterior parahippocampal cortex predicted later item recognition. 
More recently, in an effort to unify CLS and MMT a review by Winocur et al. 
(2010) summarised the literature by proposing the Transformation Model of 
Consolidation, encompassing key themes of both CLS and MMT. The key aspect of 
the transformation model is that the neocortical representation is significantly 
different to that of the hippocampus by virtue of their complementary nature. The 
hippocampus encodes a high-fidelity, contextualised episodic memory whereas 
the neocortex encodes a conceptual, decontextualised schematic memory and it is 
through repeated reactivation that the schema is modified and formed. The 
schematic structure allows key commonalities between memories to be 
consolidated in the long-term memory, allowing retrieval of the schematic 
representation when relevant information is experienced. Furthermore, Winocur et 
al. emphasise that the hippocampal representation is not as transient as CLS 
models would suggest, instead the original episodic memory remains in the 
hippocampus for as long as it can be retained. In doing so the model is able to 
account for the variation in retrograde amnesia observed in the literature. 
 
1.2.3 Conclusion 
 To summarise, across all theories there is a consensus that there are two 
forms of memory representations: hippocampal-based an episodic representation 
that is typically contextual and stored in high fidelity form, and a neocortical 
semantic or conceptual representation that is typically context-free, but more 
generalisable to different scenarios (McClelland et al., 1995; Nadel et al., 2000; 
Winocur et al., 2010). However, they primarily differ in how they view the 
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interaction between these representations. The CLS model adopts a relatively 
unidirectional view that the hippocampal episodic representation serves to 
consolidate the neocortical conceptual representation and once this has occurred, 
is free to degrade as the remote memory is available within the neocortical store. 
In contrast, MMT and TMC (Nadel et al., 2000; Winocur et al., 2010) adopt a view 
of greater hippocampal involvement in long-term memory, with the hippocampal-
episodic representation serving to influence the conceptual representation but is 
essential for providing contextual, spatial, and temporal detail that is lost in the 
decontextualised, conceptual representation. Moreover, there is a growing 
literature suggesting that conceptual representations are also important for 
encoding of episodic representations. In the following sections I will first describe 
the literature surrounding conceptual representations, including what they are 
and how they are formed, before linking them to episodic memory retrieval. 
 
1.3 Representations in Memory 
Early models of conceptual representations suggested that they were stored 
in separate modality-specific representations of motor, sensory, and verbal 
information, and that conceptual knowledge represented a form of network 
between these modality-specific representations within a distributed neocortical 
network (Eggert, 1977; Martin, 2007; Patterson et al., 2007). However, 
subsequent evidence of semantic dementia appears to dispute this distributed view 
as damage to the temporal lobe results in a breakdown of conceptual knowledge 
across all domains, providing contradictory evidence of a distributed model of 
representations (Bozeat et al., 2000; Lambon Ralph et al., 1999, 2001; Piwnica-
Worms et al., 2010).   
The study of such patients has instead led to the prominence of a ‘hub-
and-spoke’ model of conceptual knowledge, whereby concepts act as a central 
node to which the sensory, motor, and verbal representations can be linked 
(Lambon Ralph et al., 2010; Lambon Ralph, 2014; Patterson et al., 2007; Rogers 
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et al., 2004), with the spokes forming associations through the hub. The purpose 
of the hub is thought to act in three key ways: integration of information across 
different modalities and experiences; encoding the structure of conceptual 
relationships via identification of commonalities across items in order to 
generalise to novel items; and to encode items in a way in order to allow high-
order generalisation in order to allow generalisation across items that may not 
necessarily have the same surface-level features (e.g., knowing that a dolphin is 
a mammal despite all visual features indicating it may be a fish) (Rogers et al., 
2004; Lambon Ralph et al., 2010; Lambon Ralph, 2014). Evidence supporting a 
transmodal hub model was recently demonstrated in a computational model by 
McClelland and Rogers (McClelland & Rogers, 2003; Rogers et al., 2004; Rogers & 
McClelland, 2004). Within their model modality-specific regions require additional 
support from a central representational unit (the hub) in order to allow cross-
modal mappings and encoding of conceptual relationships. Studies on patients 
with semantic dementia suggest the hub is located within the anterior temporal 
lobe (ATL), with atrophy of the ATL linked to specific breakdown of conceptual 
knowledge (Brambati et al., 2009; Hodges et al., 1992; Mion et al., 2010), with a 
positive correlation observed between the degree of damage to the ATL and the 
severity of semantic impairment (Mummery et al., 2000; Nestor et al., 2006). 
This, combined with its close proximity to the medial temporal lobe (MTL), limbic 
system, and frontal cortex allow a high level of interconnectivity across important 
regions (Patterson et al., 2007). 
 
1.3.1 Formation of Conceptual Representations 
But how are conceptual representations formed? much of the evidence for 
conceptual representations suggest a form of long-term learning of elements 
through repeated exposure or reactivation of hippocampal based episodic 
representations. For example, within the previously mentioned CLS model 
(McClelland et al., 1995) consolidation is initially a two-stage process, encoding a 
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fast-learning episodic representation in the hippocampus and a slow-learning 
conceptual representation in the neocortex. Through repeated hippocampal 
activation of the episodic representation, the commonalities across experiences 
and exemplars are extracted and form a conceptual representation independent of 
the episodic representation, a process referred to as semanticisation (Battaglia et 
al., 2011; Cermak, 1984; McClelland et al., 1995; Moscovitch et al., 2005; Meeter 
& Murre, 2004; Rosenbaum et al., 2001; Stickgold, 2009; Sweegers & Talamini, 
2014; Westmacott et al., 2004).Within the literature there appears to be two 
distinct forms of conceptual formation, that of explicit, verbalised rule based 
learning and implicit, complex, non-verbal learning (Ashby et al., 1998; Knowlton 
& Squire, 1993; Nosofsky & Johansen, 2000). For the former, there are numerous 
studies that demonstrate the use of simple, verbalised rule based learning in 
various classification tasks whereby participants are able to explicitly define the 
categorisation rule (Ashby & Spiering, 2004; Ashby & Maddox, 2005). In complex 
learning, one suggestion for conceptual formation is that of similarity based-
models (Ashby & Waldron, 1999). In similarity based models, categorisation of 
items is decided based upon similarity to existing conceptual representations 
(Ashby & Maddox, 2005; Medin & Rips, 2005; Palmeri & Flanery, 1999; Posner & 
Keele, 1968; Reed, 1972; Smith, 2001; Smith & Minda, 2002; Tunney & Fernie, 
2012). An extension of this theory is that of an exemplar-based model of 
semanticisation (otherwise termed episodic models; Smith et al., 1998; Tunney & 
Fernie, 2012). Within this theory conceptual representations are formed through a 
composition of previously encountered category exemplars and activation of 
episodic representations allows subsequent categorisation of a novel item.  
1.3.2 Role of Conceptual Representations in Supporting Episodic Memory 
However, these theories somewhat underplay the role of the conceptual 
knowledge in hippocampal-based episodic memory representation. For example, 
although the CLS, MMT, and TMC models suggest interaction between neocortical 
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and hippocampal representations, much of this is theorised to be unidirectional 
whereby the hippocampal-episodic representation forms the basis of the 
neocortical-conceptual representation, with little detail given to the role of 
conceptual knowledge in the hippocampus. This appears somewhat at odds with 
neurobiological literature, with neurobiological models of episodic memory such as 
the Hierarchical Relational Binding Theory (hRBT) of Shimamura (2010) 
demonstrating that the hippocampus is key to forming associations between 
multiple memory representations, acting as a “convergence zone” whereby 
disparate inputs from the MTL and neocortex are fed and bound into a single 
representation (Damasio, 1989; Marr, 1971; McClelland et al., 1995) that 
ultimately supports episodic memory, requiring both episodic and conceptual 
knowledge in order to create an episodic representation (Tulving, 1983). More 
specifically, within the hippocampus specific concept cells have been observed in 
relation to conceptual knowledge, such as animals, buildings, and celebrities 
(Quiroga, Reddy, Kreiman, Koch, & Fried, 2005; Kreiman, Koch, & Fried, 2000). 
For example, it was observed that firing of concept cells is not linked to a 
particular trigger, but rather their firing pattern could be activated through 
multiple associated stimuli, such as a written form of a celebrity’s name or a 
photo (Quiroga et al., 2005). Moreover, concept cells can tune their firing field 
rapidly, with rodent studies demonstrating that place cells can tune after a single 
visit to the target location (Monaco, Rao, Roth, & Knierim, 2014), and concept 
cells can respond to a person within hours of meeting them (Quiroga, Kraskov, 
Koch, & Fried, 2009). Based upon this Quiroga (2012) has suggested that these 
place and concept cells form the ‘building blocks’ of hippocampal bound 
representations acting as a form of early precursor of conceptual knowledge, 
allowing rapid encoding and formation of high-fidelity hippocampal 
representations across multiple items, creating bound representations quickly. 
This rapid formation of bound representations can be beneficial in applying 
conceptual knowledge to new scenarios. A range of evidence from human, rodent, 
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and computational modelling studies suggest that pre-existing conceptual 
knowledge can be advantageous to consolidation of novel but related material. 
Within rodents, Tse et al. (2007) trained rats within a location on a schematic 
food layout, allowing learning of the typical locations via smell. Rats were given 
hippocampal or control lesions at different points in training with neocortical 
retrieval measured by digging at previously learned food sites. While the rats 
lesioned 3h after learning could not generalise to novel-but-consistent reward 
probes, rats lesioned after 48h were able to generalise to schema consistent 
novelty, suggesting a time-dependent measure in consolidation of newly learned 
information. Furthermore, when reward probes were delivered in a schema-
inconsistent manner, both task improvement and generalisation was impaired for 
both sets of rats. The study demonstrated that information that is compatible with 
pre-existing schemas can aid consolidation, even when hippocampal lesions were 
implemented after learning of the initial schema. Within humans, van Kesteren et 
al. (2010, 2013, 2014) observed through fMRI studies that prior knowledge 
modulated the contribution of the neocortex and hippocampus to encoding of new 
information. 
But for the purpose of the thesis I wish to focus the beneficial effect of 
conceptual knowledge on visual long-term memory (VLTM). At an item level it has 
been demonstrated that conceptual knowledge of visual elements can affect 
subsequent retrieval (Esyenck, 1979; Nairne, 2006; Rawson & Van Overschelde, 
2008; Schmidt, 1985; von Restorff, 1933). In a series of experiments Koutstaal et 
al. (2003) observed that recognition of real-world objects was better than 
memory for highly-distinct but novel items, suggesting that even with explicit 
labelling of ambiguous shapes, there is a substantial benefit of pre-existing 
conceptual knowledge in recognition of shapes. Furthermore, there is recent 
evidence that even within VLTM, the level of detail in the conceptual 
representation can affect the extent to which it can cue the correct representation 
without competing cues. In a series of studies Konkle, Brady, Alvarez, and Oliva 
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(2010a, 2010b) sought to compare the role of categories for various visual items 
in VLTM. Extending the previous literature that demonstrates that humans can 
have a large a detailed storage capacity to the extent of maintaining thousands of 
high-fidelity representations (Standing, 1973; Brady, Konkle, Alvarez, & Oliva, 
2008; Hollingworth, 2004; Vogt & Magnussen, 2007), Konkle et al. examined the 
role of categorical and perceptual features supported long-term memory 
representations. Within their first study (2010a) participants viewed 2800 objects 
with a varying number of exemplars from each category and in a subsequent two 
alternative forced-choice task (2AFC) participants were presented with one of the 
previously seen exemplars and a second, unseen exemplar from the same 
category. Accuracy was consistently high across all exemplar levels, even with 16 
presented exemplars (82%) but memory performance decreased as more 
exemplars were displayed, suggesting that while VLTM is capable of storing a 
large number of category exemplars, it is prone to interference when multiple 
items are required to be encoded. Furthermore, variations in categorical 
distinctiveness (e.g., a category of car could vary from a mini through to a 
limousine) were also found to reduce interference suggesting that while the 
conceptual representation can support recognition of an item, key contextual 
details of the item are important for specific recognition (e.g., although a limo is a 
car, knowing the key detail of it being longer than the average car). In a follow up 
study Konkle et al. (2010b) demonstrated a similar recognition rate for scene 
memory. Once again participants were presented with over 2900 images of 
scenery from 128 categories with 1, 4, 16, or 64 exemplars displayed per 
category. In a subsequent 2AFC task recognition rate was still consistently high, 
with the novel condition reporting 96% recognition accuracy against a novel item 
from an unseen category, dropping to 76% accuracy in the 64-exemplar category, 
comparable to the results of the object recognition task (Konkle et al., 2010a).  
From this study Konkle et al. (2010b) suggested that it is not feasible for 
humans to be able to store high-fidelity representations of each individual item and 
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as such, items within the VLTM must be represented at a conceptual level through 
an item prototype, a form mental representation of an item that can be linked to 
multiple exemplars in order to reduce cognitive load and aid consolidation of an 
episodic representation through accelerated consolidation of key features to be 
used for subsequent recognition. For example, when presented with a limousine 
the item prototype can automatically encode the key features of a car (four 
wheels, general shape) while key details can be formed in the episodic 
representation (in the example of a limo, the extended length of the car). In a 
subsequent recognition task, if participants are presented with the limo and 
another car, the prototype of a car can feature multiple exemplars ranging from 
standard hatchbacks, SUVs, cabriolets, even motorised wheelchairs, but are all 
able to be identified as a car but the specific episodic/contextual details of it being 
a limo can aid consolidation. The result is akin to examples form the verbal domain 
whereby familiar letter strings (e.g., FBI-BBC-NHS-MAN-UTD) are more likely to be 
retrieved than unfamiliar letter strings (FBIB-BCBH-SMA-NUTD; Bower & 
Springston, 1970) and is consistent with the previously reported research on 
expedited consolidation of information consistent with pre-existing conceptual 
knowledge (van Kesteren et al., 2010, 2013, 2014), suggesting that within VLTM, 
having pre-existing knowledge is beneficial. Issues of recognition or retrieval errors 
occur when items linked to the prototype have little variation, (e.g., compared to 
the previous car example, if the prototype is of a potato, in a recognition task it 
may be harder to distinguish a King Edward potato from a Maris Piper), or in 
situations whereby there is a lack of conceptual knowledge for that specific item. 
In that scenario, it may be that conceptual knowledge is required to create what is 







1.3.3 Consolidation of Bound Representations 
As of yet all the discussed studies have primarily focused on a single-item 
presentation and how episodic and conceptual representations may form from 
there, but real life is rarely so singular, visual scenes are incredibly complex and 
include a variety of different items. For example in the image below (Figure 1.2), 
although the primary focus is the dog, there are multiple different items of varying 
complexity, including the dog (breed, colour, spatial orientation, size), the pipe 
(colour, size, style), and the table (colour, shape, size). As such in order to create 
an episodic memory of those specific elements, consolidation of all the items and 
associations between these must be formed early in encoding.  
  
Figure 1.2. A dog smoking a pipe. Taken from stimuli from Standing 
(1973). 
 
Within the literature the hippocampus is thought to support creation and 
consolidation of these episodic representations by acting as a form of ‘convergence 
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zone’ through three key mechanisms: 1) rapid learning of associations, 2) pattern 
separation, 3) pattern completion. 
 
Rapid learning of new associations 
As it is incredibly unlikely that you will often experience the exact same 
scenario multiple times, one of the functions of the hippocampus is suggested to 
be rapid learning of new associations that are already encoded as conceptual 
knowledge. Several theories posit that the hippocampus is central in this form of 
rapid learned association through its position within the MTL, acting as a “hub” for 
separate elements. Recent studies utilising fMRI support the concept of bound 
representations being represented in the hippocampus yet these mostly focused on 
the hippocampus in isolation, neglecting the wider neocortical network. One study 
that built upon these findings was that of Backus et al. (2016) who examined 
hippocampal activity using an associative memory task then measuring 
hippocampal activity through multivariate pattern analyses of fMRI data. Backus 
and colleagues observed overlapping coding within the hippocampus alongside a 
hub-like network, supporting the idea that information from various neocortical 




The second proposed function of the hippocampus in supporting episodic 
recollection is that of pattern separation. This concept refers to the ability of the 
hippocampus to produce non-overlapping representations from overlapping input, 
acting to decrease interference between items by minimising overlap at encoding. 
As with much of the literature on hippocampal activity, it is primarily fMRI studies 
that have demonstrated pattern separation within the hippocampus, with Bakker 
and colleagues the first to demonstrate pattern separation within the hippocampus. 
Within their study participants were presented with multiple exemplars of items 
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(e.g., two similar rubber ducks) and noted that measures of hippocampal activity 
decreased over repeated presentation of the stimuli (Bakker, Kirwan, Miller, & 
Stark, 2008), which Bakker and colleagues inferred to be the presence of pattern 
separation.  
The effect of pattern separation can also extend to complex events with 
overlapping content. In a study using video stimuli Chadwick, Hassabis, and 
Maguire (2011) presented participants with multiple videos that combined two 
background and two foreground stimuli in unique pairings (e.g., stimuli a, b, c, d, 
could be combined as ac, ad, bc, bd). Using fMRI Chadwick and colleagues 
observed that the hippocampal representations could be distinguished within each 
video, suggesting that even in input that is highly overlapping the hippocampus is 
capable of producing high-fidelity, separated representations.  
 
Pattern Completion 
Furthermore, the hippocampus is capable of producing holistic recollections 
of episodic memory. Horner and Colleagues (2015) had participants learn complex 
hypothetical events consisting of multiple overlapping pairs of elements (people-
location-object) within distinct neocortical regions and at retrieval episodic memory 
representations were targeted through a partial cue of one element (e.g., location) 
to retrieve a second (e.g., person), with participants monitored using fMRI at both 
encoding and retrieval. It was observed that participants’ degree of reinstatement 
strongly correlated with their hippocampal activity, suggesting that episodic 
elements, even those in distinct neocortical regions, are bound into holistic event 
representations that can aid episodic recollection. Furthermore, cueing with the 
location of the complex event led to reinstatement of just the category (e.g., 
people v location) but not the exemplar-level item, suggesting that cues based 
upon location are useful for reinstatement of categorical elements but they are 
unsuitable to store high-fidelity exemplars. In situations whereby specific detail is 
required for information that may only vary slightly from others within a category 
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(e.g., visual differences between species of banana), then it may be that 
conceptual knowledge of the overall category may be preferentially retrieved, 
reducing fidelity.  
 
1.3.4 Maladaptive Influence of Conceptual Knowledge in Consolidation 
However, although prior conceptual knowledge can be of great benefit for 
expedited encoding and consolation of schema-consistent information, this same 
strength can also be maladaptive in situations whereby the information is 
inconsistent with our prior knowledge. Early work by Bartlett (1932) 
demonstrated an early representation of a conceptual consolidation within the 
“War of the Ghosts”. Within the study participants read an unfamiliar story that 
contained culturally unfamiliar narratives set within Native American folklore but 
contained information not consistent with the setting. Over time participants 
began to make errors of commission in which they inserted unrelated information 
into the narrative as well as errors of omission, failing to produce information that 
was inconsistent with the theme, with false memories an error of commission. 
Importantly, Bartlett noted how the information provided by participants over 
time gradually changed to be more consistent with pre-existing views on Native 
American Folklore, with errors of omission reducing inconsistent information, and 
errors of commission introducing consistent. Bartlett’s study was among the first 
in the literature to demonstrate that consolidated memory is not a direct 
representation of what was experienced, rather an interpretation. Yet despite the 
implications of Bartlett’s study, the results have never been successfully 
replicated by researchers (Gauld & Stephenson, 1967; Roediger, Wheeler, & 
Rajaram, 1993). In fact, Wheeler and Roediger (1992) observed that after 
presenting participants with the original ‘War of the Ghosts’ story memory was 
improved over repeated tests, but only if short delays occurred between the initial 
study and test. Yet what was important about Bartlett’s study was the distinction 
between Reproductive Memory; referring to accurate production of material from 
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memory, and Reconstructive Memory, emphasizing the process of filling in 
missing elements, typically with information that is contextually correct, with 
these distinctions serving as precursors to the episodic and semantic (conceptual) 
memory outlined in subsequent models (e.g., the CLS model, Squire 1992; 
McClelland et al., 1995).  
Further literature on flashbulb memories has demonstrated that memories 
for significant world events such as the terrorist attack of September 11th, 2001 
are typically reported with high confidence and in high fidelity but are subject to 
change even within 1 year of the original event and can distort even further over 
time (Brown & Kulik, 1977; Neisser, 1982, 1986; Lee & Brown, 2003; Conway, 
Skitka, Hemmerich, & Kershaw, 2009). For example, 50% of participants surveyed 
in the years after September 11th Terrorist attack report seeing the first plane hit 
the tower, including then U.S President George W Bush who confidently reported 
seeing the first plane hit the building, despite the event not being televised 
(Conway et al., 2009; Greenberg, 2004). These errors are thought to come about 
through the reorganisation of memory during consolidation adapting information to 
be consistent with the schema. This effect is often demonstrated in the field of 
eyewitness testimony. For example, Garcia-Bajos and Migueles (2003) presented 
participants with an account of a mugging incident containing 10 high typicality 
actions (e.g., mugger had a weapon) and 10 low typicality actions (e.g., the 
mugger had a dog with them). In a subsequent recognition task, participants were 
presented with 20 true/false statements, each containing 5 high/low typicality 
actions that were reported and 5 high/low typicality actions that were not. In the 
recognition task participants reported significantly more high-typicality actions, 
including false recognition of the unstated high-typicality actions, suggesting that 
prior schema knowledge for the event drove subsequent memory representation, a 
result that has since been replicated in a series of studies (Aizpurua, Garcia-Bajos, 
& Migueles, 2008; Garcia-Bajos, Migueles, & Aizurua, 2012). These results suggest 
that even highly-specific and widely reported events are susceptible to a 
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maladaptive influence of conceptual knowledge, shifting the episodic 
representation in order to fit in with an expected schema. 
In the past two decades the most prominent form of schema-based false 
memory generation has come in the form of the Deese-Roediger-McDermott 
(DRM) paradigm (Deese, 1959; Roediger & McDermott, 1995). In Deese’s original 
study, one overlooked until Roediger and McDermott adopted its paradigm, 
participants viewed a word list then completed a free recall memory task. The 
primary purpose of the study was to look at extra list intrusions in the free recall. 
Participants viewed 36 word lists containing 12 words each and each one had a 
critical associate. For example, the critical word King had a word list containing 
queen, England, crown, Prince, George, dictator, palace, throne, chess, rule, 
subjects, monarch, royal, leader & reign. Deese observed that some lists reliably 
induced the critical word on immediate free recall. The result of Deese’s study was 
replicated by Roediger and McDermott using six of the critical words from Deese’s 
study. In their study when participants completed a free recall task recall of 
critical lures (e.g., for the above example, King) was extremely high at 55% 
recall, a result that was higher than words presented in the middle of the study 
phase and a replication of Deese’s original study. When participants were further 
questioned about the false recall participants regularly responded as having 
‘known’ that the critical word appeared on the original word list. A follow up study 
by McDermott & Roediger (1998) found that when participants were explicitly 
instructed to decide carefully whether the critical word had previously appeared 
the false recall phenomenon still existed. Subsequent research by Neuschatz, 
Benoit, and Payne (2003) found that only when participants were given an explicit 
warning on the false memory effect was the effect reduced. 
Since its inception the DRM paradigm has been used extensively using 
both visually and aurally presented word lists to explore various effects, including 
long-lived semantic priming (McKone & Murphy, 2000), memory illusions 
(Roediger, 1996), and converging associative networks (Watson, Balota, & 
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Roediger, 2003). The effect has also been expanded beyond a word list with false 
memory effects appearing in picture stimuli as well (Roediger, McDermott, & 
Robinson, 1998; Gallo, McDermott, Percer, & Roediger, 2001; Lutz et al., 2017; 
Roediger, McDermott, Pisoni, & Gallo, 2004). One recent study, that of Lew and 
Howe (2016) presented participants with images that contained items that were 
either schema-consistent (e.g., frying pan on the cooker), schema-inconsistent 
(e.g., toaster under the table), or schema-irrelevant (e.g., toilet brush on the 
cooker). In a subsequent recognition task, participants were highly accurate in 
schema-consistent item locations and schema-irrelevant items, but they observed 
that schema-inconsistent items were more likely to be falsely recognised as in 
their schema-consistent locations (e.g., toaster on the worktop), with Lew and 
Howe theorising that this was in part due to a top-down schema influence on 
encoding of the episodic memory to make it more consistent with the pre-existing 
conceptual knowledge. Although it is to my own knowledge the first to explore 
false memory generation in visual memory in this form, the result is consistent 
with literature from visual memory. Although it is only recently published the 
study demonstrates that schema-influence is not limited to just a semantic 
domain but also visual. Given that these false memory generation effects can 
occur within an hour of encoding, this suggests that conceptual knowledge has a 
strong influence on encoding and retrieval of declarative memory, possibly as a 
result of the expedited consolidation brought about by the items all being 
consistent within a specific conceptual schema. 
 
1.3.5 Conclusion 
To summarise, there appears to be substantial evidence that neocortical 
representations support a conceptual-schema based model, with examples in this 
seen across several domains. The role of the conceptual-schema representation is 
to allow higher-order relationships to form between multiple episodic memories 
and allow generalisation. Furthermore, there appears to be substantial evidence 
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of a beneficial role of prior knowledge in consolidation of novel information, 
suggesting that conceptual representations can also affect episodic 
representations in a form of top-down processing, with conceptual knowledge 
supporting both encoding through accelerated encoding and retrieval of 
information through a form of pattern completion. Importantly, it appears that the 
hippocampus is essential for both initial formation of conceptual knowledge and 
integration of conceptual representations and episodic, with the hippocampus 
acting as a form of convergence zone for both new and pre-existing information.  
However, there is an unresolved issue: Although there is evidence that pre-
existing knowledge can aid specific episodic retrieval, it is unknown what the effect 
of sleep may have. While recent studies have demonstrated a beneficial effect of 
sleep on integration of information related to pre-existing knowledge (Hennies et 
al., 2016), It is unknown what the relation is to episodic representations, similar to 
that of Konkle et al. (2010a, 2010b). In the following sections I will discuss the 
role of sleep in regard to the wider literature before focusing more on the role of 
sleep in abstraction and integration of information.  
 
1.4 Sleep’s Role in Memory Consolidation 
As previously stated in the introduction to consolidation, the role of sleep 
in consolidation has been long known, with Marr (1970, 1971) and McClelland et 
al. (1995) suggesting hippocampal activity during sleep aided memory 
consolidation. The concept is not a new one, in the 19th century Ebbinghaus 
(1885) observed recall of newly learned words was improved after a period 
containing sleep than an equivalent period of wake, leading to the well-
established “forgetting curve”. A review almost 50 years later by Van Ormer 
(1933) found further evidence for the role of sleep in consolidation while other 
studies such as Patrick (1896) showed the reverse, sleep deprivation led to 
impaired consolidation. Since then the literature has grown exponentially, with 
studies demonstrating sleep has a beneficial role in both declarative and 
25 
 
procedural tasks (for a summary, see. Diekelmann & Born, 2010; Marshall & 
Born, 2007; Rasch & Born, 2013). Physiologically, sleep can be divided into 
stages, rapid eye movement (REM) and non-REM (NREM), which can be further 
broken down into stage 1 (S1), stage 2 (S2), and SWS (stage 3 and stage 4 
combined), with SWS occurring more than REM at the start of the night while this 
pattern reverses as the night goes on (Figure 1.3). Within the literature there are 
multiple theories as to sleep’s role in consolidation, those that are stage 
dependent, such as the dual process theory and the sequential hypothesis, and 
those that are more physiologically based, such as the active system 
consolidation model. Although they are not mutually exclusive, they assume 
different processes, the former focusing more on the entire sleep stage while the 
latter is more focused on the neurobiological events within each stage. In the 
following sections I will discuss these theories, including their strengths, 
weaknesses, and relevance to the thesis. After discussing the theories I will focus 
on the role of specific sleep architecture and finally examine the literature on the 
role of sleep in abstraction and integration of information. 
 
Figure 1.3. Typical sleep stage activity over a single night. Figure taken form 





1.4.1 Theories of Consolidation within Specific Sleep Stages 
1.4.1.1 Dual Process Theory (DPT) 
Within the dual process theory of sleep, each specific sleep stage is 
thought to be beneficial for a memory type, SWS is thought to benefit declarative 
memory while REM sleep is beneficial for nondeclarative memory. This theory is 
primarily supported by studies employing the “night-half” paradigm developed by 
Ekstrand and Colleagues (Yaroush, Sullivan, & Ekstrand, 1971; Fowler, Sullivan, & 
Ekstrand, 1973; Ekstrand, 1972). Within the paradigm performance is compared 
across sleep intervals of either the first half or the late half of nocturnal sleep, 
taking advantage of the SWS dominant first half of sleep and the REM dominated 
second half to allow comparisons without the confound of repeated awakening. 
Yaroush et al. (1971) demonstrated the benefit of SWS early sleep compared to 
REM late sleep in a study on associative word pairs while a study by Barrett and 
Ekstrand (1972) replicated the effect but controlled for circadian rhythms by 
manipulating sleep so that both “night-halfs” occurred in the same circadian 
phase. Plihal and Born (1997, 1999) explored the difference between the SWS-
rich early sleep and the REM-rich late sleep further, training participants 
separately on a word pair task and a separate mirror tracing task. They observed 
that SWS early sleep was beneficial to the word pairs task while REM late sleep 
aided the mirror tracing task, supporting the dual process theory (DPT). 
While there is strong evidence for the DPT, it has been challenged by some 
studies. For example, among a host of studies (Aeschbach, Cutler, & Ronda, 
2008; Gais, Plihal, Wagner, & Born, 2000; Huber et al., 2006; Huber, Ghliardi, 
Massimini, & Tononi, 2004). Gais, Plihal, Wagner, and Born (2000) demonstrated 
a beneficial role of SWS early sleep in a visual texture discrimination task while in 
the same study Gais et al. also demonstrated a beneficial role of REM late sleep in 
declarative materials, contradictory to the dual process theory. Another criticism 
aimed at the theory is that it forgoes a role of sleep stage S2 in any form of 
memory consolidation, which has been demonstrated to be incorrect (Gais, Mölle, 
27 
 
Helms, & Born, 2002; Genzel, Dresler, Wehrle, Grozinger, & Steiger, 2009; 
Walker, Brakefield, Morgan, Hobson, & Stickgold, 2002; Ruch et al., 2012, van 
der Helm et al., 2011). For example, sleep after learning a new procedural motor 
task has been demonstrated to not just increase the time spent in S2, but also 
the spindle density in S2 (Fogel & Smith, 2006; Fogel, Smith, & Cote, 2007; 
Nishida & Walker, 2007), with both of these increases correlated with subsequent 
increased performance in the motor task from pre- to post-sleep. More recently, 
van der Helm, Gujar, Nishida, and Walker (2011) investigated the impact of sleep 
on an episodic memory task using an item and context learning paradigm. Within 
the study participants learned two word lists, each associated with a different 
context and then assigned to either a nap or no nap group. In a subsequent 
recognition task they observed that for item memory there was no beneficial 
effect of sleep, but for context memory, which is hippocampal dependent, there 
was a significant benefit of sleep, with accuracy significantly correlating with 
amount of S2 sleep, a result supported by Ruch et al. (2012) who demonstrated 
S2’s role in consolidation of declarative memories. In Ruch et al.’s (2012) study, 
participants learned associations between faces and cities and after a nap 
completed a cued recall task, with sleep stages and spindle activity monitored 
during sleep. Increases in spindle activity in S2 were associated with enhanced 
retention of face-city associations. 
 
1.4.1.2 Sequential Model of Sleep 
As an alternative, the sequential model of sleep was proposed, suggesting 
the cyclic nature of REM and NREM across the sleep cycle was important for 
consolidation (Ambrosini & Guiditta, 2001). Early evidence in support of this 
model includes the previously mentioned study by Gais, Plihal, Wagner, and Born 
(2000). In a visual discrimination task Gais et al. observed that SWS had a 
beneficial role in the consolidation of visual information alongside a REM-based 
beneficial role in declarative memory. Interestingly, they observed that when 
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participants completed the full sleep cycle, going through SWS and REM multiple 
times performance increased significantly, strongly supporting the concept that 
sequential sleep may be more beneficial than any one stage. Elsewhere, retention 
of verbal material has been correlated with both early SWS and late REM, again 
supporting the view that repeated cycles are more important than any one stage 
(Ficca, Lombardo, Rossi, & Salzarulo, 2000; Mazzoni et al., 1999). The sequential 
hypothesis has even been supported by nap studies: A study by Mednick, 
Nakayama, and Stickgold (2003) observed that discrimination thresholds in the 
same task only improved after a nap containing both NREM and REM sleep but not 
just NREM. All of these studies suggest that the sequential hypothesis appears 
more consistent with the literature than the dual process theory. 
As with the DPT, there are issues with the sequential hypothesis. Issues 
regarding the methodology of fragmenting participants’ sleep in order to measure 
results and that these rely upon correlations between sleep stages and results 
allow no causal link to be examined. While it may be the more useful model in 
terms of explaining the role of sleep stages, it is still lacking testability. In an 
effort to seek a more in-depth view of the process, theories such as the Active 
System Consolidation (ASC) model instead more towards a more biological focus, 
focusing on the specific sleep architecture and cortical events that occur during 
sleep stages and how they may contribute to consolidation. 
 
1.4.1.3 Active System Consolidation Model 
Building upon the existing literature, the underlying theory of the ASC 
model integrates both dual process theory and the sequential hypothesis but 
adopts a more architecture-based view, looking at specific sleep architecture 
occurring during stages rather than the overall stage. During SWS, slow 
oscillations drive memory consolidation through repeated activation of newly 
encoded memory representations within the hippocampal stores, driving gradual 
redistribution to the neocortical store. This gradual redistribution results in a 
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qualitative shift in the memory representation as outlined in the CLS model of 
consolidation (Squire, 1994; McClelland et al., 1995), moving from a veridical 
based representation to a more semantic, “gist” representation that allows long-
term storage. Subsequent periods of REM sleep are thought to act as a period of 
stabilisation through synaptic consolidation. The important distinction from this 
and previous models is the focus on the interaction between three aspects of 
sleep architecture, slow wave activity, hippocampal sharp wave ripples, and sleep 
spindles (Rasch & Born, 2013). In the following section I will review each of these 
aspects in more detail and linking them to sleep-based consolidation. 
 
1.4.2 Sleep Architecture 
Slow Wave activity 
During SWS EEG activity is primarily Slow Wave Activity (SWA). Defined as 
0.5-4Hz frequency and <1Hz oscillation, SWA has been demonstrated to play a 
significant role in consolidation of memory. In animal studies learning new 
information has led to increases in SWA in subsequent SWS (Kattler, Dijk, & 
Borbely, 1994; Vyazovskiy, Borbely, & Tobler, 2000), with hemispheric 
differences observed depending on which paw the rat used during the day 
(Vyazovskiy, Cirelli, Tononi, & Tobler, 2008). This pattern has been repeated in 
humans, with Gais, Wagner & Born, (2002) observing increases in SWA during 
sleep stage SWS after a period of learning word pairs. Furthermore, several 
studies using transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) has provided direct 
evidence for a causal role of SWA in consolidation. Marshall, Helgadottir, Mölle, & 
Born (2006) applied tDCS to induce slow oscillating field potentials over the pre-
frontal cortex during NREM sleep and observed an increase in SWA that 
subsequently produced a significant improvement in retention of word pairs. At 
the other end of the scale, applying tDCS at 5Hz had a suppressing effect upon 
the SWA affecting performance on the retention task (Marshall, Kirov, Brade, 
Mölle, & Born, 2011). Although this research direction is relatively new, dating 
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back only the last decade, these studies demonstrate a direct causal role of SWA 
and SWS more generally in the consolidation of memory during sleep. 
 
Hippocampal Sharp Wave Ripples 
As stated in section 1.1 of the literature review, a key point of the CLS 
models is the role of sleep in consolidation; sleep is thought to be a period of 
offline consolidation where repeated activation of hippocampal representation 
leads to a hippocampal-neocortical transfer. Advances in neuroimaging have 
revealed a wealth of evidence supporting hippocampal reactivation during sleep in 
both animal and human studies. Hippocampal SW-R are primarily composed of 
large amplitude sharp waves in local field potentials and are suggested to be 
indicators of the most prominent hippocampal activity and are suggested to play 
an essential role in consolidation. One study that demonstrated their importance 
was that of Girardeau, Benchenane, Wiener, Buzsaki, and Zugaro (2009) who 
interfered with hippocampal ripples in sleeping rats who learned a spatial 
navigation task. Those rats whose hippocampal ripples were not modified had no 
issues with the task after a period of sleep. In contrast, those whose hippocampal 
ripples were blocked learned at a slower rate and did not achieve an equivalent 
level of performance. This result was repeated by Ego-Stengel and Wilson (2010) 
who trained rats in two identical special navigation task. In the 1h rest period 
after the experimental task, the rats experienced disruption of hippocampal SW-
R. In a subsequent task, performance in the control task was significantly faster 
than the task followed by hippocampal interference, indicating hippocampal 
ripples are important for consolidation and learning. As previously stated, these 
hippocampal SW-R are often temporally synchronised with spindles. Intracranial 
recordings from rats and humans have observed that SW-R are associated with a 
rise in spindle activity shortly before the ripple onset and that outlast the ripple 
(Mölle, Yeshenko, Marshall, Sara, & Born, 2006), with Mölle, Eschenko, Gais, 
Sara, and Born (2009) observing that during sleep following a learning task 
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spindle activity increased further. Furthermore, temporal analyses reveals that 
spindles and ripples lead to a “spindle-ripple event”, whereby individual ripples 
become temporally nested in repeated troughs of a spindle (Siapas & Wilson, 
1998; Wierzenski, Lubenov Gu, & Siapas, 2009). Taken together, these events 
may represent the CLS’s suggested transfer of reactivated memories from the 
hippocampus to neocortical sites (Sirota & Buzaki, 2005; Mölle & Born, 2009).  
 
Sleep Spindles 
One of the more recent areas of research in the sleep literature is the role 
of sleep spindles in memory consolidation. Sleep spindles are characterised as 
small bursts of activity (11-15Hz) that are relatively fast, typically lasting 
anywhere between 0.5 – 3s (De Gennaro & Ferrera, 2003). Spindles are most 
prominent during S2 but are also detectable during SWS, with spindle frequency 
gradually decreasing as SWS processes (Andrillon et al, 2011; Azumi & 
Shirakawa, 1982; Dijk, Hayes, & Czeisler, 1993; de Gennaro & Ferrara, 2003; de 
Gennaro et al, 2000; Marshall, Mölle, Hallschmid, & Born, 2004; Silverstein & 
Levy, 1976; Uchida, Atsumi, & Kojima, 1994; Zeitlhofer, 1997). Moreover, 
spindles are of particular interest due to their temporal synchronisation with 
hippocampal sharp-wave ripples (SW-R) (e.g., Siapas & Wilson, 1998; Clemens, 
Mölle, Eross, Barsi, Halaz, & Born, 2007; for a summary, see. Rasch & Born, 
2013). While studies have linked spindle activity to IQ (Nader & Smith, 2001; 
Schabus et al. 2004), many studies in the field of behavioural psychology have 
demonstrated a strong relationship between sleep spindles and offline memory 
consolidation during sleep for both declarative and procedural learning. For 
example, several studies have demonstrated that spindle activity is linked to 
performance in spatial navigation tasks (Meier-Koll, Bussmann, Schmidt, & 
Neuschwander, 1999), motor learning (Fogel & smith, 2006; Fogel, Smith, & 
Cote, 2007; Nishida & Walker, 2007; Tamaki, Matsuoka, Nittono, & Hori, 2008; 
2009), item-context pairs (Ruch et al., 2012; van der Helm et al., 2011), face-
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name associations (Clemens, Fabo, & Halasz, 2005), and word-pair learning 
(Gais, Mölle, Helms, & Born, 2002; Schabus et al., 2004; Schmidt et al., 2006; 
Schabus et al., 2008). One key study in recent years was that of Tamminen, 
Payne, Stickgold, Wamsley, and Gaskell (2010) who looked at spindles in relation 
to item integration. Within the study participants learned novel spoken words that 
had phonological overlap with existing vocabulary (e.g., cathedruke-cathedral) 
then were either in a wake group or a sleep group that was monitored via 
polysomnography, with a recall test after the delay and a second recall test one 
week later. Tamminen et al. observed that participants in the sleep group recalled 
more words and recognised them faster than the wake group in the 12h delayed 
test, with the wake group only reporting similar accuracy and speed after the one 
week delay. Furthermore, recognition of existing vocabulary significantly slowed 
in both groups after the retention interval, suggesting that novel words had 
become consolidated and acted as interference for the existing vocabulary. More 
relevant to the current section, increased spindle activity was strongly correlated 
with overnight lexical integration of novel words but this was not reflected in 
increases in recall rate or recognition speed of the novel words, suggesting a 
central role of spindles in the consolidation and integration of newly learned 
material into existing cortical networks. 
It is also important to note that spindle activity has been linked to region-
specific locations for memory consolidation. Previously, Nishida and Walker 
(2007) demonstrated region-specific spindle activity with relation to a procedural 
memory task. Participants were trained on a finger tapping task using their left 
hand and in a subsequent nap period Nishida and Walker observed a significant 
increase in spindle activity that correlated with performance improvement. When 
examined further, this correlation was due to spindle activity specifically in the 
contralateral (right) motor area, with no correlations observed for the LH, 
suggesting spindles are linked to region-specific consolidation rather than a global 
effect. Further evidence of this can be seen in a study by Tamminen et al. (2013) 
33 
 
who examined the role of spindles in the integration of novel words into densely 
or sparsely populated semantic neighbourhood. Within the study participants 
learned novel words over two sessions and recall was measured immediately after 
training, the following morning, and one week after. They observed that although 
recognition amount was equal across both conditions, novel words from the dense 
semantic neighbourhood were significantly lower in recognition, with Tamminen et 
al. taking this as evidence for integration of the novel words into the existing 
semantic network with existing vocabulary acting as interference. They also 
observed that spindle activity was linked to semantic density, with the sparse 
semantic neighbourhood related to more sleep spindles during sleep than the 
dense semantic neighbourhood. Critically, they observed a significant interaction 
between neighbourhood and hemispheric spindles; the neighbourhood effect 
observed was specific to the left hemisphere. The result appears consistent with 
current theories that sleep aids integration of recent experiences into the long-
term vocabulary store (Dumay & Gaskell, 2007, 2012) which is suggested to be 
located in the LH (Ellis, 2004; Ellis et al., 2009). The relevance of hemispheric 
lateralisation in sleep will be discussed further in Chapter 5. 
Yet there is an important point to make about the previous paragraph, the 
spindle ripple events observed are restricted to fast spindles. Studies have 
demonstrated two types of spindles; fast spindles (13-15Hz) are typically 
distributed over the central and parietal cortex and are typically in S2 whereas 
slow spindles (10-12Hz) are primarily concentrated around the frontal cortex and 
are more pronounced in SWS (Anderer et al., 2001; De Gennaro & Ferrara, 2003; 
Mölle, Bergman, Marshall, & Born, 2011; Terrier & Gottesmann, 1978). 
Importantly, the two spindles are also associated with different areas of activity; 
slow spindles with increased activation in the superior frontal gyrus whereas fast 
spindles are associated with activation in the hippocampus, suggesting a 
relationship between fast spindles and hippocampal-dependent memory 
processes. Recent literature exploring this different has demonstrated key 
34 
 
differences. Schimdt et al. (2006) observed that compared to a non-learning task 
spindle activity increased after learning word-pairs, and more specifically, only for 
slow spindles in frontocentral areas. In the study by van der Helm et al. (2011) 
within the recognition task they observed that for item memory there was no 
beneficial effect of sleep, but for context memory, which is hippocampal 
dependent, there was a significant benefit of sleep, with accuracy significantly 
correlating with both amount of S2 sleep and frontal fast spindle density. This 
effect is not limited to declarative memory, with Tamaki et al. (2008, 2009) 
observing an increase in fast spindle activity following a visuospatial motor task 
but no such increase for slow spindles. These studies suggest that fast spindles in 
particular may be vital for neocortical consolidation and links to hippocampal 
activity. 
 
1.4.3 Sleep’s role in consolidation- Abstraction and Integration 
In the last few decades a wealth of literature has demonstrated that sleep 
is a factor in promotion of associative and a conceptualised form of memory (for a 
summary, see Chatburn et al., 2014, Mirkovic & Gaskell, 2016), with sleep 
benefitting consolidation of numerous forms of abstraction. In a study on 
relational memory, Ellenbogen Hu, Payne, Titone, and Walker (2007) taught 
participants a series of premise pairs (A>B, B>C, C>D, D>E, E>F), with an 
embedded hierarchy (A>B>C>D>E>F). After a delay of 20 minutes, 12 h 
containing sleep/wake, or 24h participants were examined in an inferential 
judgement task for novel pairs (e.g., B>D, C>F, B>E). They observed that while 
the original premise pair recognition was consistent across all groups, only those 
who had a period of offline delay displayed inferential ability in the novel pair 
task, suggesting that sleep appears to preferentially facilitate inferential processes 
through enhancing hierarchical memory. This was expanded upon by Sio, 
Monaghan, and Ormerod (2013) who demonstrated a similar effect in problem 
solving. Participants were presented with a set of remote-associate tasks of 
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varying difficulty and after a period of sleep or wake reattempted unsolved 
problems. They observed that participants in the sleep group completed a greater 
number of problems than other groups, but this only applied to problems 
categorised as difficult, with no difference in easy problems, a result consistent 
with existing literature (Cai et al., 2009; Kuriyama, Stickgold, and Walker, 2004). 
The beneficial role of sleep in abstraction has even been demonstrated in infants, 
with Gomez, Bootzin, and Nadel (2006) observing that 15-month-old infants who 
napped between familiarisation and test on an artificial language appeared to 
remember more abstract relations in the language and generalised to stimuli 
similar to the familiarisation task. Efforts to create theoretical accounts of 
abstraction and integration during sleep have resulted in two prominent theories; 
the Memory Triage model by Stickgold and Walker (2013) and the information 
Overlap to Abstract (iOtA) model by Lewis and Durrant (2011). In understanding 
how sleep can lead to abstraction and integration of information, these theories 
can be broadly split into two key processes: how memory selection occurs during 
sleep, and how memory reactivation during sleep can affect consolidation. 
 
Memory Selection 
In order to avoid consolidating superfluous information consolidation 
processes during sleep must be capable of preferentially selecting which 
memories are consolidated and which aren’t. Task salience has been denoted as 
an important factor in this area, with the nature of the task being implicit or 
explicit demonstrated to affect subsequent post-sleep retention (Song, 2009; 
Spencer, Sunm, & Ivry, 2006). Task salience doesn’t even have to be explicit at 
the time of encoding but can be revealed any time before sleep. Fischer and Born 
(2009) noted that sleep can selectively consolidate memory based on a potential 
reward upon waking, even after only being told of a future reward after learning, 
suggesting we can engage in selective preservation, possibly linked to the 
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previously mentioned top-down processing that the neocortical conceptual 
knowledge can influence episodic representations. 
 
Memory Reactivation 
A key assumption of the ASC model is that during sleep memory 
representations are repeatedly reactivated and this in turn leads to consolidation. 
Evidence of this can be seen in the work of Wilson and McNaughton (1994) who 
recorded hippocampal CA1 place cells in rats during a physical activity to earn 
food. In subsequent SWS the hippocampal firing pattern was similar to that of the 
rat performing the action when awake, with the pattern not seen in sleep 
preceding the action. This pattern has been demonstrated in numerous species 
including primates (Hoffman & McNaughton, 2002) and birds (Dave & Margoliash, 
2000). In humans, Peigneux et al. (2004) observed clear signs of hippocampal 
reactivation during SWS in participants who learned a spatial navigation task with 
the size of hippocampal reactivation predicting performance at a later retest. This 
and subsequent studies suggest that during sleep the neuronal firing pattern 
during wake is replayed, albeit in a compressed form (Lee & Wilson, 2002). More 
recently, Deuker et al. (2013) were able to provide evidence of reactivation of 
specific memories during sleep, with Deuker and colleagues observing specific 
patterns that were identified during memory encoding reoccurring during post-
learning sleep.  
Further studies have demonstrated hippocampal reactivation during SWS 
through cueing. Rasch, Buchel, Gais, and Born (2007) had participants learn card-
pair locations alongside a specific odour cue (e.g., roses). When participants 
entered SWS the odour was presented again and in subsequent recall task 
participants recalled significantly more card-pair locations, with fMRI confirming 
hippocampal reactivation during odour exposure and more interestingly, actually 
increased hippocampal activation compared to wake. Ensuing studies have 
demonstrated this isn’t limited to just odour cues, with Rudoy, Voss, Westerberg, 
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and Paller (2009) demonstrating that sounds can also benefit hippocampal 
reactivation in SWS. 
As discussed in the previous sections, promotion of a conceptual-schema 
driven process can also lead to false memories. Within the sleep literature there is 
a growing consensus of the role of sleep in false memory generation. Using the 
DRM paradigm one of the first reported studies, that of Diekelmann, Landolt, Lahl, 
Born, and Wagner (2008) reported false memory generation as a result of sleep 
deprivation. Within a series of experiments participants were exposed to a series 
of DRM wordlists and were either sleep deprived, sleep through the night, or had 
an equivalent period of wake then completed a recognition task on seen words 
(old), unseen words (new), or unseen but related words (critical lure). There was 
no significant difference between the sleep or day-wake group, suggesting no role 
of sleep in the consolidation of false memories, but those in the sleep deprivation 
group recognised significantly more critical lures than either group. The lack of a 
sleep effect in generation of false memories was repeated by Fenn et al. (2009) 
who utilising the same methodology demonstrated that sleep reduced false 
recognition of lure words, extending the results that sleep is beneficial to episodic 
memory. The growing literature that sleep has no or a reducing effect on false 
memories was contradicted by Payne et al. (2009). Within their study participants 
were exposed to DRM lists just like Diekelmann et al. and Fenn et al. but memory 
was measured by recall instead of recognition. When measured by recall sleep 
was found to increase false memory generation compared to an equivalent period 
of wake, with the results also replicated in a nap study. Moreover, Payne et al. 
were able to link false memory generation to sleep architecture; within both the 
overnight and nap paradigms SWS was significantly negatively correlated with 
recall accuracy, r = -0.60 and r = -0.54 respectively. As with other studies, the 
false memory generation during sleep does appear to suggest that conceptual 
knowledge is promoted during sleep. Although the exact mechanisms are unclear 
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there are models that seek to explain it. The following sections will explore these 
models further. 
 
Memory Triage Model of Sleep-based Consolidation 
Within the literature there are multiple models for conceptual-schema 
based consolidation. One such theory is that of Stickgold and Walker’s (2013) 
Memory Triage model. Underlying the model is that memory consolidation is not 
universal, instead memories are filtered for which will be retained and in what 
form to be consolidated. There is some evidence for the former; emotional 
memory has been demonstrated to undergo preferential preservation during REM 
sleep (Hu, Stylos-Allan, & Walker, 2006; Atienza & Cantero, 2008; Nishida, 
Pearsall, Buckner, & Walker, 2009; Wagner, Gais, & Born, 2001; Wilhelm, 
Diekelmann, & Born, 2008) while others have demonstrated sleep can selectively 
consolidate memory based on a potential reward upon waking, even after only 
being told of a future reward after learning (Fischer & Born, 2009), suggesting we 
can engage in selective preservation. Following on from memory discrimination 
items can be consolidated in two possible ways, item integration or multi-item 
generalisation. Within item integration the newly learned representation can be 
consolidated into pre-existing schema, with the schema’s rules expanding upon 
integration. Example of this form of consolidation can be seen in the work of 
Dumay and Gaskell (2012) and Tamminen et al. (2010) in the cathedruke-
cathedral paradigm. To recap these studies, participants learned a novel word 
similar to an existing vocabulary item and after sleep there was evidence of the 
novel word becoming integrated into the existing vocabulary store. Similarly, the 
results of Sio et al. (2013) can be explained by this concept. Item integration of 
the remote-associate tasks into existing categorical networks prompted new 
associations to form, resulting in a subsequent increase in performance. The 
second form of consolidation, the multi-item generalisation can also account for 
the previously discussed studies. Gomez et al.’s (2006) observation that 15-
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month-old infants were able to engage in abstraction and rule extraction support 
the concept of sleep actively creating cognitive schemata based on new 
information, as does Ellenbogen et al.’s (2007) observation of sleep aiding 
relational memory. 
 
iOtA model of Sleep-based consolidation 
However, an issue with Stickgold and Walker’s (2013) model is that 
although it can account for much of the observed effects of sleep, the functions 
provided are not strictly limited to sleep, and as such it raises questions as to its 
suitability for explaining sleep based associative consolidation. An alternate theory 
is promoted by Lewis and Durrant (2011). Within their model, the information 
Overlap to Abstract (iOtA), abstraction of rules can be explained through repeated 
reactivation of memories and their influence on existing schemata. As previously 
mentioned, there is recent literature suggesting that hippocampal-neocortical 
transfer occurs faster in cases where the encoded representation is compatible 
with existing schemas (Tse et al., 2007; van Kersteren et al., 2010a, 2010b). 
Building upon this and existing models of consolidation such as the CLS (Squire, 
1992; McClelland et al., 1995; Winocur et al., 2010), Lewis and Durrant suggest 
that in initial consolidation all connections between memories are activated but 
during sleep as repeated reactivation of hippocampal representation occurs, 
connections between common features/themes will become stronger than the 
single unified memory. With each repeated reactivation during SWS, the 
overlapping features are ‘primed’ for the following reactivation, resulting in a 
strongly consolidated gist based representation that encapsulates common 
features of multiple memories. While this has a clear advantageous effect, 
benefitting abstraction of information and building cognitive schemata, it does 
explain the recent literature that suggests promotion of gist based consolidation 
during sleep may lead to subsequent false memory errors during retrieval 
(Pardilla-Delgado & Payne, 2017; Payne et al., 2009).  
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1.4.4 Role of Pre-Existing Conceptual Knowledge in Sleep 
 Recently, an exciting strand of literature has sought to examine the role of 
pre-existing conceptual knowledge and how sleep may affect consolidation of 
related material. Much of this stems from the work of van Kesteren and 
colleagues van Kesteren, Rijpkema, Ruiter, & Fernández, 2010; van Kesteren et 
al., 2013; van Kesteren, Fernández, et al., 2010) and the development of the 
Schema-Linked Interactions between Medial prefrontal and Medial Temporal 
regions (SLIMM) model, which proposes that when information is perceived as 
congruent to an existing schema, a mutual-reinforcement activity occurs across 
the cortical network associated with the schema. Related to sleep, van Kesteren 
et al. (2010) presented participants with incongruent and congruent item-
background pairs and observed that sleep preferentially consolidated information 
that was congruent with preexisting schema. Within audio stimuli, Durrant, 
Cairney, McDemott, and Lewis (2015) required participants to learn a series of 
melodies, half of which conformed to a tonal schema, and half of which did not. 
After a 24h consolidation period participants were presented with more melodies, 
before completing a recognition test where melodies from both sessions were 
presented alongside unheard foils. Durrant et al. (2015) observed that 
participants remembered the schema-conformant melodies better than non-
conformant melodies, suggesting that over a 24h consolidation period schema-
consistent items are preferentially consolidated; moreover, analysis of the 
participants data revealed a correlation between consolidation and REM sleep, 
adding to previous literature that favours a link to SWS. Within a linguistic 
domain, the aforementioned Tamminen et al. (2010, 2013) studies provided 
evidence that during sleep information can become integrated into existing 
knowledge structure, with sleep spindles in particular linked to consolidation. 
Building upon this, Hennies et al. (2016) sought to explicitly link sleep 
architecture to consolidation within pre-existing conceptual knowledge. Within the 
study participants were trained on a schema over the span of 2 weeks in order to 
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establish a schema. Once a schema had been established participants encoded 
new facts that were either schema-related or schema-unrelated. After a 24h delay 
containing a period of sleep monitored with polysomnography participants 
encoded a second set of facts with a 2AFC task on all 144 facts occurring shortly 
after. Hennies and colleagues observed that spindle density predicted an increase 
in schema benefit to memory over the retention interval, with the higher spindle 
densities associated with reduced decay of schema-related memories. These 
studies provide evidence that sleep is associated with the interaction between 
pre-existing conceptual knowledge and long-term memory formation.  
 
1.5 Overview and Objectives of the Thesis 
Throughout the thesis the aim is to understand the role of sleep in 
complex, multi-item episodic memory. More specifically, I seek to expand on the 
literature that suggests the hippocampus is a ‘convergence zone’, acting as a site 
where bound representations (multiple items stored as one representation, e.g., a 
representation of a classroom features many items) can be formed (for a 
summary, see Horner & Doeller, 2017) and how conceptual knowledge and sleep 
may interact in this. In the previous literature, most of the investigations into this 
are primarily through associative cues, participants learn an associative pairing or 
a complex-multi-item event (called bound representations in subsequent 
chapters) then in subsequent recognition or recall tasks part of the learned 
association is presented and successful retrieval of the other half suggests a 
bound representation. Within the thesis I seek to extend this to specific bound 
representations when presented in a two-alternative-forced-choice task. Within 
this form of recognition paradigm it requires a stronger bound representation as 
participants are presented with both the target bound representation and an 
alternative foil that may contain similar/competing items with recognition 
requiring the specific pairing.  
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First, as the previous literature has focused primarily on testing and 
developing theories from a mono-cultural (Western) sample, as a validation of 
previous research (e.g., Urgolites & Wood, 2013b), Experiment 1a focused on the role 
of culture in associative memories to see if issues related to bound representations in 
visual long-term memory is a cross-cultural effect and not specific to Western 
participants, Experiment 1b sought to determine whether effects were due to 
familiarity or due to differences in binding, and Experiment 2 utilised different stimuli 
(object-scene and action-scene) to ensure any observed effects were not unique to 
one form of stimuli .  
Within Chapter 3, the role of sleep is examined in bound representations within 
visual long-term memory. Participants in either a sleep (9pm-9am) or wake (9am-
9pm) group were tested on their ability to recognise specific action-scene and object-
scene composites. Alongside this study separate control studies were conducted with 
the same stimuli in order to ensure no confounding effects of circadian rhythm. In 
Chapter 4, as some literature has suggested that context can aid retrieval of visual 
information (e.g., Kersten, 1988), sleep’s role in visual long-term memory was 
investigated in a contextualised setting; instead of using unrelated action-scene or 
object-scene composites CCTV videos of crimes were displayed and retrieval for the 
different item modalities measured in a recall task in order to see if pre-existing 
conceptual schema promoted any item modality over another. Chapter 5 shifts stimuli 
to that of DRM wordlists, previously demonstrated to promote false memories. Within 
the study, participants were presented with several DRM wordlists and then were 
either awake or had a nap (90 mins) that used polysomnography to record sleep 
stages and sleep spindles. Within the recognition task participants were presented 
with old, new, and critical lure words from the DRM lists to either hemisphere in order 
to account for existing hemispheric semantic networks (Beeman, 1998; Beeman & 
Bowden, 2000). Finally, in Chapter 6 the main results and themes of the experiments 
are discussed within the wider literature, where future studies can go, and 
methodological issues that occurred.  
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Chapter 2.  Impact of Culture in the Relaional Binding of Actions, Objects, 
and Scenes in Visual Long-Term Memory 
 
Before examining the role of sleep of associative memory in the VLTM there is an 
important methodological point that was noted during the literature review.  The 
past literature on the VLTM has demonstrated that humans have a remarkable 
capacity for visual items, with studies demonstrating that in recognition tasks 
participants can recognise objects, scenes, and actions, even when over 2500+ 
images have been presented.  Moreover, these aren’t low fidelity representations, 
with studies with multiple category level exemplars replicating this effect, 
suggesting the VLTM is capable of storing a large quantity of high-fidelity visual 
representations.  However, recent literature in cross-cultural psychology has 
suggested differences in perceptual processing between East Asian cultures and 
Western cultures, the latter of which the VLTM literature is focused on.  These 
differences can manifest as early perceptual differences as well as differences in 
recall and recognition.  As universities are a now a lot more international, it is 
important to explore in any potential effect of culture in order to account for any 
potential confound in subsequent studies.   
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The degree of individualism or collectivism in a culture has observable 
effects on cognitive processing.  Participants from collectivist cultures are less 
able to identify a previously displayed object when presented with a novel 
background than participants from individualist cultures. This can be interpreted 
as collectivist cultures more likely to process information field dependently.  We 
tested explicitly whether collectivist or individualist cultures are more likely to 
bind foreground and background images and whether such binding is differentially 
affected for object-scene and action-scene combinations.  Across three 
experiments participants viewed item-context composites, then completed a 
forced-choice recognition task.  In Experiment 1, 61 UK and 57 Malaysian 
participants viewed object-scene composites, with UK participants significantly 
more accurate in correct composite recognition, with Experiment 2  
demonstrating this difference was not due to cultural differences in object 
familiarity.  In Experiment 3,  62 UK and 67 Malaysian participants viewed action-
scene composites, with no significant difference between cultures in proportion of 
items recognised.   The results of Experiment 1 suggest that the UK sample were 
able to store high-fidelity representations of visual features as an association 
between item and context, while the Malaysian sample were unable to. This result 
is discussed in relation to both cultural, and cognitive psychology. 
Keywords 
Culture, Visual Long-Term Memory, Binding Memory, Item-Context Recognition 
Highlights 
• Western participants are more accurate in recognition of specific object-
scene bound representations 
• Across both cultures bound representations that only altered the 
background were significantly more likely to be recognized than bound 
representations that only changed foreground, or both elements 
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1.  Introduction 
 In the field of culture, a large number of studies have suggested there are 
differences between Western and East Asian cultures. Westerners are thought to 
engage in analytical processing, focusing on salient objects, while East Asian 
cultures engage in holistic processing, focusing on processing scenes within 
context. This difference has been suggested to be due to Western cultures 
typically being more individualist while East Asian cultures are typically more 
collectivist (Gutchess et al., 2006, Masuda & Nisbett, 2001; Na et al., 2010; 
Nisbett; 2003; Nisbett & Masuda, 2003).  Within these studies, American and 
Japanese participants view a focal object in a scene (e.g., fish in a pond), and 
after a delay recognition of the focal objects are tested with visual scenes 
manipulated so that old objects may be presented in an old or new background, 
or a new object may be presented in an old or new background, with participants 
completing a Yes/No (YN) recognition task on the focal object (Chua, Boland, & 
Nisbett, 2005; Masuda & Nisbett, 2001).  In a seminal paper, Masuda and Nisbett 
(2001) reported that Japanese participants were more likely to describe 
previously seen video clips contextually than American participants who focused 
more on foreground details.  Likewise, in speeded recognition tasks Japanese 
participants were more accurate when the target object is presented in the same 
training context whereas American participants were unaffected by the contextual 
manipulations but were overall slower than East Asian participants when 
identifying the focal object in all conditions. This difference based upon culture 
was suggested to be evidence of decontextualisation (analytical processing) in 
American participants and binding (holistic processing) in Japanese participants; 
Americans were slower due to processing the object and background separately, 
whilst Japanese participants were quicker due to the holistic binding, but at the 
cost of reduced accuracy when the context changed.  Follow up studies ultilising a 
change-blindness paradigm (where participants are required to identify changes 
in either foreground or background) also observed that East Asian participants 
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were much more attentive to contextual changes while American participants 
were more attentive to focal object changes (Masuda & Nisbett, 2006).  This is 
further expanded upon in the culture-based attentional bias theory that suggests 
that Americans are better than East Asians at detecting changes in the centre of 
the screen, suggesting that East Asians allocate their attention more broadly 
(Boduroglu et al., 2009).  Within the theory, there is some evidence that culture 
influences early attention (Chua et al., 2005; Goh et al., 2009; Ji et al., 2000; 
Kitayama et al., 2003) with American participants looking at central objects 
sooner and longer than East Asian participants, who made more saccades to the 
background, suggesting East Asians allocate attention more broadly than 
Westerners.  This results in greater detection in changes to contextual stimuli but 
at the expense of reduced reaction time for changes in focal objects, supporting 
the interference effect of novel backgrounds in Masuda and Nisbett’s (2001) study 
although this has been disputed in some eye-tracking studies that have found no 
effect on culture on saccades (Evans et al., 2009; Rayner et al., 2007).   
 Although these studies have demonstrated cultural differences in visual 
recognition, much of the focus has been on how context can affect recognition of 
a focal object, with little research on the recognition of the context itself.  At 
present only one study has looked at this: Millar et al.  (2013) investigated the 
influence on culture on separate foreground and background recognition.  In their 
first experiment, participants were shown objects or backgrounds and in a 
subsequent recognition task were shown the original image, a similar image, or a 
new, foil image.  In a second experiment, the object and background were shown 
in a composite image before a recognition task displayed the items separately, 
with recognition scored as either specific- (seen for old items, not seen for 
similar), or general- memory (seen for old items and similar items.  It was 
observed that Americans exhibited greater accuracy in specific memory compared 
to East Asians, while both cultures performed similar on measures of general 
memory, with this pattern observed across both object and background 
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recognition.  From this, Millar et al.  suggested that Western culture’s analytical 
focus means individuals are more likely to study specific details of focal objects, 
whilst East Asian cultures, by focusing on the holistic image, miss these specific 
details but have a general recognition similar to Western participants.  The result 
appears consistent with the visual long-term memory literature that has largely 
focused on Western participants, with recent research on image recognition 
demonstrating humans have a remarkable ability to recognise visual items, with 
scene (Konkle, Brady, Alvarez, & Oliva, 2010), object (Brady, Konkle, Alvarez, & 
Oliva, 2008), and action (Urgolites & Wood, 2013a) recognition observed to 
accuracy levels above 80%, suggesting that we are able to store high-fidelity 
representations of previously seen stimuli. 
However, when expanded to specific item-context composite memory, 
where an action- or object- scene composite image is displayed and participants 
have to recognise that specific pairing (e.g., a man performing a twist in front of a 
harbour), proportion of items correctly recognised in Western participants drops 
significantly in two alternative forced-choice (2AFC) tasks to close to chance 
(Urgolites & Wood, 2013b).  The result is more surprising as with the same 
composite stimuli, participants are able to recognise an individual element of the 
composite close to previously reported accuracy levels, again supporting Millar et 
al.  (2013).  These results suggest that while Western participants are capable of 
binding visual stimuli together, this process is difficult and prone to errors in spite 
of participants having a detailed memory of the individual elements.   
 The result can be interpreted within theories of recognition, for example, 
dual process theory of recognition memory assumes recognition can be split into 
two facets, familiarity and recollection, analogous to the general- and specific- 
memory split suggested by Millar et al (2013).  Familiarity is considered an 
automatic process that allows recognition but no retrieval of specific detail, while 
recollection requires a conscious effort of specific details related to the encoding 
episode, requiring a longer processing time, with both suggested to rely upon 
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different memory traces (for a summary, see Yonelinas, 2002, 2010; Zimmer et 
al., 2006).  Familiarity is suggested to rely on an object ‘token’; information about 
the object such as colour, size, and shape, while recollection requires an episodic 
token, integrating the object-token with additional contextual information, 
allowing the ‘where, when, how’ questions to be answered (for a summary, see  
Ecker et al., 2004).  When applied to the results observed in the culture 
literature, it appears that Western participants employ recollection, as 
demonstrated in Millar et al.  and this theory can be interpreted as a potential 
explanation for the longer reaction time in Masuda and Nisbett (2001).  East Asian 
cultures that rely on familiarity based recognition due to holistic processing would 
typically be quicker in their reaction times, but less accurate on specific 
recognition tasks, again as seen in Masuda & Nisbett.   
 Although this is a suitable explanation for the item- or context- 
recognition, it is unable to account for the accuracy in specific item-context 
composite recognition.  One theory, suggested by Chalfonte and Johnson (1996) 
suggest there are at least two ways that feature binding may be expressed.  
Features may be independently represented, but associated or features may form 
a blended representation, distinct from the two features separately (Chalfonte & 
Johnson, 1996; Graf & Schacter, 1989).  When applied to culture-based visual 
recognition, it appears that Western participants employ this independent but 
associated representation, as demonstrated by the existing literature, while East 
Asian cultures rely on blended representation, with this distinction supported by 
the existing cultural literature (Gutchess et al., 2006, Na et al., 2010; Nisbett; 
2003; Nisbett & Masuda, 2003; Masuda & Nisbett, 2001), although it has not 
been explicitly tested in a specific composite memory task.  As such, within the 
current study, we sought to examine whether there is a significant cultural 
difference between Western (UK) and East Asian (Malaysian) participants in 
recognition of specific item-context composite videos that can relate to this 
proposed difference in feature binding. 
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 In order to ensure it was only specific item-context composite memory 
being tested, recognition was measured by a 2AFC task rather than a YN 
recognition task.  While previous studies utilized a YN recognition paradigm (Chua 
et al., 2005; Evans et al., 2009; Masuda & Nisbett, 2001; Millar et al., 2013; 
Rayner et al., 2007), when the YN task is compared to 2AFC recognition tasks, 
performance on 2AFC is reliably better due to its performance being determined 
by the proportion of correctly identified items, minimizing false alarm rates from 
noise trials observed in the YN recognition task (Jiang, Wixted, & Huber, 2009).  
Furthermore, the same study observed a difference between Forced-Choice 
Corresponding (FC-C) and Forced-Choice Non-Corresponding (FC-NC).  FC-C 
involves the target item being paired with a similar foil in order to generate 
similar levels of familiarity but stronger in the target item.   As such, the 
familiarity may initially generate a high number of false alarms but recognition of 
the specific composite image should lead to a reliable difference throughout 
testing (Jiang et al., 2009).  As such, the current study used a 2AFC paradigm 
with three types of foil, two FC-C and one FC-NC, with all visual components 
taken from previously existing stimuli but in novel composites in order to ensure 
it was specific binding memory that was being tested.   
 In accordance with Chalfonte and Johnson’s (1996) feature binding theory, 
we hypothesized that the Western participants would more accurately recognize 
specific object-scene composites compared to the East Asian participants due to 
Westerner’s analytical processing supporting associated, high-fidelity visual 
representations compared to the East Asian’s holistic processing supporting 
reduced fidelity, blended visual representations, making recognition more 
susceptible to the FC-C foils.  In order to minimize any cultural effects of visual 
novelty, such as those demonstrated in Goh et al.  (2009), The foils used in the 
testing phased contained stimuli already seen in the training phase but in new 
pairings to avoid novel visual information.  Whereas previous studies have focused 
upon a largely Chinese/Japanese based participant group, this study has focused 
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upon Malaysia, due to Malaysia being an Asian culture but using a Latin-based 
language as well as a high English speaking population.  This population should 
account for de-confounding any potential effects a pictographic-based language, 
such as Chinese/Japanese may have upon complex image recognition, as previously 
suggested by Kühnen et al.  (2001). 
 
 
2.1 Experiment 1: Object-Scene Composite Recognition 
2.1.1 Method 
2.1.1.1 Participants 
 A total of 131 participants took part in the study (61 Western, 57 East 
Asian and 13 Other; pilot study data indicated that Russian participants did not 
identify as either Western or Eastern, see Table 2.1).  Western participants were 
students from Lancaster University completing the task for course credit.  East 
Asian and Other participants were recruited from Sunway University using an 
opportunity sampling method.  All students who attended Sunway University 
required an English language requirement to IELTS minimum band 5.5, defined as 
a modest English Language User 
(https://onlineapplication.sunway.edu.my/?m=link&c=entry_requirement).  The 
experimenters comprised English, Mandarin and Malay speakers in order to 
ensure participants fully comprehended the study.  Participants gave informed 
consent and were reminded they were free to withdraw from the study at any 
time.  Due to data protection issues at Sunway University, age and gender was 
not recorded for East Asian participants but for Western participants this data was 
recorded (38 Females, Mean age = 19.28, SE = 0.03).  Participants were fully 
debriefed and informed as to the study’s purpose after completion.  Sunway 
students identifying as Eastern cultures were asked whether they were 
born/raised in Malaysia.  If they were, they would then be asked about their 
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ethnicity.  If participants indicated they weren’t born in Malaysia they were 
considered East Asian Other. 
Table 2.1.  Table showing the total participants in each study by culture and 
ethnicity 






American 6 8 
European 47 39 
Slavic/Eastern European 1 6 
Western Other 8 8 
East Asian 
Cultures 
Malay 24 17 
Chinese/Chinese Malay 27 32 
Indian/Indian Malay 7 5 
East Asian Other 9 3 
Other 19 13 
Total 148 131 
 
 
2.1.1.2  Stimuli 
 The stimuli consisted of 40 animated objects and 40 images of scenes 
combined to create a unique object-scene composite.  The object-scene 
composites were taken from an unpublished paper by Urgolites and Wood 
(unpublished).  Each composite consisted of an object performing a 360° rotation 
for 1 second within one scene (see Figure 2.1) in the centre of the scene.  All of 
the objects had the same duration (1000 ms) and frame rate (30 frames per 








Figure 2.1 Image demonstrating the study and test phase of the object-
scene composite recognition task.  
 
 
2.1.1.3  Procedure 
 In the study phase participants viewed 40 object-scene composites in a 
randomised order.  Each trial started with a 1000 ms black screen followed by the 
object-scene composite for 1000 ms, where the object rotated once and after the 
object-scene composite had been displayed a second 1000 ms black screen was 
displayed.   
 In order to ensure participants were maintaining concentration during the 
study phase after each object-scene composite was displayed, participants 
performed a repeat-detection task where every 4th novel object-scene composite 
was repeated at intervals of zero, one, two, three or four trials between the initial 
presentation and the repeated composite.  After each object-scene composite was 
presented participants were instructed to indicate whether the previous scene had 
been displayed before with ‘Has this object-scene composite been presented 
before? Press Z for Old and M for New’ being displayed centrally and ‘Old’ 
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appearing in the left half of the screen and ‘New’ appearing in the right half of the 
screen, counterbalanced across participants.  Participants were able to respond to 
this without time pressure but were asked to respond quickly and accurately. 
 The test phase started 2 minutes after the initial training phase.  For each 
trial participants performed a two-alternative forced choice task.  Two object-
scene composites were presented on a screen: one previously seen ‘old’ 
composite and one new, foil composite.  Participants saw 40 test trials which 
began with a 1,000 ms black screen, a composite was presented on the left half 
of the screen for 1000 ms, an interval of 1000 ms with a black screen followed by 
a second composite presented on the right half of the screen for 1000 ms.  After 
this, a black screen was presented for 1000 ms, then participants were asked 
which composite had previously been displayed, pressing Q for the left composite 
and P for the right composite.  Both the old composite and the foil composite 
were only presented once for the full duration of the object’s rotation and were 
hidden immediately after the rotation had completed.  The side in which the old 
composite was displayed was counterbalanced so it appeared equally across both 
the left and right sides of the test phase.   
 Foils within the study were split into two categories, FC-C and FC-NC.  In 
the FC-C category, in Binding Condition (BC) A participants were presented with 
the old composite whilst the foil composite had the same scene but different 
object (DFSB).  In BC B the old composite was presented with a foil composite 
with the different scene but same object (SFDB).  For the FC-NC category, BC C 
had the old composite presented with a foil composite with a different scene and 
different object (DFDB).  All backgrounds and foregrounds were taken from 
stimuli seen in the training task, just in new pairings. 
 For all tasks participants were given verbal instructions before the 
experiment started and written instructions were provided on the screen before 





2.1.2 Results and Discussion 
 The dataset was initially filtered by proportion of items correctly identified 
in the training phase so that only results higher than 50% were included in the 
dataset as any data below that would be less than chance and indicates 
participants may not have fully understood the instructions.  This left 126 
participants (55 East Asian, 58 Western, 13 Other), further analysis found that 
the Other category lead to no significant difference and as such was removed 
from further analysis leaving 113 participants (55 East Asian, 58 Western).  
Analysis of ethnicity also led to no significant difference and as such there was no 
further analysis on this. 
Linear mixed effects (LME) modelling was conducted in order to allow us to 
account for random effects between item and participants.  In the analysis the 
model was initially fitted with a base model of participant number composite to 
measure random effects, Model AIC = -239.353. We then added the experimental 
conditions gradually over a series of models. Introducing Culture led to a 
significant difference compared to the previous model, χ2 = 6.2288, p = 0.012, 
Model AIC = -252.945, suggesting that culture had a significant impact on the 
ability to recognise object-scene composites.  Introducing Foreground/Background 
foils as a factor also increased the model fit, χ2 = 10.405, p = 0.005, Model AIC = 
-247.210, suggesting that Foreground/Background foils had a significant influence 
on recognition.  Adding in the interaction between Culture and Foil led to a better 
model fit but was only borderline significant, compared to the previous model, χ2 
= 5.0834, p = 0.078 (see Table 2.2 for full LME information, Figure 2.2 for visual 









Table 2.2. Summary of the Linear Mixed Effect Model for the Action-Scene 
Recognition Task. 
Fixed Effects Estimate Standard Error t value p value 
Intercept 0.822 0.048 17.028 p < 0.001 
Culture -0.082 0.031 -2.690 p = 0.007 
Type of Foil -0.149 0.068 -2.191 p = 0.029 
Culture * Type of 
Foil 
0.064 0.043 1.483 p = .139 














Figure 2.2.  Graph showing the average proportion of items correctly identified for 
each culture.  Bars indicate accuracy by type of foil, SFDB- Same Foreground 
Different Background; DFSB- Different Foreground Same Background; DFDB- 








The result appeared to support our initial hypotheses; holistic processing 
used by East Asian cultures reduces proportion of items correctly identified of 
specific object-scene composites compared to Western cultures that employ 
analytical processing.  Although there were differences based on foil type with 
SFDB significantly more accurate than other foil types, this was not found to 
interact with culture, suggesting this was an overall effect.  However, as previous 
studies have observed differences based upon stimuli type, with familiarity to 
stimuli affecting the results (Masuda & Nisbett, 2001, 2006), it was unclear if 
these results were due to a difference in culture or a difference in familiarity to 
the object stimuli.  In order to control for any cultural differences in familiarity to 
object stimuli, the following study examined exposure and familiarity to the target 
objects between East Asian and Western cultures. 
 
 2.2 Experiment 2: Cultural Familiarity of Object Stimuli 
2.2.1 Method 
2.2.1.1 Participants. 
 A total of 31 participants (15 East Asian, 16 Western) were recruited from 
Sunway University Psychology club and Lancaster University Psychology Society.  
Participants were given full information of the study before completing and were 
free to withdraw from the study at any time.   
 
2.2.1.2 Stimuli. 
 A total of 40 objects were taken from experiment 1.  Objects had the 
background removed so participants could only focus on the object.  Static 
objects were presented in the centre of the screen with no time restriction.   
2.2.1.3 Procedure. 
 Participants completed this study online and were free to do so without 
experimenter supervision.  Like the previous experiments, before starting 
14 
 
participants supplied some cultural/ethnicity information.  Participants were given 
the choice between classifying themselves as Western, East Asian or Other.  As 
this questionnaire was more interested in cultural familiarity rather than ethnicity, 
no questions were asked about ethnicity.  Participants then saw an object and had 
to indicate whether they had seen the object before (Yes/No) and how familiar 
the object was on a 6-point Likert Scale, from Extremely Familiar (1) to Not 
Familiar at all (6). 
2.2.2 Results and Discussion 
 The proportion of familiar objects and average familiarity rating were 
calculated for each culture (see Table 2.3).  A between-subjects ANOVA with 
Culture as the independent variable and mean proportion recognised and average 
familiarity rating as dependent variables.  There was no significant difference 
between cultures in proportion recognised, F <1, or average familiarity ratings, F 
<1.  The result suggested that there was no difference in object exposure based 
upon culture, thus the results of experiment 1 were legitimate and that there was 
a significant cultural difference in specific object-scene composite recognition.   
 
Table 2.3.   Table showing mean proportion of objects recognised and average 
familiarity rating by culture. 




East Asian 0.975 (0.025) 1.598 (0.058) 
Western 0.981 (0.006) 1.583 (0.059) 
 
 
2.3 Experiment 3 Action-Scene Composite Recognition 
 In the previous study it was demonstrated that Western cultures were 
significantly more accurate than East Asian cultures in proportion of items 
correctly identified of specific object-scene composites.  Within the current 
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experiment, we sought to extend this result by changing the stimuli to action-
scene composites, as used by Urgolites & Wood (2013b).  Within their study, they 
observed that proportion of items correctly identified was only just above chance 
levels, averaging 56%.  As the study used an American sample, it was unclear if 
the accuracy level was due to the type of visual processing or due to the 
complexity of the stimuli.  Our first hypothesis was Western participants would 
replicate the results of Urgolites & Wood (2013b); proportion of items correctly 
identified would be significantly above chance, albeit only slightly.  Our second 
hypothesis was that based upon the results of experiment 1a, there would be no 
significant difference between Western and East Asian cultures for specific action-




 Before the experiment started participants indicated some cultural/ethni-  
city information.  Participants were given the choice between classifying 
themselves as Western, East Asian, or Other (pilot study data indicated that 
Russian participants did not identify as either Western or East Asian).  For those 
that Identified as Western, they were then given the option to identify themselves 
as American, European, Slavic, or Western Other.  Those identifying as Eastern 
were given the option as identifying as Malay, Chinese/Chinese Malay, 
Indian/Indian Malay, or East Asian Other.   
 A total of 148 participants took part in the study (62 Western, 67 East 
Asian and 19 Other, see Table 2.4).  Western participants were students from 
Lancaster University who were set to conduct the research at Sunway University 
and undergraduate psychology students completing the task for a course credit.  
Participants completed the study before travelling and had no prior knowledge as 
to what the study consisted of so as to prevent demand characteristics but were 
fully informed as to the study’s purpose both after completing the study and 
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before administering the test at Sunway University.  East Asian and Other 
participants were recruited from Sunway University using an opportunity sampling 
method.  All students who attend Sunway University require an English language 
requirement to IELTS minimum band 5.5, defined as a modest English Language 
User fully detailed on the website.  To mitigate any confound of lack of 
comprehension within the research team, two research assistants were fluent in 
Mandarin and one in Malay speakers in order to ensure participants fully 
comprehended the instructions.  Participants gave informed consent and were 
reminded they were free to withdraw from the study at any time.  Due to data 
protection issues at Sunway University, age and gender was not recorded but this 
information were obtained from the Western sample, (33 Females, Mean age = 
18.97, SE = 0.14), however research from a secondary study has indicated no 
gender or age differences (Shaw, Monaghan, & Urgolites, in draft).   Sunway 
students identifying as East Asian cultures were asked whether they were 
born/raised in Malaysia.  If they were, they were then asked about their ethnicity.  
If they indicated they weren’t born in Malaysia, they were considered East Asian 
Other.  Participants were fully debriefed and informed as to the study’s purpose 
after completing the study. 
 
Table 2.4.  Table showing total participants in each study by culture and ethnicity. 






American 6 8 
European 47 39 
Slavic/Eastern European 1 6 
Western Other 8 8 
East Asian 
Cultures 
Malay 24 17 
Chinese/Chinese Malay 27 32 
Indian/Indian Malay 7 5 
East Asian Other 9 3 
Other 19 13 








 The stimuli consisted of 40 animated actions and 40 images of scenes 
combined to create an action/scene composite.  The actions were taken from a 
previous paper that had examined fidelity of actions in VLTM by Urgolites and 
Wood (2013a) whilst the scenes were taken from a study examining the fidelity of 
scene representations in VLTM by Konkle et al. (2010).  The combined composites 
were taken from a previous study by Urgolites and Wood (2013b).  Each 
composite consisted of an action being performed for 1000 ms within one scene 
(see Figure 2.3).  The actions appeared in the centre of the scene.  All of the 
actions had the same duration (1000 ms) and frame rate (30 frames per second) 
with each action reaching its maximum deviation from the neutral standing 
position at the 15th frame.   The action stimuli included jumps, turns, bends and 
crouches.  The stimuli set included mountains, beaches, oceans, forests and 
cities.  The study was created on Psychopy 1.83.05 (Peirce, 2009) 
2.3.1.3 Procedure. 
 Procedure for this study was the same as the experiment 1 (See figure 
2.3). 
 
Figure 2.3 Image demonstrating the study and test phase of the action-scene 




2.3.2 Results and Discussion The dataset was initially filtered by proportion 
of items correctly identified in the training phase so that only results higher than 
50% were included in the dataset as any data below that would be less than 
chance and indicates participants may not have fully understood the instructions.  
This left 145 participants, (65 East Asian, 61 western, 19 other, accuracy M = 
97.6%, SE = 0.05).  Further analysis found that the Other category lead to no 
significant difference and as such was removed from further analysis leading 126 
participants to be analysed.  Analysis of ethnicity also led to no significant 
difference and as such there was no further analysis. 
 Linear mixed effects (LME) modelling was conducted in order to allow us to 
account for random effects between item and participants.  In the analysis, we 
used a series of models 
Model 1.  A model with just random effects (Participant ID and action-
scene pairing) 
Model 2.  A model introducing Culture as a factor 
Model 3. A model introducing Culture and Foils as factors 
Model 4.  A model introducing Culture and Foils as factors along with 
the corresponding interaction. 
 We found that each increment in complexity did not differ significantly 
from the previous model, comparing Model 1 and 2 χ2 = 1.0014, p = 0.317; 
comparing Model 2 and 3, χ2 = 1.918, p = 0.5895, comparing Models 3 and 4, χ2 
= 2.7883, p = 0.248.    The results suggested that culture and foil did not 
significantly affect proportion of items correctly identified of action-scene 
composites.  Although different from the results of experiment 1, the result was 
consistent with previous literature on specific recognition of action-scene 
composites (Urgolites & Wood, 2013b), suggesting that the reduced proportion of 
items correctly identified for action-scene composites was not unique to Western 
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culture, but is generally more difficult than recognition of object-scene 
composites.  
 
Table 2.5. Summary of the Linear Mixed Effect Model for the Action-Scene 
Recognition Task. 
Fixed Effects Estimate  Standard Error t value p value 
Intercept 0.569 0.016 34.303 p < 0.001 
Culture 0.006 0.023 - 1.915 p = 0.056 
Type of Foil -0.035 0.023 -1.503 p = 0.133 
Culture * Type of 
Foil 
0.042 0.032 1.299 p = 0.194 
 AIC= -437.016 BIC = -433.097 LogLik = -439.016 
 
 
Table 2.6.  Table showing the average proportion of items correctly recognised for 
Western and East Asian cultures split by Task and foil type.  SE in parentheses. 
 Action-Scene Task Object Scene Task 














































Figure 2.5.  Graph showing the average accuracy for each culture.  Bars indicate 
accuracy by type of foil, SFDB- Same Foreground Different Background; DFSB- 
Different Foreground Same Background; DFDB- Different Foreground, Different 
Background.  Errors Bars are ± 1SEM. 
 
 
3.  General Discussion 
 Within the current study we sought to extend the previous literature that 
has demonstrated cultural differences between East Asian and Western cultures in 
separate item (Chua et al., 2005; Masuda & Nisbett, 2001), and context (Millar et 
al., 2013) recognition to see if this would also apply to specific item-context 
composites.  In Experiment 1, there was a significant difference in specific object-
scene composite recognition based on culture; UK participants were significantly 
more accurate than Malaysian participants.  Experiment 2 revealed that this 
Mean Proportion of Composites Recognised 
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difference was not due to cultural differences in object familiarity.  When 
extended to action-scene composite recognition, the result of Experiment 3 
replicated the results previously observed by Urgolites & Wood (2013b) that 
action-scene composite recognition is above chance, albeit only slightly, in a UK 
sample, but also demonstrated the same effect in a Malaysian sample, suggesting 
that culture is not a significant factor in difficulties associated with action-scene 
composite recognition.   
 The question then becomes why are Western cultures more accurate in 
recognising specific object-scene composites compared to East Asian cultures, 
and why this effect seems specific to object-scene and not action-scene? The 
latter may be more easily explained; One explanation is the differences in 
complexity of the foreground stimuli and processing it in the time frame given.  
Within all experiments reported, participants saw the action-scene/object-scene 
pairs for 1000 ms.  Whilst object recognition is fast, with brain responses 
associated with visual discrimination of objects occurring around 150ms (Allison, 
Puce, Spencer, & McCarthy, 1999; Thorpe, Fize, & Marlot, 1996), action 
recognition within the current study is not possible until 500ms (where the action 
reaches maximum deviation from the neutral standing position, making what 
action it is clearest), leaving less time to process the background information, 
thereby potentially reducing the fidelity any bound representation.  As 
participants only had 1000 ms to process all this information, it could be that any 
potential cultural differences in the action-scene task did not have enough time to 
manifest.  In Urgolites & Wood’s (2013b) study there was a small but significant 
increase in accuracy when the action was repeated three times against the same 
background.  While this was not conducted here, it would be interesting to see if 
any cultural effects could be replicated if there was more exposure to the focal 
foreground item.  In addition to this, differences in encoding requirements could 
be linked to this difference; object-scene composites only require encoding over 
space, whereas for actions, long-term memory must encode dynamic information 
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distributed over space and time, thus any bound representation may be more 
fragile. 
 For the former, it may be that the cultural differences in visual processing 
also lead to cultural differences in visual binding.  One theory suggested by 
Chalfonte and Johnson (1996) suggests there are at least two ways that feature 
binding may be expressed.  Features may be independently represented but 
associated or features may form a blended representation, distinct from 
processing the two features separately (Chalfonte & Johnson, 1996; Graf & 
Schacter, 1989).  When applied to the results of Experiment 1, it appears that 
Western participants employ this independent but associated representation; 
analytical processing ensures high-fidelity representations of the visual features 
are encoded and the association between the elements is maintained, consistent 
with existing literature (Millar et al., 2013; Urgolites & Wood, 2013b).  In 
contrast, East Asian participants that engage in holistic processing, encoding the 
entire visual scene as one contextualized representation, result in a blended 
representation with reduced visual fidelity of each feature, making it difficult to 
correctly recognize specific composites.  This explanation would also appear 
consistent with the previous literature as to why East Asian participants respond 
quicker than Western participants but are also typically less accurate in 
recognition tasks (Masuda & Nisbett, 2001); by having a blended representation 
of the entire visual scene it allows judgement based on familiarity but the reduced 
fidelity makes the judgement more prone to errors.  In contrast, having 
independent but associated high-fidelity representations would allow a more 
accurate recognition judgement but at the expense of a longer reaction time, as 
seen in Masuda and Nisbett (2001). 
 Alternatively, the observed cultural difference may be due to issues 
regarding visual incongruity.  Memory for scene items has previously been 
demonstrated to be diminished when object-background pairs are semantically 
incongruent due to required interactive processing of object and background 
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 (Davenport & Potter, 2004). Jenkins et al.  (2010) demonstrated in an 
fMRI study that Chinese participants demonstrated a heightened response to 
semantically incongruent scenes compared to American participants.  The style of 
the composites, with the object rotating above the visual scene, it may have 
facilitated the object-based analysis favoured by Western cultures (Jenkins et al., 
2010).  Further studies could attempt to address this by measuring recognition of 
specific item-background photographs. 
 A second consideration for future studies could be extending the East 
Asian sample to multiple countries.  The current study, for design reasons, was 
primarily focused upon a Malaysian sample.  As Malay is a latin-based language, it 
was chosen in order to account for any potential confounds a pictographic 
language may have in visual memory, with previous studies highlighting this 
importance (Kühnen et al., 2001).  As a result, it may be that this sample is not 
wholly representative of the larger East Asian culture, such as Chinese, Japanese, 
or Korean cultures that use a pictographic language.  As such, further studies may 
want to focus on these cultures in order to see if the effect can be replicated.  It 
may be the case that cultures with a pictographic language may be able to 
process the intricate details of an item-context scene better, due to having to 
identify the various specific differences between language characters (Kühnen et 
al., 2001). 
  In summary, within the current study we have empirically demonstrated 
that previously suggested cultural differences in visual processing can extend to 
feature binding.  By processing scenes analytically, Western cultures are able to 
store high-fidelity representations of visual features and maintain an association 
between them.  In contrast, holistic processing creates a blended representation, 
a reduced fidelity representation of the whole visual image that allows general 
familiarity, but reduced specific recognition.  This difference appears to be limited 
to object-scene composites with no cultural difference observed for action-scene 
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Chapter 3.  The impact of Sleep on relational binding of actions, objects, 
and scenes in visual long-term memory 
 In the previous chapter we sought to expand on the previous literature 
that has demonstrated that relational binding in the VLTM is particularly difficult.  
Within the study it was demonstrated that while the object-scene composite 
recognition was significantly affected by culture, with Western participants more 
accurate than East Asian participants, performance on the action-scene composite 
recognition task was consistent across both cultures, averaging close to chance 
levels.   
 With this established, the thesis moved onto one of the main aims, to 
understand the role that sleep may have on consolidation of these action-
scene/object scene composites.  Previous literature has demonstrated that sleep 
can have a consolidating role on associative memory, but most of this is in the 
form of associative pairs, with one item cueing another.  In order to explore high-
fidelity representations, the following study uses the same methodology as the 
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 Previous research has demonstrated that visual long-term memory has a 
large and detailed storage capacity for scenes, objects, and actions.  However, 
when required to recall which action had occurred within which scene, 
performance drops significantly suggesting there is a dissociation between 
memories for actions and scenes.  Sleep has been shown to have a strong impact 
on declarative memory, but can sleep affect joint recognition? Across three 
experiments participants viewed action-scene or object scene composites and 
were assigned to either an experimental condition with a 12-hour delay consisting 
of sleep (9pm-9am) or wake (9am-9pm) or a control group (9am or 9pm) with a 
two minute delay.  Participants then viewed the composites for 1000-3000ms 
each.  In the test phase, participants completed an alternative forced choice task 
whereby they were shown an original set and a new, unseen set and had to 
indicate which one they had previously seen.  For action-scene composites, there 
was no significant difference between groups with sleep (49.5%) and wake 
(50.6%) performing around chance, which did not differ significantly from two 
control groups.  For object-scene composites there was a significant difference 
between the sleep group (67.3%) and the wake group (59.7%).  Those in control 
groups were the most accurate.  The findings demonstrate that for object-scene 
composites, while immediate testing is most accurate, sleep appears to preserve 
and consolidate the memories when compared to a wake delay but this was not 
apparent for action-scene composites.  This result is discussed in relation to the 
existing sleep literature 
Keywords: Sleep, Visual Long-Term Memory, Binding Memory, Item-Context Recognition 
Highlights: 
• Object-scene composite recognition was significantly higher than action-scene 
composite recognition 




1.  Introduction 
Within the literature on visual long-term memory (VLTM), it has been 
demonstrated that humans have a remarkable capacity to store item 
representations (Standing, 1973; Hollingworth, 2004).  However, it is a 
mischaracterisation to judge it based on the number of items stored.  These 
representations are not just item representations of each individual item, rather 
these representations are highly-structured, allowing for multiple levels of 
representations ranging from individual item level (e.g., what your car looks like) 
through to higher-level conceptual representations (e.g., what makes a car; 
Konkle, Brady, Alvarez, & Oliva, 2010a).   
Studies investigating specifically memory capacity have demonstrated a 
remarkable allowance.  In a seminal paper, Standing (1973) observed that 
participants were highly accurate in recognition of previously seen images, even 
when presented with over 10 000 images participants could recognise 
approximately 87% of them, leading to suggestions that VLTM is effectively 
unlimited and only restricted by how visually distinctive an item is compared to 
similar items.   
Yet distinctiveness does not seem to be a limiting factor.  Studies have 
demonstrated that item representations are constructed in a high-fidelity manner.  
For example, Hollingworth (2004) noted that participants were able to maintain 
sufficient detail to distinguish between items within the same categories or even 
different viewpoints, with above chance recognition observed across 400 objects, 
even after a 24h delay (Hollingworth, 2005).  In an effort to replicate and extend 
the work of Standing (1973), Brady, Konkle, Alvarez, and Oliva (2008) presented 
participants with over 2500 categorically distinct items and then asked them to 
complete a two-alternative-forced-choice task (2AFC) varying the relationship 
between the target item and the foil item, so that it was a novel category item, 
requiring memory for only the semantic category (e.g., var v mobile phone), a 
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novel, exemplar-level item, requiring a level of fidelity that could not be utilised 
from semantic level (e.g., a limousine v a sedan car), or state-level item, the 
exact same item, just in a different state (e.g., a sedan car v the same car with 
the door open).   
Amazingly, performance across all conditions was close to ceiling, with 
even the state-foil condition recognition accuracy averaging 87%, suggesting that 
humans can store high-fidelity representations of recently learned items.  
Furthermore, this effect is not limited to objects, with recent literature 
demonstrating similar performance levels for both scenes (Konkle, Brady, Alvarez, 
& Oliva, 2010a, 2010b), and actions (Urgolites & Wood, 2013a).   
One of the suggestions for how humans can store high-fidelity 
representations to this level is through what Konkle et al.  (2010b) term a 
“conceptual hook”.  The idea is built upon consolidation models of memory, such 
as the Complementary Learning Systems (CLS) model (Squire, 1992; McClelland 
et al., 1995) or Multiple Trace Theory (MMT, Nadel et al., 2000) that suggest 
interaction between hippocampal and neocortical representations leads to 
consolidation of representations.  Although the literature is too vast to describe 
within this paper, to summarise representations are initially located within the 
hippocampus and through repeated activation they become interleaved within a 
neocortical semantic network that contains pre-existing conceptual knowledge 
(McClelland et al., 1995) until the hippocampal representation is no longer 
required and subsequent retrieval can occur from neocortical sites.  To create this 
conceptual knowledge, the memory often undergoes a qualitative reorganisation, 
with commonalities between episodic representations being extracted to form the 
conceptual representation, a process often termed semanticisation (McClelland et 
al., 1995).  The resulting neocortical representation is not a direct copy of the 
episodic representation, but rather a representation that can be used to 
generalise to similar items, similar to schema theory (Bartlett, 1932; Brewer & 
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Nakamura, 1984; Norman, 1972; Rummelhart, 1980; Spiro, 1977).  Within the 
conceptual hook model by Konkle et al. (2010b), there is a form of item prototype 
that can act as a prompt for both encoding as retrieval.  For example, the 
conceptual hook for a car may be a motor vehicle with four wheels and at least 
one door.  Moreover, each item prototype can be linked to multiple exemplars and 
the variation within this is what affects recognition.  For the above example of a 
car there is a wide variation is possible category-based exemplars, ranging from 
mini coopers through to limousines.  In contrast, for an item like a microwave, 
there is much less variance and as such, more prone to interference.   
The conceptual representation is not just limited to individual items but by 
its nature of being generalisable can also associate representations together.  
Several studies have also looked at the relationships between objects and other 
objects as well as between objects and the surrounding scene (see Luck & 
Hollingworth, 2008), often termed schemata (Biederman et al., 1982; Hock, 
Romanski, Galie, & Williams, 1978) or context frames (Bar & Ullman, 1996; Bar, 
2004).  In having this association, even presentation of a single item from 
schemata can trigger associative expectation of related items (Bar et al., 2006), 
with multiple studies demonstrating that when items are presented in a context 
consistent with expectations accuracy can increase or occur faster (Davenport & 
Potter, 2004).  For example, Hollingworth (2006) observed that participants who 
studied a scene with multiple objects in it performed significantly better at an 
object recognition task when the object was presented within the presented 
scene, with a similar effect observed in spatial positions of objects (Hollingworth, 
2007).  Although these studies were presented at a relatively short timeframe, 
the results mirror that of the encoding-specificity principle (Tulving & Thomson, 
1973) which suggests that the better the match between encoding and retrieval, 
the better the performance. 
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Although conceptual knowledge of visual representations has been 
demonstrated to led to expedited encoding, it can also lead to retrieval errors/ 
errors of commission, whereby associated items are falsely recalled as being part 
of the representation.  For example, after studying items in a series of scenes 
(e.g., golf course), participants are more likely to falsely recognise a schematic-
consistent item (e.g., a golf club) than a schematic-irrelevant item (e.g., a fridge; 
Miller & Gazzaniga, 1998).  Moreover, Lew and Howe (2016) demonstrated that 
the influence of visual schema can influence location of objects within a scene, but 
schema irrelevant items (e.g., a toilet brush in a kitchen scene) are recognised to 
a high level due to the uniqueness.  These errors of commission typically come 
about through the expectation of the scene, although you are unsure if the item 
was there, given the expectation of it due to the schema it is more likely that it 
was than wasn’t, akin to the false memory generation as seen in the DRM 
paradigm (Deese, 1959; Roediger & McDermott, 1995).   
Despite there being a wide literature on associations formed in the VLTM, 
few studies have examined recognition of specific composite pairs, i.e., making 
judgements about whether a specific item-item pair has been previously seen 
when presented in a 2AFC task.  Although studies have demonstrated a role of 
context in VLTM as outlined in the previous paragraph, most of these are formed 
through cued associative pairs, where participants are presented one half of the 
pair and have to retrieve the associated item, meanwhile recognition of unrelated 
pairs is relatively unresearched.   One study, Urgolites & Wood (2013b) examined 
the ability of the VLTM to associate specific actions and scenes as a form of 
composite pair.  In their study participants viewed 40 unique action-scene 
composites (e.g., a1s1, a2s2) and at retrieval were presented with a 2AFC task 
containing the target composite and a foil item containing a novel composite but 
containing a previously seen element (e.g., for the above example, the foil may 
be a1s2 or a2s1).  It was observed that overall performance was only just 
significantly above chance (59%), although performance on recognition of just 
6 
 
the action or scene separately close to previously reported levels (Konkle et al., 
2010a, Urgolites & Wood, 2013a). Urgolites and Wood (2013b) suggested that 
the issue was not one of encoding or retrieving individual actions or scenes, but 
one of relational binding, although it is unclear if this was an issue of binding at 
encoding or retrieval.  One suggestion by Urgolites and Wood (2013b) was that 
actions and scenes are stored separately within the VLTM.  There is some 
neurophysiological evidence for this dissociation with studies demonstrating at 
least four dissociated cortical pathways within visual cognition (reviewed by 
Kravitz et al., 2011).  To summarise, the ventral pathway is thought to support 
object recognition while the dorsal pathway contributes to the ability to track 
movement and location of objects projected to the prefrontal cortex, scene-based 
recognition for spatial navigation projected to the medial temporal lobe, and 
visually guided actions projected to the premotor cortex (Kravitz et al., 2011).  By 
nature of this disparate processing areas and the requirement of processing at 
both a temporal and spatial level, binding of actions and scenes in the 
hippocampus may have been too difficult.  At the time of writing this, although 
studies have looked at the relationship between object and scene-as-a-context in 
retrieval, none have looked at recognition of the specific object-scene pairing in a 
2AFC task similar to Urgolites & Wood (2013b).   
Within the current study one of our aims was to see if there was any 
difference between recognition for object-scene composites  and action-scene 
composites.  If difficulty associated with relational binding at encoding or retrieval 
is unique to action-scene composites, there should be a significant difference 
observed between action-scene and object-scene composites. 
The second aim of this paper was to determine if sleep may have an effect 
on this form of relational binding.  Modern theories of consolidation (e.g., 
McClelland et al., 1995; Winocur et al., 2010) emphasise how hippocampal 
reactivity during sleep is influential for memory consolidation (see Diekelmann & 
Born, 2010; Rasch & Born, 2013).  Across a range of studies, sleep has been 
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demonstrated to have a beneficial role in learned associative pairs compared to a 
period of wakefulness. This effect was demonstrated in cued associative tasks 
that use a range of stimuli including related- and unrelated- word pairs (Gais & 
Born, 2004), item-context pairs (van der Helm et al., 2011), and face-location 
pairs (Ruch et al., 2012).  One of the suggestions for this beneficial effect of sleep 
on consolidation is the semanticisation that can occur during sleep and that  
facilitates extraction of regularities and the integration of information into unified 
representations.  For example, Wagner et al.  (2004) was the first to demonstrate 
that sleep can aid consolidation of concepts by noting that a period of sleep 
facilitated participants insight into a hidden rule in a number reduction task.  
Subsequent studies have further extended the importance of sleep in abstraction 
of common themes and proto-rules (Durrant & Lewis, 2009; Gomez et al., 2006; 
Fischer et al., 2006; Nadel et al., 2012; Nere et al., 2013; Sio, Monaghan, & 
Ormerod, 2013), although abstraction during sleep can lead to generation of false 
memories (Monaghan, Shaw, Ashworth-Lord, & Newbury, 2016; Pardilla-Delgado 
& Payne, 2017; Payne et al., 2009; Shaw & Monaghan, 2017).   
 Our third aim was to examine the role of sleep in composite recognition.  
As sleep has been demonstrated to have a beneficial effect on learning 
associations, it is unclear what role it may have on the action-scene and object-
scene composites.  It may be that sleep has a compensatory effect on relational 
binding of action-scenes, acting to consolidate the poorly bound association to 
above chance levels.  Alternatively, if sleep does preferentially bind 
representations that are already strongly bound, it may be that object-scene 




2.1 Experiment 1a: The role of sleep in action-scene Relational Binding: 
Experimental Groups 
2.1.1 Method 
2.1.1.1  Participants 
A total of 40 undergraduate participants (28 females, 12 males, mean age 
=19.26, SEM= .03) with normal or corrected to normal vision initially signed up to 
the study agreeing to be tested on two sessions that were set twelve hours apart.  
Then the experimenter assigned the participants to their specific timeslot in order 
to avoid any potential time preferences in the participants.  Sample size was set 
to 20 in each group based upon previous sleep studies (Rasch & Born, 2013).  
Participants were asked to maintain a normal sleep schedule for the two days 
prior to testing, to sleep for at least 6h for the night preceding the study, and to 
refrain from drinking alcohol and caffeine for at least 12h prior to the start of the 
study.  Participants reported mean bed times of 10:56pm, wake times of 8:14am 
and average sleep times of 7h 32m. 
Participants were either given course credit or were paid £7 for 
participating upon completion of the study after the second session.  Participants 
gave informed consent and were reminded they were free to withdraw from the 
study at any time without incurring any penalty. 
2.1.1.2  Stimuli 
The stimuli consisted of 40 animated actions and 40 images of landscape 
scenes combined to create 40 action/scene composites for the learning phase.  
The actions were taken from a previous paper that had examined fidelity of 
actions in VLTM by Urgolites and Wood (2013a), whilst the scenes were taken 
from a study examining the fidelity of scene representations in VLTM by Konkle et 
al. (2010).  The combined composites were taken from a previous study by 
Urgolites and Wood (2013b).  Each composite consisted of an action being 
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performed for 1000 ms within one scene (see Figure 3.1).  The actions appeared 
in the centre of the scene.  All of the actions had the same duration (1,000 ms) 
and frame rate (30 frames per second), with each action reaching its maximum 
deviation from the neutral standing position at the 15th frame.   The action stimuli 
included jumps, turns, bends and crouches.  The scene stimuli included 
mountains, beaches, oceans, forests and cities.  The study was programmed on 
Psychopy 1.83.05 (Peirce, 2009).  Participants completed the Stanford sleepiness 
scale and completed a questionnaire about their sleep habits and any 
caffeine/alcohol intake in the last 12h. 
For the test, three different types of foil stimuli were created.  Foils either 
had a different foreground action but the same background scene (DFSB) as the 
target action/scene composite, or the same foreground action but a different 
background scene (SFDB), or a different foreground action and different 
background scene (DFDB).  All foil composites were created from actions and 
scenes that were already seen in the study and across all conditions the 40 foils 
were split by 13, 13, and 14 presented in random order. 
 
2.1.1.3 Procedure  
The procedure for the study closely followed that of Urgolites and Wood 
(2013b), except with the introduction of sleep as an experimental manipulation.  
The experiment consisted of a study phase and a test phase spaced 12h apart, 
with the two experimental groups being wake (study phase at 9am, test phase at 
9pm) or sleep (study phase at 9pm, test phase at 9am the following day, see 
Figure 3.1).  In the study phase participants viewed 40 action-scene composites.  
Each trial started with a 1000 ms black screen followed by the action-scene 
composite for 1000 ms where the action was performed once.  Then, a second 
1000 ms blank screen was displayed.  To ensure participants were maintaining 
concentration during the study phase, after the post-composite blank screen was 
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displayed participants had to respond whether they had seen the scene before, by 
pressing the Z key or M key on a keyboard for yes or no judgments, respectively 
counterbalanced across participants.  Every 4th action-scene composite was 
repeated at intervals of zero, one, two, three or four trials between the initial 
presentation and the repeated trial in order to measure whether participants were 
paying attention to the task.  Participants responded without time pressure but 
were instructed to respond as quickly and accurately as possible.  After the 
participant responded, the blank screen commencing the next trial appeared.  In 
the wake condition participants were instructed to stay awake during the next 12h 
and refrain from any form of sleep.  In the sleep condition participants were 
instructed to go to bed and sleep. 
The test session began approximately 12h after the test phase.  Both 
groups of participants completed the Stanford Sleepiness scale and participants in 
the sleep condition also completed a sleep questionnaire detailing how much sleep 
they had the previous night and caffeine intake.  Then participants conducted the 
memory test, which was a two-alternative forced choice test.  Two action-scene 
composites were presented on a screen: one previously seen and one new foil.  
Participants saw 40 test trials which began with a 1000 ms black screen, then an 
action-scene composite appeared on the left half of the screen for 1000 ms, 
followed by a 1000 ms black screen, and then a second action-scene composite 
appeared on the right half of the screen for 1000 ms.  A black screen was 
presented for 1000 ms, and then participants were asked which composite had 
previously been displayed, pressing the Q key on a keyboard for the left 
composite or the P key for the right composite.  The side of the screen on which 
the old and foil composites appeared were balanced.  Although amount of each 
foil was varied as a counterbalance, across all conditions the 40 foils were split by 









Figure 3.1 Image demonstrating the study paradigm study and test phase of the 
action-scene composite recognition task. 
 
2.1.2 Results 
A 3 (Foil Type) x 2 (Group) ANOVA was conducted on accuracy of 
recognition.  For Group there was no significant difference in accuracy between 
Sleep (0.511) and Wake (0.509), F < 1, p = ns suggesting that sleep had no 
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beneficial impact on the binding of action-scene composite.  The observed 
accuracy levels did also not differ from chance performance, sleep group t(19) 
0.636, p = ns, wake group t(19) 0.424, p = ns. For Foil Type there was no 
significant difference between SFDB (M = 0.517), DFSB (M = 0.532) or DFDB (M 
= 0.482), F(2, 38) = 1.377, p = 0.253.  There was also no significant interaction 
between group and foil type, F < 1, p = ns.  As there was a delay between the 
display of the first composite and the time a participant could respond, reaction 
times were not included in any further analysis.  
 
2.2 Experiment 1b Sleep’s role in action-scene Relational Binding: Control 
Groups 
 The result of Experiment 1a demonstrated that sleep had no beneficial 
effect on consolidation of action-scene composite recognition, with both the sleep 
and wake group reporting proportion of items correctly recognised at chance 
levels after the 12h delay, suggesting that the result was due to the length of the 
delay.  In order to examine this further, the following study replicated that of 
Urgolites and Wood (2013b) by presenting the recognition task 1 minute after the 
training task.  The testing time of participants was varied between the morning 
and the evening, so that the potential contribution of the delay to memory 
binding could be tested at these different times of day. 
2.2.1 Method 
2.2.1.1 Participants 
A total of 40 undergraduate participants (28 females, 12 males, mean age 
=19.48, SEM= 0.07) with normal or corrected to normal vision and who had not 
taken part in Experiment 1a were assigned to groups as outlined in Experiment 
1a.  Participants were asked to maintain a normal sleep schedule for the two days 
prior to testing, to sleep for at least 6h for the night preceding the study, and 
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refrain from drinking alcohol and caffeine for at least 12h prior to the start of the 
study.  Participants reported mean bed times of 12.36am, wake times of 
08.43am, mean sleep duration of 8h 7m.  Participants were given course credit or 
£3.50.  Participants gave informed consent and were reminded they were free to 
withdraw from the study at any time without incurring penalty. 
2.2.1.2 Stimuli  
Stimuli used for the study were the same as those used in Experiment 1a. 
2.2.1.3 Procedure 
Participants were randomly assigned to either a morning (9am) or evening 
(9pm) condition.  First, participants completed the Stanford sleepiness scale and 
completed a questionnaire about their sleep habits and any caffeine/alcohol intake 
in the last 12 hours.  Participants then completed the study phase of the action-
scene composites.  After completing the study phase, there was a 1 minute 
pause, after which participants completed the test phase in exactly the same way 
as in Experiment 1a.    
2.2.2 Results 
A 3 (Foil Type) x 2 (Group) ANOVA was conducted on proportion of items 
correctly recognised.  For Group there was no significant difference between 
Morning (M = 0.552, SE = 0.018) and Evening (M = 0.549, SE = 0.018), F < 1, p 
= ns.  The observed accuracy levels did significantly differ from chance 
performance, evening group t(19) 3.056, p = 0.002, evening group t(19) 2.841, 
p = 0.005. There was also no significant difference based upon Foil Type, F(2, 38) 
= 1.402, p = 0.246, and no significant interaction between group and foil, F < 1, 
p = ns.  When compared to the groups in Experiment 1a, there was a significant 
difference of delay condition (immediate versus 12 hour delay), F(2, 78) = 5.283, 
p = 0.022, with the Experiment 1b immediate recognition groups significantly 
more accurate (M = 0.551, SE = 0.012) than the Experiment 1a delayed 
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recognition groups (M = 0.510, SE = 0.012; see Figure 3.2 for comparison across 
groups).   
 
 
Figure 3.2.  Graph showing the average accuracy for each group.  Bars indicate 
mean proportion correct by Foil Type, SFDB- Same Foreground Different 
Background; DFSB- Different Foreground Same Background; DFDB- Different 
Foreground, Different Background.  Errors Bars are ± 1SEM. 
 
 
2.3.  Experiment 2: Sleep’s role in action-scene Relational Binding: 
Repeated Viewing 
 In Experiment 1a it was observed that there was no significant effect of 
sleep on the consolidation of action-scene composites, with both the sleep and 
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wake group reporting similar proportion of items correctly recognised after a 12h 
delay, suggesting a time delay effect.  Urgolites and Wood (2013b) noted in their 
study that if the action was repeated three times then proportion of items 
correctly recognised increased slightly, so Experiment 2 presented repeated 
stimuli and determined whether a sleep effect could then be observed on action-
scene binding memory after a 12 hour delay.   
2.3.1 Method 
2.3.1.1 Participants 
 17 undergraduate participants (9 female, mean age = 18.76, SEM = 0.09)  
with normal or corrected to normal vision were assigned to wake or sleep groups 
as outlined in Experiment 1a.  Participants were asked to maintain a normal sleep 
schedule for the two days prior to testing and were asked to sleep for at least 6h 
for the night preceding the study and refrain from drinking alcohol and caffeine 
for at least 12h prior to the start of the study.  Participants reported mean bed 
times of 12:12am wake times of 8:14am. 
Participants were given course credit upon completion of the study after the 
second session.  Participants gave informed consent and were reminded they 
were free to withdraw from the study at any time without incurring penalty. 
2.3.1.2 Stimuli 
 Action-scene composites used in the current task were the same as those 
used in Experiment 1a/1b with the exception that the action was performed three 
times.  The figure started from a neutral position and reached maximum deviation 
from the neutral position at 500ms, and returning to the neutral position at 
1000ms.  This was looped 3 times so that maximum deviation from the neutral 
standing position occurred at 500ms, 1500ms, and 2500ms. 
  2.3.1.3 Procedure 
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 The procedure for the study replicated Experiment 1a with the exception 
that each trial started with a 1000 ms black screen followed by the action-scene 
composite for 3000 ms where the action was performed three times and after the 
action-scene composite had been displayed a second 1000 ms black screen was 
displayed.  In the 2AFC recognition task, where participants saw 40 test trials,  
each of which began with a 1000 ms black screen, a composite performed on the 
left half of the screen for 3000 ms, an interval of 1000 ms with a black screen 
followed by a second composite being performed on the right half of the screen 
for 3000 ms.  All other elements of the study (foil composition and wording of 
questions) remained the same. 
2.3.2 Results 
A 3 (Foil Type) x 2 (Group) ANOVA was conducted.  For group, there was 
no significant difference between sleep (M = 0.505, SE = 0.028) and wake (M = 
0.540, SE = 0.026), F < 1, p = ns.  There was also no significant difference based 
upon foil type, F < 1, p = ns, and no interaction between group and foil, F < 1, p 
= ns.  Comparing overall proportion of items correctly recognised between 
Experiment 1a (1 action repetition) and Experiment 2 (3 action repetition; Figure 
3.3) resulted in no significant difference, F < 1, p = ns.  There was also no 
significant difference of experiment by group, experiment by foil type, or 








Figure.  3.3. Left panel shows a graph showing the average accuracy for each 
group.  Bars indicate mean proportion correct by type of foil, SFDB- Same 
Foreground Different Background; DFSB- Different Foreground Same Background; 
DFDB- Different Foreground, Different Background.  Errors Bars are ± 1SEM.  
Right panel shows a graph showing the average accuracy for each experimental 
group compared across Experiment 1a and Experiment 2.  Bars indicate mean 
proportion correct by type of foil, SFDB- Same Foreground Different Background; 
DFSB- Different Foreground Same Background; DFDB- Different Foreground, 
Different Background.  Errors Bars are ± 1SEM. 
 
 Within the last two experiments we examined the role of sleep on action-
scene composite recognition.  Previous literature has demonstrated that action-
scene recognition is prone to errors, with recognition of specific pairs at 
approximately chance level (Urgolites & Wood, 2013b).  One of the suggestions 
for this difference is due to actions and scenes being processed in different 
cortical areas, with these disparate locations part of the reason for the difficulty in 
relational binding (Urgolites & Wood, 2013b).  In order to test a cortical location 
hypothesis, we used object-scene composites as stimuli, which are also thought 
to be located in separate cortical locations.  If the issue of relational binding is 









A total of 40 undergraduate participants (27 females, 13 males, mean age 
=19.25, SEM= 0.03) with normal or corrected to normal vision were assigned to 
groups in a similar way to Experiment 1a.  Participants were asked to maintain a 
normal sleep schedule for the two days prior to testing, to sleep for at least 6h for 
the night preceding the study, and to refrain from drinking alcohol and caffeine 
for at least 12h prior to the start of the study.  Participants reported mean bed 
times of 11.36pm, wake times of 8.14am, and average sleep times of 8h 38m.  
Participants were either given course credit or were paid £7 for participating upon 
completion of the study after the second session.  Participants gave informed 
consent and were reminded they were free to withdraw from the study at any 
time without incurring penalty. 
 
 2.4.1.2 Stimuli 
The stimuli consisted of 40 animated objects and 40 images of scenes that 
were combined to create 40 object/scene composites.  The objects were taken 
from a previous paper that had examined fidelity of objects in VLTM by Brady et 
al. (2008) whilst the scenes were taken from a study examining the fidelity of 
scene representations in VLTM by Konkle et al. (2010).  The combined composites 
were taken from a previous study by Urgolites and Wood (unpublished).  Each 
composite consisted of an object rotating a full 360° for 1 second within one 
scene (see Figure 3.4.).  The objects appeared in the centre of the scene.  All of 
the objects had the same duration (1000ms) and frame rate (30 frames per 
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second) with each object reaching its maximum deviation from the neutral, face-
on position at the 15th frame rotating 180°.   The object stimuli included 
household appliances, electronics, vehicles, and fruit or vegetables.  The scene 
stimuli used in these composites was the same as experiment 1a.  The study was 
programmed on Psychopy 1.83.05 (Peirce, 2009).  Foils were created in the same 
ratio of 13/13/14 as in Experiments 1 and 2. 
2.4.1.3 Procedure 
The procedure was the same as Experiment 1a with the exception of object-scene 
composites appearing instead of action-scene composites and a delay of 12h 







Figure 3.4 Image demonstrating the study and test phase of the object-scene 
composite recognition task. 
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A 3 (Foil Type) x 2 (Group) ANOVA was conducted.  There was a main 
effect of group, F(1, 39) = 9.527, p = 0.002.  Sleep (M = 0.644, SE = 0.017) had 
a beneficial impact on object-scene recognition compared to wake (M = 0.570, SE 
= 0.017).  The observed accuracy levels did significantly differ from chance 
performance, sleep group t(19) 8.405, p < 0.001, wake group t(19) 3.924, p < 
0.001.There was also a main effect of Foil Type, F(2, 38) = 9,214.  p < 0.001.  
Post-hoc analysis revealed that SFDB (M = 0.672, SE = 0.021) was significantly 
more accurate than DFDB (M = 0.546, SE = 0.021), p < 0.001.  There was no 
significant difference between DFSB (M = 0.603, SE = 0.021) and SFDB, p = 
0.065, or DFDB, p = 0.155.   There was no significant interaction between group 
and foil type, F(2, 38)= 1.721, p = 0.179. 
2.5.  Experiment 3b Sleep’s role in object-scene Relational Binding: 
Control Groups 
 As we noted a sleep/wake effect within Experiment 3b in order to control 
for circadian effects a second object-scene study was conducted using an 
immediate recognition task.  This also served as a comparison of immediate 
recognition to the action-scene task. 
2.5.1 Method 
2.5.1.1 Participants 
40 undergraduate participants (27 females, 13 males, mean age =19.2, 
SEM= 0.03) with normal or corrected to normal vision were randomly assigned 
groups in the same manner as outlined in experiment 1a.  Participants were 
asked to maintain a normal sleep schedule for the two days prior to testing, to 
sleep for at least 6h for the night preceding the study, and to refrain from 
drinking alcohol and caffeine for at least 12h prior to the start of the study.  
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Participants reported mean bed times of 11.51pm wake times of 8.43am and 
average sleep times of 8h 38m.  Those in the control group were given course 
credit or £3.50 for completing they study.  Participants gave informed consent 
and were reminded they were free to withdraw from the study at any time 
without incurring penalty. 
2.5.1.2 Stimuli 
Stimuli used for the study were the same as those in Experiment 3a. 
2.5.3 Procedure 
Participants were randomly assigned to either a morning (9am) or evening 
condition (9pm).  Initially participants completed the Stanford Sleepiness scale 
and completed a questionnaire about their sleep habits and any caffeine/alcohol 
intake in the last 12h.  Participants then completed the study phase as outlined in 
experiment 3a.  After completing the study phase, 1 minute later participants 
completed the test phase whereby participants had to indicate which object-scene 
composite had been previously displayed.    
2.5.2 Results 
A 3 (Foil Type) x 2 (Group) ANOVA was conducted.  For Group there was 
no significant difference between Morning (M = 0.728, SE = 0.052) and Evening 
(M = 0.692, SE = 0.055), F(1, 39) = 2.533, p = 0.112.  The observed accuracy 
levels did significantly differ from chance performance, morning group t(19) 
14.790, p < 0.001, evening group t(19) 11.373, p < 0.001. There was a 
significant effect of Foil Type, F(2, 38) = 9.826, p < 0.001, with SFDB (M = 
0.773) being significantly more accurate than both DFSB (M = 0.704), p = 0.043, 
and DFDB (M = 0.652), p < 0.001, while DFSB and DFDB did not significantly 
differ, p = 0.173.  There was no significant interaction between Group and Foil 
ty[e, F < 1, p = ns.  As with Experiment 1, performance in the immediate 
recognition task (Exp.  3b) was compared against performance in the delayed 
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recognition task (Exp.  3a, see Figure 3.5 for comparison across experiments).  
Analysis revealed that there was a significant difference based on recognition task 
delay, F(1, 79) = 38.820, p < 0.001, with the immediate recognition task (M = 
0.710, SE = 0.012) significantly more accurate than the delayed recognition task 
(M = 0.607, SE = 0.012). 
 
 
Figure 3.5.  Graph showing the average accuracy for each experimental group.  
Errors Bars are ± 1SEM. 
3.  General discussion 
To recap, previous literature suggests that the VLTM is capable of 
supporting a large amount of high-fidelity representations of actions (Urgolites & 
Wood, 2013a), objects (Brady et al., 2008), and scenes (Konkle et al., 2010a, 
2010b), and that when presented in a composite image (e.g., object in a scene), 
object recognition is further enhanced by scene presentation (Davenport & Potter, 
2004; Vogt & Magnussen, 2007), similar to the encoding-specificity principle 
(Tulving & Thomson, 1973).  However, few studies have explored specific 
composite recognition in a 2AFC paradigm (that is to recognise a specific item-
scene composite when presented with an alternative).  One such study, Urgolites 
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and Wood (2013b), observed that recognition for specific action-scene composites 
was difficult, with recognition accuracy at approximately 59% (with chance at 
50%), despite recognition of specific actions or scenes at close to reported levels, 
suggesting an issue of relational binding between the two items.  As sleep has 
been demonstrated to be beneficial for consolidation of learned associations (see 
Diekelmann & Born, 2010; Rasch & Born, 2013), the current examined if sleep 
could have any benefit on recognition of action-scene, and object-scene 
composites. 
Focusing on action-scene binding first, the results appear consistent with 
the existing literature.  In Experiment 1b, participants in the control groups who 
completed the recognition task immediately after learning had proportion of items 
correctly recognised at approximately 55%, significantly above chance but still 
lower than individual item recognition, in line with Urgolites and Wood (2013b).  
Furthermore, Experiment 1a demonstrated that sleep had no beneficial effect on 
consolidation, with proportion of items correctly recognised in both the sleep and 
wake groups not differing significantly from chance.  When action-scene 
composites were presented with the action repeated three times and a delay 
between exposure and test (Experiment 2), proportion of items correctly 
recognised was again at chance levels and did not significantly differ from 
Experiment 1a.  There was a significant difference in time of recognition task, 
with proportion of items correctly recognised in the immediate recognition task 
(Experiment 1b) significantly higher than in the delayed recognition task 
(Experiment 1a), suggesting that despite accuracy being close to chance, when 
tested immediately recognition of action-scene composites is possible, but is 
prone to decay.   
In contrast to the action-scene tasks, for the object-scene task 
(Experiment 3a) there was a significant benefit of sleep with proportion of items 
correctly recognised in the sleep group (M = 0.644) significantly higher than the 
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wake group (M = 0.570), although these were significantly lower than the 
immediate recognition groups (Experiment 3b), suggesting that although object-
scene composite representations are prone to decay.  Moreover, in the immediate 
recognition task experiments (Experiment 1b, 3b) the object-scene recognition 
was significantly higher than action-scene recognition, suggesting that there is a 
qualitative difference between the two, which to the authors’ knowledge is the 
first study to demonstrate this. 
 There is a significant difference in consolidation of action-scene composites 
compared to object-scene composite; recognition for object-scene was 
significantly more accurate than action-scene composites in both experimental 
(12h delay between sessions) and control conditions (2 min delay between 
sessions), as such, the first question is does this difference occur? One suggestion 
we can dismiss is the limited amount of exposure time to stimuli affecting the 
actions and object separately.  Within both Experiment 1 and 3 participants were 
only exposed to the target stimuli for 1000ms.  While object recognition is fast, 
with brain responses associated with visual discrimination of objects occurring 
around 150ms (Allison et al., 1999; Thorpe et al., 1996), action recognition within 
the current study is not possible until 500ms (where the action reaches maximum 
deviation from the neutral standing position, making what action it is clearest) yet 
this did not appear to affect the results.  Accuracy for the repeat detection task in 
the training phase was consistently high across all experiments regardless of 
stimuli type, averaging over 90% with no significant difference between exposure 
for 1000ms and exposure for 3000ms, suggesting that participants could 
accurately recognise the specific composite under certain conditions, consistent 
with the previous literature (Urgolites & Wood, 2013b) recognition of that specific 
item-scene composite; as the repeat detection task is presented as a Yes/No 
judgement task, familiarity based recognition of just one element would suffice in 
making a correct judgement. 
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Instead, the significant difference between action-scene and object-scene 
composites appears in the recognition task when the target composite is 
presented alongside a foil.  Before discussing the details between the two it is 
worth noting that although actions and objects are often compared, both within 
the current study and the wider literature, particularly that of eyewitness 
testimony (Brown & Deffenbacher, 1978; Kersten & Earles, 2010), they are 
fundamentally different forms of stimuli, with differing levels of complexity, thus 
different forms of memory. Actions, by virtue of being a movement, occur in both 
a spatial and temporal form, whereas objects only occur in a spatial manner. As 
such caution should be taken in interpreting results when they are compared 
directly. 
When participants engaged in the 2AFC task proportion of items correctly 
recognised declined to close to chance levels in the action-scene task, consistent 
with previous literature (Urgolites & Wood, 2013b) but recognition of specific 
composites was significantly higher in the object-scene task.  In their paper 
Urgolites and Wood (2013b) suggest that the difficulty in action-scene binding 
was potentially due to the separate storage of actions and scenes within the 
VLTM, with the binding at retrieval problematic due to the requirement of having 
to draw representations from separate cortical locations.  However, as both 
objects and scenes are also stored separately within the VLTM (see Kravitz et al., 
2011), location of stored representations may not be an adequate explanation for 
the observed difference.  Furthermore, as the same background-scene stimuli was 
used across all experiments, this suggests that any issue of binding is related to 
the foreground item - the action or the object.   
One possible explanation for the difference may be related to the form of 
encoding and consolidation of items through perceptual and conceptual features.  
There is an extensive literature that suggests that conceptual knowledge can have 
a beneficial role in consolidation within the VLTM (Brady et al., 2011; Konkle et 
al., 2010b).  Within the current study, by having a conceptual representation 
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based upon past experience, this may reduce the cognitive load during initial 
encoding.  Reducing the cognitive load would mean that participants can engage 
in directing their attention and encoding resources to the details that are most 
likely to distinguish between pairs (e.g., Eysenck, 1979; Nosofsky, 1986).  The 
concept of using features to distinguish items (termed Diagnostic Feature 
Support) is well established in distinctiveness models of memory (Nairne, 2002; 
Hunt & Worthen, 2006; Schmidt, 1991), and models of categorisation (Nosofsky, 
1984, 1986; Anderson, 1991).   
 In contrast, as actions are novel and thus don’t have any pre-existing 
conceptual knowledge, encoding and consolidation of the representation is 
dependent on perceptual features (e.g., arm movement), allowing participants to 
create high-fidelity representations of the individual actions within the 
hippocampal store that can be recognised in subsequent recognition tasks but at 
the expense of creating a consolidated association with the scene.  This process 
may be aided by the mirror neuron process, whereby viewing an action can 
trigger the same neuronal firing pattern in the parieto-frontal section of the brain 
than when performing the action (see Steinhorst & Funke, 2014) but this still 
requires attention to the action for its duration, thus it appears to not help 
relational binding in the same manner preexisting conceptual knowledge can help 
objects at encoding. This view would support the result observed by Urgolites & 
Wood (2013b) who observed that separate action and scene recognition was close 
to previously reported levels (~80%) while the composite recognition was only 
just significantly above chance.   
 This difference in encoding does appear consistent with recent literature on 
hippocampal role in episodic memory.  In the past few fMRI studies into the 
hippocampus have identified numerous functions, including pattern separation 
within the Dentate Gyrus and pattern completion within the CA3 hippocampal 
region.  Pattern separation refers to the hippocampus’ ability to form distinct, 
non-overlapping representations of highly overlapping input.  For example, 
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Chadwick and colleagues presented participants with a series of videos containing 
overlapping foreground and background stimuli (e.g., taking the current study 
example, a1s1, a2s2, a1s2, a2s1) and pattern analyses of the fMRI data revealed 
that their representations in the hippocampus can be distinguished (Chadwick, 
Hassabis, & Maguire, 2011).  In contrast, pattern completion refers the ability to 
retrieve a complete representation (pattern) based upon partial input.  For 
example, you can recall all the information about a person just by hearing their 
name or seeing their picture.  Horner and Burgess (2014) examined the role of 
pattern completion in bound representations through the use of location-object-
person associations.  They observed that cueing with location allowed the retrieval 
of both the associated person and object representations, with the cueing 
correlating with hippocampal activity in their respective cortical areas.  However, 
the retrieval effect was specific to category and not the specific element (e.g., 
location may cue person, but not Jose Mourinho), thus it is unclear if cueing led to 
reinstatement of specific elements or just general concept.  Recent literature on 
these hippocampal functions suggest they may work in tandem with CA3 through 
the feedforward mechanisms displaying output for both pattern separation and 
pattern completion. 
When applying this form of pattern separation/completion to the current 
study, the distinction between action-scene/object-scene recognition appears to 
be explainable.  Within the action-scene composite pattern separation allows 
retrieval and recognition of high-fidelity representations, accounting for the 
previously seen result of Urgolites and Wood (2013b).  However, if pattern 
completion is in some part mediated by reinstatement of category and not specific 
element (Horner & Burgess, 2014), then actions, which are more generalised and 
don’t have the semantic label for specific exemplar-level actions, would be more 
susceptible to interference from the foil composite that are from the same 
category.  In contrast, the object-scene composites are able to engage in both 
pattern separation allowing individual item recognition but also pattern 
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completion, with the effect of category level reinstatement mitigated by the 
presence of pre-existing exemplar-level object prototypes.  As such, the pattern 
completion process is expedited as it requires level visual input than the action-
scene composites. 
Furthermore, when examining the difference between the action and 
object scene stimuli, this may also be linked to language.  Previous literature has 
demonstrated that labelling visual items in a way that can relate to conceptual 
knowledge can aid consolidation and recognition of novel visual items (Wiseman & 
Neisser, 1974; Koutstaal et al., 2003).  For example, Wiseman and Neisser 
(1974) presented participants with two-tone ambiguous faces and required 
participants to judge whether or not it was a face.  In a subsequent recognition 
task memory for previously seen items was significantly higher among items 
judged to be faces than those that were not labelled.  Similarly, in a series of 
experiments Koutstaal et al.  (2003) recognition of ambiguous shapes increases 
when a disambiguating semantic label is provided during training, and memory 
for real-world objects is better than memory for highly-distinct but novel items.  
Within binding literature, Dessalegn and Landau (2008) observed that 
verbalisation of the bound items (e.g., The red square is next to the green circle) 
aided consolidation of the bound representation in a matching task for 4-year 
olds, with no such improvement observed with nonlinguistic cues.   
As such, it may be that the exemplar-level semantic label for objects that 
exists as part of the pre-existing conceptual knowledge may lead to expedited 
encoding and consolidation of the individual item (see Brady et al., 2011), thus 
allowing associations to form not on a pure visual level, but on a visual-semantic 
level, with participants consolidating the association of two exemplar-level 
semantic labels (e.g., banana-beach) alongside the visual representations.  In 
contrast, as the actions are novel, they have no clearly defined exemplar-level 
semantic labels to aid encoding or consolidation at an associative level.  It may be 
that alongside a pure visual association, the visual semantic level is one of 
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category-exemplar (e.g., a jump – beach), thus in the 2AFC task the foil stimuli 
that contains previously seen stimuli in novel pairings may act as interference to a 
greater level.   
Beyond the difference between action-scene and object-scene composite 
recognition, the novel result of the paper was the observed result that sleep 
preferentially aided consolidation of specific object-scene composites compared to 
an equivalent period of wake.  The result adds to a growing literature that has 
demonstrated that sleep can aid consolidation of associative memory (Chatburn 
et al., 2014), with previous literature demonstrating a sleep-based consolidation 
effect amongst related- and unrelated-word pairs (Gais & Born, 2004), item-
context association (van der Helm et al., 2011), and face-location pairs (Ruch et 
al., 2012).   
First, the general decrease in action-scene composite recognition may 
reflect a natural decay of the fidelity of the action representation.  As the action is 
novel with no form of semantic label recognition is based primarily off of 
perceptual features, which can degrade in memory representation over time as it 
shifts to a more conceptualised representation.  If we apply the categorical 
reinstatement effect at pattern completion as seen in Horner and Burgess (2014) 
this would further explain chance level performance, the participants no longer 
have a high-fidelity representation of the action available in episodic memory and 
categorical reinstatement may apply to both items in the 2AFC task.   
For the object-scene composite task, although the target item 
representation may decay over the same time frame, because there are already 
prototype item representations available (Konkle et al., 2010b) then retrieval of 
the exact item is not as important as pattern completion can occur through the 
use of the item prototype as it retains enough unique features to still appear as 
the target item.  The difference between sleep and wake groups for the object-
scene composite may reflect consolidation of that particular learned association.  
Although previous literature suggests that in part sleep can aid gist 
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extraction/abstraction of memory, this is not as essential to object-scene 
composites that again can utilise the item prototype representation as a gist form 
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Chapter 4.  The impact of sleep on the recall of different item modalities 
in a free recall task 
 Within the previous chapter it was demonstrated that object-scene 
composite recognition was significantly more accurate than action-scene 
composite recognition, in both immediate recognition tasks and after a delay 
containing sleep or wake.  While this is a novel result, the stimuli used may not 
truly be applicable to real world scenarios.  Items (actions/objects) were 
presented in front of a scene but this contained no form of contextualisation, 
something that has been suggested to aid encoding, consolidation, and retrieval 
of actions (e.g., Kersten, 1998).  As such, the following chapter seeks to 
implement this contextualisation of the item modalities and examine the effect of 
sleep on consolidation.  To apply this to real-life scenarios this was implemented 
as recall tasks of CCTV footage of crimes in order to mimic eyewitness testimony.  
The study focuses on four key item modalities, Actions, Objects, People, and 
Locations.   
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The impact of sleep on the recall of different item modalities in a free 
recall task 
Abstract 
In eyewitness testimony the details matter.  The distinction between a 
man with blonde hair and blue eyes attacking a man rather than a man with 
blonde hair and brown eyes may be the deciding factor in convicting an innocent 
man who just happened to also witness the incident.  These ‘action-agent’ binding 
errors are commonplace, but can sleep help? The current study seeks to see if 
sleep can aid in consolidation of multi-item complex events in the form of CCTV 
crime recall.  Participants viewed 6 CCTV videos and completed a free recall task 
for each video in two sessions, with the second session 12h after the first and 
containing a period of sleep or wake.  Details regarding actions, objects, people, 
and locations were recorded.  There was a significant difference between item 
modalities, with actions recalled more frequently than other item modalities.  
However, there was no sleep/wake effect, suggesting that a 12h delay is still 
sufficient time to recall accurate details of witnessed events. These results 
suggest that sleep had no significant effect on consolidation of different item 
modalities. The results are discussed in relation to the existing literature of sleep 
and eyewitness testimony. 
Keywords: Sleep, Eyewitness Testimony, Item Modality 
Highlights 
• Actions were recalled to a higher frequency 




1.  Introduction 
Despite literature demonstrating that humans have a large and detailed 
memory (Brady et al., 2008; Standing, 1973; Konkle et al., 2010), it is often 
prone to distortions (Schacter, 1996).   Evidence from eyewitness testimony 
reveals that people are susceptible to errors of agent-action binding; mistakenly 
recalling actions and agents from two different events as being from the same 
event (Earles, Kersten, Curtayne, & Perle, 2008; Kersten & Earles, 2010; Kersten, 
Earles, Curtayne, & Layne, 2008; Loftus, 1976; Perfect & Harris, 2003; Ross, 
Ceci, Dunning, & Toglia, 1994).  A similar issue is that of unconscious 
transference errors; whereby a witness to a crime can be mistakenly be identified 
as a perpetrator in later police line ups due to occurring in the same situation 
(Brown, Deffenbacher, & Sturgill, 1977; Buckhout, 1974; Loftus, 1976), 
suggesting an issue at retrieval.   
These issues of omission/commission are often linked to false memories; 
commonly defined as the memory for an event that did not exist or existed in a 
different way as to how it occurred.  Within the laboratory setting these are often 
created through the Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm (Roediger & 
McDermott, 1995); participants are presented with a list of thematically related 
words (e.g., bed, dream, dark, night, snooze, pillow) then in subsequent recall or 
recognition tasks often report an unseen critical lure which is thematically related 
to the list of words (for the above example- sleep).  A similar effect can be 
generated in autobiographical memory, for decades research using the “lost in the 
mall” paradigm has demonstrated that adults can falsely recall autobiographical 
memories ranging from non-existent hospital stays, animal attacks, and even hot-
air balloon rides (for a summary, see Newman & Garry, 2013).  Applied to 
eyewitness testimony, these false memories are often generated through the 
misinformation effect.  Within this paradigm participants experience an event, 
receive post-event misinformation, and in a subsequent memory task often 
reported events altered by the misinformation (Loftus, 2005; Loftus & Hoffman, 
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1989).  Theories for this range from the post-event misinformation reflects 
retroactive interference, it impairs access to the original memory trace (Loftus, 
Miller, & Burns, 1978), or the misinformation causes issues around source 
monitoring with participants unable to accurately recollect which source is the 
correct one (Lindsay & Johnson, 1989), with this theory supported by recent brain 
imaging studies (Okado & Stark, 2005; Stark, Okado, & Loftus, 2010).  A recent 
comparison between DRM based false memories and the misinformation effect by 
Zhu, Chen, Loftus, Lin, and Dong (2013) demonstrated a small but significant 
positive correlation between the two, although Zhu et al.  suggest it is only their 
global discrimination ability (those susceptible to misinformation are also likely to 
be susceptible to DRM task) that is linked between the DRM paradigm and 
misinformation susceptibility. 
Issues of memory errors therefore present an important practical issue; 
accurate recall of key information such as actions performed, objects used, people 
involved, and location of the incident are crucial in criminal investigations and 
witness statements (Woolnough & MacLeod, 2001), yet they are susceptible to 
manipulation relatively easily (Frenda, Nichols, & Loftus, 2011; Nash & Wade, 
2009).  For example, Shaw and Porter (2015) interviewed undergraduate 
students about a true event from their past and a non-descript false event 
involving the police.  After three interviews 70% of participants reported false 
memories of committing a crime that led to police interaction, although the 
methodology of the study has been questioned for failing to distinguish between 
false memories (genuinely remember the event) and false belief (accept it may 
have happened), an important distinction in the literature and when applied to the 
Shaw and Porter experiment, false memory generation is approximately 22%, 
suggesting that it wasn’t false memories driving the effect observed by Shaw and 
Porter, but a belief it may have happened.  (Wade, Garry, & Pezdek, 2017).   
One area that is underreported in the literature is consolidation of these 
different modalities of information in a combined presentation.  As previously 
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stated in the first paragraph, the existing literature demonstrates that we have a 
remarkably large and detailed capacity for objects (Brady et al., 2008; Standing, 
1973), scenes (Konkle et al., 2010), and actions (Urgolites & Wood, 2013a), yet 
few have directly compared across the different item modalities within the same 
study.  Within one study, Urgolites and Wood (2013b) presented participants with 
combined action and scene composites and in a subsequent recognition task 1 
minute after exposure participants were presented the original set and a foil set 
with participants required to identify the specific composite.  They observed that 
for individual action or scene recognition, accuracy was at previously reported 
levels (averaging 80%) but when required to identify the specific composite, 
accuracy was close to chance (59%), suggesting that while humans are capable 
of binding actions and scenes together, it is prone to error, with Urgolites and 
Wood theorising that actions and scenes may be stored in separate locations and 
require “rebinding” at retrieval.  In a similar experiment Old and Naveh-Benjamin 
(2008) examined participants’ ability to recognise people, actions, and specific 
people-action composites.  After a short delay participants were most accurate for 
actions (70%), then person-action association (47%), then person (39%), with a 
retest the following day replicating the difference, a result confirmed by Kersten 
et al.  (2008).  One key study by Deffenbacher, Carr and Leu (1981) examined 
the effects of retroactive interference after two minutes and two weeks on 
different item modalities, faces, objects, landscapes (scenes), and words.  Within 
the study Deffenbacher et al.  sought to understand the role of new information 
on inhibiting retrieval previously learned material (retroactive interference), an 
important issue in eyewitness scenarios where interviews may occur some time 
after the event.  They observed that after two minutes, recognition was above 
chance for all item modalities and retroactive interference only significantly 
affected faces and landscapes.  When retested after 2 weeks, retroactive 
interference had no significant interaction with item modality but interestingly 
memory for faces was the highest accuracy out of the four tested, a result which 
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highlights that in eyewitness testimony memory for people at the event can 
persist, but associated information such as the actions the people performed 
decays, possibly giving rise to the previously mentioned action-agent binding 
errors (Earles et al., 2008; Kerstern & Earles, 2010; Kerstern et al., 2008; Loftus, 
1976; Perfect & Harris, 2003; Ross et al., 1994).   
While these studies provide important evidence for different encoding and 
retrieval mechanisms for the different item modalities, memory was often 
measured by recognition tasks, a qualitatively different process than free recall 
that is primarily used in eyewitness testimony (Migueles & Garcia-Bajos, 1999).  
In studies utilising free recall tasks, accuracy for seen actions is high (Clifford & 
Scott, 1978) but not people (Tollestrup, Turtle, & Yuille, 1994).  In a seminal 
paper, Yuille & Cutshall (1986) observed that free recall of an event typically 
consisted of actions (56%), people (26%) and objects (17%).  Within the same 
task accuracy was highest for objects (87%) compared to actions (82%) and 
people (74%), again, suggesting differences in encoding and retrieval for each 
item modality, a result replicated by Migueles and Garcia-Bajos (2007) who 
observed that after viewing a crime participants accurately recalled 57% of action 
details and 38% of people details observed, suggesting that actions are among 
the most salient items at encoding. 
Yet one aspect of research that has not been explicitly examined is the role 
of sleep in consolidation of these different item modalities.  Extensive literature 
from neuroscience and behavioural psychology demonstrates that sleep aids 
memory consolidation (for a summary, see Diekelmann & Born, 2010; Rasch & 
Born, 2013), and has a beneficial impact on associative memory (for a summary, 
see.  Chatburn et al., 2014).  Models of sleep’s role in consolidation suggest that 
sleep aids consolidation in two ways- by passively reducing interference with 
existing memory traces, and by actively repeating activation of the encoded 
memory representation in the hippocampal network and subsequently integrating 
the representation into prior knowledge located within the long-term neocortical 
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store.  Yet these encoded representations undergo a qualitative change; alongside 
veridical memory consolidation, sleep has been demonstrated to promote 
consolidation of “gist” based memory, promoting shared categorical elements and 
themes of newly encoded memories for easier integration with pre-existing 
information (Durrant & Lewis, 2009; Gomez et al., 2006; Lewis & Durrant, 2011; 
Sio, Monaghan, & Ormerod, 2013; Wagner et al., 2004).  While beneficial for 
integration, promotion of gist-based memory can lead to false memories within 
the DRM paradigm (Diekelmann, Born, & Wagner, 2010; Monaghan, Shaw, 
Ashworth-Lord, & Newbury, 2016; Pardilla-Delgado & Payne, 2017; Payne et al., 
2009; Shaw & Monaghan, 2017).   
These effects are not limited to DRM-generated false memories, literature 
has demonstrated that participants often have prior knowledge of what is 
characteristic for each crime (Smith, 1991; 1993) and often have event-schemas 
(Greenberg, Westcott, & Bailey, 1998; Holst & Pezek, 1992; List, 1986) that can 
affect encoding and retrieval of witnessed events.  In a series of studies, Garcia-
Bajos and Migueles demonstrated this effect whereby participants were 
susceptible to false memories of witness events based upon typicality of the 
content within its event-schema; high-typicality content (e.g., perpetrator had a 
gun) was reported more often than low-typicality (e.g., perpetrator had a dog 
with them) and in subsequent recognition tasks high-typicality was falsely 
recognised more frequently than low-typicality.  When participants were tested 
one week later, false alarms for low typicality reduced significantly (0.18 v .04) 
while high-typicality remained constant (0.44 v .45), suggesting that over time 
we are more susceptible to information that is more consistent (high typicality) 
with pre-existing schematic knowledge (Garcia-Bajos & Migueles, 2003, 2005).   
One study that has addressed the relationship between sleep and eyewitness 
testimony (Thorley, 2013) observed that decreased sleep quality and related 
increases in sleepiness reduced accuracy in recollecting peripheral details of a 
previously seen crime while central details remained unaffected, emphasising that 
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sleepiness and sleep deprivation can impair peripheral recollection, although as 
this study only focused sleep related details on immediate recall, it is unclear 
what effect intervening sleep will have.   
To the author’s knowledge few, if any, studies have addressed the role of 
sleep on these different item modalities when presented in a naturalistic free 
recall task.  As of yet only one study has attempted something similar; the 
binding memory study in chapter 3 replicated the methodology of Urgolites & 
Wood (2013b) but modified it to include sleep and wake conditions as a factor, 
alongside a second study using a set of object-scene composite stimuli.  
Participants were assigned to a sleep or wake group and in the first session 
viewed 40 novel action-scene composite sets and after a delay completed a two-
alternative forced choice recognition task to measure specific bound memory 
representations (i.e., recognition of a specific action/specific background pairing).  
Within the action-scene experiment sleep had no beneficial effect on recognition, 
decreasing proportion of items correctly recognised to chance levels, similar to 
the wake group, suggesting that any form of delay was a detriment to action-
scene recognition.  In contrast, within the object-scene experiment sleep 
preferentially preserved object-scene bound representations (64.4%) compared 
to the wake group (57%).  However, as this was a recognition task it is unclear if 
this difference will be replicated in a free recall task.  Moreover, the task was 
focused on actions, objects, and scenes; it is unknown what the effect of sleep 
may be on other modalities such as people when presented in combination.  
Within the current study participants were assigned to a sleep or wake group and 
in the first session viewed six CCTV videos of various crimes, completing a free 
recall question on each video after three videos.  In the second session 
participants completed a free recall question for each video without viewing the 
videos again.  We hypothesise that across both sessions actions should be 
recalled to a higher level than people, objects, and locations, in line with the 
previous literature (Old & Naveh-Benjamin, 2008; Kersten et al., 2008).  We also 
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hypothesise that sleep should have a beneficial impact upon consolidation across 
all item modalities compared to an equivalent period of wake, either due to lack of 
interference from encoding of new memories, or through actively consolidating 
the representation. 
 
2.  Methodology 
2.1 Participants 
41 participants (24 females, mean age = 19.84, SEM = 0.04) with normal 
or corrected to normal vision were randomly assigned to each of the 2 conditions 
(wake or sleep).  Participants initially signed up to the study agreeing to be tested 
on two sessions twelve hours apart, then the experimenter assigned them their 
specific timeslot in order to avoid any potential time preferences in the 
participants.  Participants were asked to maintain a normal sleep schedule for the 
two days prior to testing and were asked to sleep for at least 6h for the night 
preceding the study and refrain from drinking alcohol and caffeine for at least 12h 
prior to the start of the study.  Participants reported mean bed times of 11:04pm, 
wake times of 7:53am, and average sleep times of 8h 49m. 
Participants were either given course credits towards a first year module or 
paid £7 for participating upon completion of the study after the second session.  
Participants gave informed consent and were reminded they were free to 
withdraw from the study at any time without incurring any penalty.  The research 
was approved by the University Research Ethics Committee. 
2.2 Stimuli 
2.2.1 Videos 
6 videos, ranging from 30s to 2 minutes were used in the study.  The 
videos involved criminal activity captured on CCTV posted on Youtube.com.  All 
the videos included were not flagged as containing inappropriate content and 
none were age restricted.  The first video was footage of a woman having her 
purse stolen in a car park by two males.  The second video was of two males 
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robbing a small convenience store where a third male and a female are witnesses 
to the crime.  The third video was of a female being attacked on public transport.  
The fourth video was of 2 males attempting to rob a post office.  The fifth video 
was footage of 5 males breaking into a storage depot.  The sixth video was of a 
female shoplifting from a phone store (See figure 4.1) 
 
   
 
Figure 4.1 Video stills taken from 6 stimuli videos. Video length ranged from 30s 
to 2 minutes 
 
2.2.2 Questionnaires 
The questionnaire used in the study comprised a single, free recall 
question asking them to recall everything they could about the video including a 
prompt saying ‘Including the perpetrators, victims, the crime, the location, and 
any actions performed’, similar to other studies utilising a free recall paradigm 
(Gabbert, Hope, & Fisher, 2009).  Participants were also given a questionnaire 




Before attending the first session, participants were randomly assigned to 
one of two groups, a sleep group viewing the videos at 9pm then tested at 9am or 
a wake group viewing the videos at 9am then tested at 9pm.   
For the first session participants first completed consent forms and after 
completing a questionnaire on sleep habits viewed the first three CCTV videos.  
After watching three videos participants were then prompted with the free recall 
questionnaire for each of the three videos.  This procedure was then repeated for 
the next three videos.  12 hours later participants returned for the second session 
and were instructed to complete a free recall questionnaire for each video.  In the 
second session participants were given a total of 30 minutes to complete the 
same questionnaire for each of the six videos.  Participants did not view the 
videos again and no cues were given to participants about the content of the 
videos. 
2.4 Scoring 
Answers produced by free recall in the questionnaires were coded for 
information type in accordance within pre-existing coding guidelines based on the 
work of Memon et al.  (1996, Memon et al., 1997; Wright & Holliday, 2007).  
Information was coded into four key categories: people (P), actions (A), objects 
(O), and locations (L).  For example, a participant recalling “The man attacked the 
victim with a knife” would be coded as two person details (Man, Victim), one 
object (knife) and one action (attacked).  For the purpose of this study only 
correct information (statements that contained information that was present in 
the video) was included in subsequent analysis.  Information was recorded for 
each individual video split by modality as well as each modality totalled across all 
videos. 
3.  Results 
3 participants were excluded from the analysis due to not returning for the 
second session or failing to answer anything of content in response to at least 3 of 
the videos in the second session.  To account for variance across the different 
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modalities of information and differences in potential detail available in each 
video, a 2 (Group) by 4 (Item modality) by 6 (Video) MANOVA was conducted 
with number of information recalled the dependent variable.   
First a MANOVA was conducted across both session 1 and session 2 in 
order to determine any overall effect of item modality.  Overall there was a 
significant effect of item modality, F(3, 34) = 149.345, p < 0.001, eta = 0.929.  
Post-hoc analysis revealed that actions (M = 8.52, SE = 0.44), people (M = 5.42, 
SE = 0.32), objects (M = 4.27, SE = 0.24), and location (M = 0.299, SE = 0.16), 
were all significantly different from each other, all p < 0.001, with this pattern 
replicated in both session 1 and session 2.   
In order to account for differences between sessions, a 2 (Group) x 4 
(Modality) x 6 (Video) MANOVA reported the ratio of information recalled in 
session 2 compared to session 1 (value over 1 indicate more information in 
session 1 than session 2, values under 1 indicate less information recalled in 
session 2 than session 1).  Overall there was a significant effect of item modality, 
F(3, 34) = 5.570, p = 0.003, eta = 0.330.  Post-hoc analysis revealed that the 
only significant pairwise comparison was between object details (M = 0.910, SE = 
0.031) and action details (M = 1.022, SE = 0.033) p < 0.001, with all other 
pairwise comparisons between people (M = 1.051, SE = 0.042), and location (M 
= 1.046, SE = 0.064) non-significant, all p > 0.2.  There was also a significant 
effect of video, F(5, 32) = 6.813, p < 0.001, eta = 0.516 but no significant effect 
of group, F < 1, with both sleep (M = 1.125, SE = 0.058) and wake (1.075) 
similar (See table 4.1 for full summary of detail recall).  In order to examine the 
difference between session 1 and session 2 post-hoc analysis was also conducted 
on the change in number of accurate details recalled.  Paired sample T-test 
revealed that total object details significantly differed from session one (M = 
26.132, SE = 1.664) to session two (M = 23.763, SE = 1.572), t(37) = 3.414, p 
= 0.002; and a significant difference between total people details from session 
one (M = 38.605, SE = 2.008) to session two (M = 36.710, SE = 2.227), t(37) = 
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2.079, p = 0.045.  There was no significant difference between session one and 
two for action details or location details, both p > .5. 
Analysing two-way interactions, there was no significant interaction of item 
modality by group, F < 1, suggesting that sleep did not significantly affect item 
modalities in different ways way.  There was also no interaction of video by 
Group, F(5, 32) = 1.325, p = 0.279, eta = 0.172.  Analysing the three-way 
interactions, there was no significant item modality * video * group, F(15, 22) = 
1.097, p = 0.412, eta = 0.428. 
Table 4.1.  Table displaying the average recall for each item modality by session and ratio of 
information recalled from session 1 in session 2 (value over 1 indicate more information in session 1 
than session 2, values under 1 indicate less information recalled in session 1 than session 2). 
 Group 
 Wake Sleep 


































































Figure.  4.2.  Graph depicting mean number of details recalled for each Item modality split 





Figure.  4.3.  Graph depicting mean number of details recalled for each Item modality 
across sleep and wake groups.  Errors Bars are ± 1SEM. 
 
 
4.  Discussion 
Previous literature suggests that autobiographical memory and eyewitness 
accounts of events are often prone to errors, either through post-event 
misinformation (Lindsay & Johnson, 1989; Loftus, Miller, & Burns, 1978) or due to 
schema based biases (Garcia-Bajos & Migueles, 2003, 2005), raising questions of 
the validity of any given account.  While steps have been taken to ensure 
accurate recall, such as the Self-Administered Questionnaire (Gabbert et al., 
2009), cuts to funding and increased time pressure often means witnesses are 
not always interviewed immediately after an event, with delays common (Kebbel 
et al., 1999; Kebbel & Wagstaff, 1999).  As such, it is important to understand 
the impact of the beneficial role of sleep on consolidation of memory on such 
testimony.  Within the current study we sought to examine the role of sleep in 
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consolidation of different item modalities within eyewitness testimony of various 
crimes by measuring the number of action, objects, people, and location details.  
There was a difference based upon item modality, with action details recalled the 
most, then people, objects, and locations, but there was no significant Group 
difference; sleep had no beneficial effect on recall.   
 
The results are an interesting extension of the current literature.  First, 
participants were most accurate for actions, followed by people, then objects, and 
locations, with this pattern repeated across both sessions.  The result adds to a 
growing literature on item modalities in recall.  Previously, Old and Naveh-
Benjamin (2008) observed that in a recognition task actions were significantly 
more likely to be recognised than person details, a result replicated by Kersten et 
al.  (2008).  Within recall tasks, the literature is more varied.  While some studies 
have observed people and actions are recalled to a greater degree (Milne, Bull, 
Köhnen, & Memon, 1995), others have observed free recall elicits more object 
and action details (Memon et al., 1997; Granhag & Spjut, 2001).  Although it 
seems conflicted, it can be explained; although efforts have been made to 
standardise stimuli, the types and amount of details remembered is also 
dependent on the stimuli used.  For example, a video involving a single mugger 
and victim will naturally result in fewer person details compared to a multi-person 
fight.  Similarly, the salience and meaningfulness of different detail types depends 
on the nature of the event (Akehurst et al., 2003).  In the above example of a 
mugging, an event involving a large weapon will report more object details than a 
small weapon.   
Our main hypothesis of the study was that sleep would aid consolidation of 
the memory for events compared to a similar period of wake.  Recent studies 
examining sleep’s role in memory has found it is beneficial for consolidation of 
associations (Lewis & Durrant, 2011; Nadel et al., 2012, Walker & Stickgold, 
2010; for a summary, see.  Chatburn et al., 2014), both at a basic level such as 
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associative pairs (Staresina & Davachi, 2008), and more complex associations, 
such as prediction of future outcomes (Djonlagic et al., 2009) and aiding complex 
problem solving (Sio et al., 2013).  Recent models of sleep suggest that during 
sleep repeated activation of hippocampal networks repeatedly consolidate the 
representation (for a summary, see.  Diekelmann & Born, 2010; Rasch & Born, 
2013).  Such models emphasise the role of spreading activation in memory 
consolidation; Lewis and Durrant’s (2011) Information Overlap to Abstract (iOtA) 
Model suggests that as representations are repeatedly activated, shared 
categorical elements are preferentially strengthened through spreading activation, 
promoting schema-level memory formation.  As several studies have highlighted 
the role of spreading activation in eyewitness testimony (Collins & Loftus, 1975; 
Paulo et al., 2016), we hypothesised that sleep may preferentially aid 
consolidation compared to an equivalent period of wake.  Yet this was not the 
case, compared to an equivalent period of wake sleep had no significant benefit 
on proportion of information recalled from the first session, with no interaction 
with the item modality types either, going against our hypothesis.  In the 
introduction we discussed the study reported in Chapter 3 as evidence that sleep 
does preferentially consolidate certain item modalities and based on that we 
thought we may be able to replicate the difference in the current study.  Within 
their study it was observed that sleep had a beneficial effect on consolidation of 
object-scene composite recognition but not action-scene recognition, with Shaw 
and Monaghan theorising that prior knowledge and conceptual level “item 
prototypes” aided recognition of objects and scenes compared to actions.  As 
such, why does this effect not appear here? 
One explanation may be the level of detail that was required in the current 
study compared to the study in Chapter 3.  In their study participants were 
required to identify specific composites in a 2AFC task, relying upon high-fidelity 
representations from long-term memory.  In the current study by using a free 
recall task participants could retrieve information to a lower detail level than 
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required in the binding task but in terms of accuracy, remain similar.  For 
example, while participants in the action binding task of Chapter 3 may have been 
required to identify a jump with a twist to the left, in the current study 
participants could have said for the equivalent item the man jumped, meaning 
that a gist-based representation of the information would have sufficed as an 
accurate answer.  Further studies would need to verify this, potentially though a 
similar methodology to that of Chapter 3 whereby participants are presented with 
a 2AFC containing a screenshot from the video and a foil screenshot containing 
some elements that have been changed.  One study that has utilised a similar 
paradigm, albeit focused on false memory generation, is that of Lew and Howe 
(2016).  In their study, participants were presented with visual scenes that 
contained schema-inconsistent information (e.g., a kitchen with a pan on a stool) 
and observed that at retrieval participants were more likely to falsely remember 
the schema consistent location (e.g., pan on the kitchen worktop), than the 
schema inconsistent.  Although Lew and Howe’s study is focused on item-location 
binding within a spatial context, it could be adapted for an expansion on the 
current study when designed in conjunction with the iOtA model (Lewis & Durrant, 
2011) to examine the role of sleep in consolidation of schema-related information.  
One future adaptation could be to present modality-varied schema 
consistent/related/inconsistent videos of crimes (e.g., for object, a man being 
mugged with a knife/crowbar/crutch), and see if there are any differences based 
upon modality. 
A second explanation for the lack of a sleep effect may be the result of 
methodological issues with the study.  Within the current study participants were 
tested on recall on two occasions, immediately after viewing the videos and then 
after a 12h delay in order to compare the decrease in retrieval between groups.  
Yet, it may be that by implementing an immediate free recall task, this would 
mitigate any group difference.  There is an extensive literature that has 
demonstrated that immediate retrieval of information can benefit subsequent 
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recall (Bjork, 1988; Brock, Fisher, & Cutler, 1999; McCauley & Fisher, 1995; 
Shaw, Bjork, & Handal, 1995) in both learning information (Butler & Roediger, 
2007; McDaniel & Masson, 1985; Wheeler & Roediger, 1992), and in eyewitness 
recall (Ebbesen & Rienick, 1998), similar to the widely known testing effect 
whereby being tested on information immediately after learning can benefit 
subsequent retrieval (Roediger & Karpicke, 2006a, 2006b).  Ebbesen and Rienick 
(1998) observed that witnesses who had made an immediate recall attempt were 
less likely to suffer subsequent memory loss and recall performance was 
preferentially preserved over a retention interval of 4 weeks.  This beneficial 
effect of recall may be explained through associative activation network models of 
memory; in actively retrieving the memory through a recall task the episodic 
memory representation is further strengthened (Anderson, 1983, Damasio, 
1989).  It is also theorised that through active retrieval participants are able to 
create different retrieval routes to information, offering more memory traces in 
order to access the episodic memory (Bjork, 1988; Schacter, Norman, & Koustaal, 
1998).  As such it may be that if participants didn’t have the initial retrieval 
practice through the session 1 free recall task, we may have seen an effect of 
sleep compared to wake due to its promotion of associative memory, but this is a 
direction for future studies.  The introduction of an initial recall task may also 
explain the increase in action details in the second session.  When measured by 
proportion of information recalled from session one in session two, this pattern 
was replicated, actions were recalled significantly more often that people, objects, 
but not locations.  In fact, the number of actions recalled in session two was often 
higher than in session one, something which did not occur for any other item 
modality.  Again, this appears consistent within the eyewitness literature with 
Turtle and Yuille (1994) demonstrating that repeated eyewitness recall can lead to 
an increase in recall in subsequent recall attempts, similar to the benefits of 
retrieval practice.  As actions were the most salient item modality across all 




In summary, within the current study we sought to examine the role of 
sleep in consolidation of different item modalities.  While we were able to replicate 
the existing literature that actions, objects, people, and locations can be recalled 
to differing levels (e.g., Old & Naveh Benjamin, 2008; Wright & Holiday, 2007), 
we were unable to observe any significant effect of sleep on consolidation, an 
effect the previous literature alludes to (for a summary, see.  Diekelmann & Born, 
2010; Rasch & Born, 2013), but part of the lack of an effect may be due to 
methodological issues, introducing an immediate free recall task enhancing 
subsequent recall through retrieval practice, reducing any effect of sleep v wake.   
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Chapter 5.  Lateralised sleep spindles relate to false memory generation 
In the previous papers the primary focus has been on the role of sleep in 
associative memory in the consolidation of novel associations, best represented in 
the decontextualised object-scene/action-scene composite tasks.  The results of 
the studies suggest that sleep is beneficial to consolidating these links, but they 
are somewhat dependent on prior knowledge.  There is already an extensive 
literature on the link between associative memory and sleep architecture (e.g., 
hippocampal ripples, slow wave ripples, sleep spindles), the final study sought to 
expand upon this further, expanding the results of a pre-thesis study on the 
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 Lateralised sleep spindles relate to false memory generation  
Abstract 
 Sleep is known to enhance false memories: After presenting participants 
with lists of semantically related words, sleeping before recalling these words 
results in a greater acceptance of unseen “lure” words related in theme to 
previously seen words.  Furthermore, the right hemisphere (RH) seems to be 
more prone to false memories than the left hemisphere (LH).  In the current 
study, we investigated the sleep architecture associated with these false memory 
and lateralisation effects in a nap study.  Participants viewed lists of related 
words, then stayed awake or slept for approximately 90 minutes, and were then 
tested for recognition of previously seen-old, unseen-new, or unseen-lure words 
presented either to the LH or RH.  Sleep increased acceptance of unseen-lure 
words as previously seen compared to the wake group, particularly for RH 
presentations of word lists.  RH lateralised stage 2 sleep spindle density relative 
to the LH correlated with this increase in false memories, suggesting that RH 
sleep spindles enhanced false memories in the RH. 
Key-words 
Sleep spindles, memory, false memory, sleep consolidation, hemispheric 
lateralisation 
Highlights 
A daytime nap promotes false memories of words. 
Sleep enhances false memories in the right hemisphere. 
Sleep spindles in the right hemisphere promote false memories.  
2 
 
1.  Introduction 
 Sleep has a profound impact on the consolidation of new memories.  
Contemporary models of memory consolidation suggest that during sleep 
memories are repeatedly reactivated in hippocampal networks (Rasch, Büchel, 
Gais, & Born, 2007; Rudoy, Voss, Westerberg, & Paller, 2009), with this 
reactivation gradually leading to plastic synaptic changes within neocortical 
networks, thus consolidating the memory.  Furthermore, different sleep stages 
have been found to have different influences on this process.  For instance, slow-
wave sleep (SWS) has been found to be beneficial for declarative memory 
consolidation (for a summary, see Diekelmann & Born, 2010; Marshall & Born, 
2007), whilst NREM stage 2 has been linked to both declarative (Gais, Mölle, 
Helms, & Born, 2002; Genzel, Dresler, Wehrle, Grözinger, & Steiger, 2009; Ruch 
et al, 2012; van der Helm, Gujar, Nishida, & Walker, 2011), and procedural-motor 
task consolidation (Fogel & Smith, 2006; Fogel, Smith, & Cote, 2007; Nishida & 
Walker, 2007).   
 Sleep spindles have also been directly related to memory consolidation.  
Considered a characteristic feature of stage 2 sleep, but also present during SWS, 
spindles (10 -16 Hz oscillations lasting up to 3s) are thalamocortical oscillations 
that are implicated in offline information processing for both declarative and 
procedural learning (Clemens, Fabo, & Halasz, 2005; Cox, Hofman, & Talamini, 
2012; Gais et al., 2002; Nishida & Walker, 2007; Ruch et al., 2012; Schabus et 
al., 2004, 2008; Tamaki, Matsuoka, Nittono, & Hori., 2008; Tamminen, Payne, 
Stickgold, Wamsley, & Gaskell, 2010; van der Helm, Gujar, Nishida, & Walker, 
2011), and have been interpreted in terms of information transfer from 
hippocampus to neocortex (Diekelmann & Born, 2010; Rasch & Born, 2013).  
Moreover, different types of spindle have been identified.  Fast spindles (13-15Hz) 
largely occur during stage 2 sleep and are focused around the centro-parietal 
region, and have been linked to hippocampal activity suggesting a role in memory 
consolidation (Diekelmann & Born, 2010; Girardeau, Benchenane, Wiener, 
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Buzsaki, & Zugaro, 2009; van der Helm et al., 2011).  Slow spindles (10-12Hz) 
are primarily observed in frontal areas and although are present during stage 2, 
are more commonly associated with SWS.  For integration of vocabulary with 
long-term store, Tamminen, Lambon Ralph, and Lewis (2013) observed that 
lateralised LH spindle activity was predictive of degree of integration of new words 
in semantic memory.   These results are consistent with the theory that sleep aids 
integration of recent experiences into the long-term vocabulary store (Dumay & 
Gaskell, 2007, 2012) which is primarily located in the LH (Ellis et al., 2009; 
Tamminen et al., 2010). 
 However, sleep effects on memory are not only limited to veridical 
memory, with recent studies demonstrating that sleep is also important for 
abstraction and extraction of “gist”, or the common theme, from sets of 
information (Durrant & Lewis, 2009; Fischer, Drosopoulos, Tsen, & Born, 2006; 
Gomez, Bootzin, & Nadel, 2006), as well as enabling integration of information 
from multiple memories (Ellenbogen, Hu, Payne, Titone, & Walker, 2007; 
Tamminen, Payne, Stickgold, Wamsley, & Gaskell, 2010), and allowing extraction 
of proto-rules and themes from newly encoded memories (Nadel, Hupbach, 
Gomez, & Newman-Smith, 2012; Nere, Hashmi, Cirelli, & Tononi, 2013).   
 Sleep can also affect generation of false memories for information that had 
not been previously experienced (Diekelmann, Born, & Wagner, 2010; Pardilla-
Delgado & Payne, 2017; Payne et al., 2009).  In the field of false memory 
research, the most common form of test uses the Deese-Roediger-McDermott 
(DRM, Deese, 1959; Roediger & McDermott, 1995) paradigm that exposes 
participants to lists of semantically related words (e.g., bed, rest, awake, tired, 
dream, wake, snooze, nap, snore), and then tests recall or recognition of words 
that are part of the list (seen-old), not related to the list (unseen-new), or not 
previously seen but related to the theme of the list (unseen-lure words, e.g., for 
the above examples, sleep).  Participants are more likely to accept as previously 
seen the unseen-lure rather than the unseen-new words (McDermott, 1996; 
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Roediger, Watson, McDermott, & Gallo, 2001; Stadler, Roediger, & McDermott, 
1999; Underwood, 1965).   
 Payne et al.  (2009) linked false memory effects to different sleep stages, 
and found a negative correlation between time spent in SWS and recall accuracy 
in both overnight and nap studies, indicating that SWS promoted false memories.  
Pardilla-Delgado and Payne (2017) performed a similar study but with both a 
recall and a recognition task.  Though there was no significant correlation 
between SWS and recall accuracy, they observed a significant negative correlation 
between SWS and false memory recognition, with the authors suggesting this was 
due to SWS supporting consolidation of contextual and episodic details of the DRM 
lists increasing the ability to discriminate between presented and non-presented 
words, akin to source-monitoring that has been shown to decrease false 
recognition (Neuschatz, Benoit, & Payne, 2003).  Lutz, Diekelmann, Hinse-Stern, 
Born, and Rauss (2017) found that a single night of sleep increased veridical 
memory, but multiple nights of sleep contributed to extraction of gist from 
visually presented sets of items in the DRM paradigm. 
 There are numerous studies demonstrating the beneficial influence of SWS 
on consolidation of veridical episodic and declarative memory (for a summary, 
see.  Diekelmann & Born, 2010; Marshall & Born, 2007; Peigneux et al., 2004; 
Takashima et al., 2006), but also increased abstraction and gist extraction of 
memory (Gomez et al., 2006; Fischer et al., 2006, Lewis & Durrant, 2011), and 
gist extraction could be a plausible explanation for this false memory generation 
and the negative correlation between SWS and recall accuracy.  False memory 
effects could be due to extraction of a central theme, or gist, from a set of related 
information which then prompts acceptance of an unseen-lure word (due to 
abstraction and extraction of a gist from a set of related information, which then 
prompts acceptance of an unseen-lure word (Brainerd & Reyna, 2005).  Lewis and 
Durrant (2011) propose a theoretical model to account for these effects of gist 
extraction associated with sleep.  The “information Overlap to Abstract” (iOtA) 
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model proposes that gist extraction occurs alongside memory consolidation, 
where overlapping replay of related memories during sleep preferentially 
strengthens the shared elements of a set of information, such as an unseen lure 
word from a thematically related list of words.  Alternatively, it may be that 
broader associations in long-term semantic memory in the neocortex are more 
active during sleep (Cai, Mednick, Harrison, Kanady, & Mednick, 2009; Sio, 
Monaghan, & Ormerod, 2013) which could contribute to increased false memories 
as more distant associates to the seen words, including unseen-lure words 
(Roediger, Watson, McDermott, & Gallo, 2001) would then be activated (Howe, 
Wilkinson, & Monaghan, 2012). 
 Whereas Payne et al.  (2009) demonstrated the role of SWS in false 
memory formation, and despite their role in hippocampal to neocortical transfer, 
there have been no previous studies of the role of sleep spindles in false 
memories.  The first aim of our study was to determine how sleep spindles related 
to consolidation of veridical and false memories in the DRM paradigm.  In 
accordance with previous studies indicating that sleep spindle density relates to 
consolidation of recent experience with long-term memory (e.g., Tamminen et al., 
2013), we predicted that LH lateralised sleep spindle density would relate to 
veridical memory for the DRM task as this would promote alignment of words 
seen with their long-term representation in the vocabulary store. 
 However, the role of the RH in veridical and false memory and the effect of 
sleep on its processing are understudied.  Both the LH and RH are capable of 
processing words (Marsolek & Deason, 2007; Shillcock, Ellison, & Monaghan, 
2000), but do so with different signatures in terms of semantic processing effects.  
Distantly associated words prime one another in the RH, whereas only closely 
associated words are primed in the LH, which indicates that the LH semantic 
associative network prioritises a small network of strongly-associated words 
whereas the RH activates a broader network of more weakly-associated words 
(Beeman, 1998; Beeman & Bowman, 2000; Monaghan, Shillcock, & McDonald, 
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2004), analogous to coarse- and fine- coding asymmetries seen in visual 
processing between the two hemispheres (Brady, Campbell, & Flaherty, 2005; 
Christman, Kitterle, & Hellige, 1991; Hsiao, Cipollini, & Cottrell, 2013; Monaghan 
& Shillcock, 2004).  It has previously been observed that more false memories for 
DRM lists occur when words are presented to the RH rather than the LH at 
retrieval (Bellamy & Shillcock, 2007; Faust, Ben-Artzi, & Harel, 2008; Ito, 2001; 
Westerberg & Marsolek, 2003).   
 Furthermore, during overnight sleep, there is greater activity in the RH 
than the LH in the early half of the night (Casagrande & Bertini, 2008a, 2008b; 
Natale et al., 2007, 2010) indicating potential for asymmetries in the effect of 
sleep on memory to occur.  Monaghan, Shaw, Ashworth-Lord, and Newbury 
(2017) tested behaviourally the effect of overnight sleep on lateralised memory 
by presenting DRM stimuli to the LH or RH at retrieval.  They replicated studies 
finding that sleep facilitated false memories, and further demonstrated a 
differential effect of sleep on LH versus RH recognition accuracy, with sleep 
promoting accuracy in the LH compared to the RH, whereas the wake group 
showed an advantage for accuracy in the RH compared to the LH.  These results 
were interpreted as sleep primarily affecting access to veridical memory in the LH, 
thus opening up the possibility that the RH is key for generation of false 
memories, either by sleep promoting gist extraction in the RH or by increasing 
spreading activation in the broader associative network in the RH thereby 
increasing activation of unseen lure words during testing.   
 In the current study we extended the behavioural study of Monaghan et al.  
(2017), which demonstrated a lateralised effect of memory retrieval for DRM word 
lists, by using a nap study paradigm where we measured the relationship between 
sleep architecture and construction of false memories.  We hypothesised that the 
key effects of sleep-enhanced false memory would be reproduced in our study.  
We also predicted that, if the RH is dominant in false memory generation then we 
should observe enhanced false memories (greater acceptance of unseen lure 
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words) in the RH compared to the LH associated with sleep.  Furthermore, if sleep 
affects veridical memory consolidation then we should observe increased 
acceptance of seen old words in the LH than the RH associated with sleep.  In 
terms of sleep architecture, we predicted that sleep spindles will contribute to 
generation of representations of previously experienced words (Tamminen et al., 
2013) with LH involved in veridical memory, and in addition predicted that sleep 
spindles in the RH may involve consolidation with the broader semantic 
associative network, resulting in enhanced gist extraction or greater activation of 
distantly related associates.   
2.  Method 
2.1 Participants 
 A total of 32 healthy, medication free university students (26 females; 
mean age = 19.72, SE = 0.30) were paid £21 for participating.  Participants 
maintained a normal sleep schedule for two days prior to testing as reported by 
sleep diaries, were asked to sleep at least 8 hours for the night preceding the 
study, and abstain from alcohol and caffeine based products for 12 hours 
preceding the study.  All participants were right-handed as assessed by the 
Oldfield Handedness questionnaire (1971).  This research was approved by the 
University Research Ethics Committee. 
2.2 Stimuli 
 For the memory task a total of 12 word lists were taken from Stadler et al.  
(1999).  Each list contained 10 words associated with a semantic topic, along with 
an associated unseen-lure word which related to the theme of the word list (the 
list themes were: car, chair, doctor, bread, fruit, sleep, thief, river, needle, music, 
mountain, king).  For testing, 48 words comprising 12 unseen-lure words, 24 
seen-old words (two previously seen-old words from each word list), and 12 
unrelated unseen-new words taken from other unused DRM word lists in Stadler 
et al.  (1999) were used.  All words were presented in lower case Courier New 
bold, black, 18 point font on a computer screen.  In the training task words were 
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presented centrally to avoid any potential hemispheric bias at encoding.  During 
the recognition task lateralised presentations of words were positioned with the 
near edge of the word 2.9° either to the left or right of the fixation point and 
subtending between 2.9° and 4.5° of the visual field depending on the word’s 
length.  In total 12 seen-old, 6 unseen-lure, and 6 unseen-new words were 
presented to each hemisphere. 
  2.3 Procedure 
 Participants arrived at the sleep lab at 11:30h and were attached with the 
polysomnography equipment regardless of group, in order to prevent any 
confounds that may arise from expectations about the study conditions.  At 
approximately 12:00h they participated in the exposure phase of the memory 
task.  Participants sat 60cm from a computer screen that displayed a central 
fixation point for 500ms followed by a word presented horizontally in the centre of 
the screen for 1500ms.  After viewing all the words from one list of thematically 
related words they completed maths problems as a distractor task for 30 s before 
moving onto the next list.  The process was repeated until all 12 word lists had 
been seen.  The word list order, and order of words within each list, was 
randomised. 
 Participants were then randomly assigned into a sleep or wake group.  
Those in the sleep group were monitored with polysomnography (PSG), recorded 
with an Embla N7000 system using EEG sites O1, O2, C3, C4, F3, and F4 
referenced against the contralateral mastoid (M1 and M2).  All signals were 
digitally sampled at a rate of 200 Hz and verified at the beginning and the end of 
the study to have a connection impedance of <5kΩ, with any noisy channels 
removed from analysis.  Sleep participants had the opportunity to sleep from 
12:15h until 14:00h, whereas those in the wake group watched an emotionally 
neutral movie with no verbal stimuli (a Mr Bean cartoon or a nature documentary) 
with neutral music played over for the same duration and were monitored to 
ensure they remained awake.  At 14:00 those in the sleep group were woken and 
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were given the opportunity to remove sensors and have a short break to prevent 
any potential effects of sleep inertia before completing the recognition task. 
 At 14:15h the memory recognition phase began.  Participants were again 
sat 60cm from the computer screen, and were instructed to press a yes or no key 
according to whether they had previously seen a word appearing on a computer 
screen or not.  At the start of each trial a central fixation point appeared in the 
screen for 500ms, which participants were instructed to focus on, followed by a 
word presented to the left or right hemisphere for 120ms.  The unseen-lure 
words, seen-old words, and unseen-new words were assigned equally to the right 
or left hemisphere presentation and were presented in random order.  Once all 48 
test words were presented, the study was finished.  Viewing location was not 
recorded, which was a limitation of our study.  However, participants show 
excellent conformity with fixation instructions, with 97% of fixations at the 
requested location in lateralisation studies for word presentations (Lavidor & 
Whitney, 2004). 
 Sleep data were scored in 30s epochs independently by two sleep 
researchers in accordance with the standardised sleep scoring criteria of 
Rechtschaffen and Kales (1968).  For spindle analysis, as spindles mainly emerge 
over the frontal-centro and centro-parietal areas, only electrodes positioned in 
these locations were analysed.  Spindle analysis involved NREM (stage 2 and slow 
wave sleep) band-pass filtered (11-15Hz) using a linear finite impulse response 
filter, with the range selected based on Tamminen et al.  (2013).  Using an 
automated detection algorithm (Ferrarelli et al., 2007) we derived the number of 
discrete spindle effects for each channel, with amplitude fluctuations in the 
filtered time series exceeding a predetermined threshold counted as spindles.  
Thresholds were calculated relative to mean channel amplitude (eight times 
average amplitude).   
 As slow and fast frequency spindles may relate to distinct memory 
consolidation processes (Mölle, Bergmann, Marshall, & Born, 2011; van der Helm 
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et al., 2011), spindles were filtered for slow (11-13Hz) and fast (13-15Hz) sleep 
spindles, with the frequency range consistent with Ferrarelli et al.  (2007), 
Tamminen et al.  (2013), and van der Helm et al.  (2011). 
3.  Results 
3.1 Statistical Analysis 
 Criteria for including participants for analysis were participants reporting 
more than 6 hours sleep per night in the 3 nights leading up to the study and 
sleeping in the study for more than 50 minutes within the sleep condition, and all 
participants passed these criteria.  We first tested whether previously observed 
behavioural effects of overnight sleep on memory for words were reproduced here 
in a nap study, determining (1) whether there was an overall false memory effect, 
i.e., greater unseen-lure word than unseen-new word acceptance; (2) whether 
this false memory effect was enhanced by sleep (Payne et al., 2009); and (3) 
whether the dominance of veridical memory of studied words in the LH was a 
consequence of sleep (Monaghan et al., 2017).  We conducted a 3-way mixed 
ANOVA with response accuracy in terms of proportion of words recognised as old 
as the dependent variable, group (sleep or wake) as between subjects factor, and 
hemisphere (LH, RH) and word type (unseen-lure, unseen-new, seen-old) as 
within subjects factors.  See Table 5.1 for the descriptive statistics.  As each word 
type represents a different measure of memory (i.e., hits in seen-old, false alarms 
in unseen-new, and false memories in unseen-lure), we also performed ANOVAs 
for each word type separately, as in previous studies of false memory and sleep 
(see Diekelmann et al., 2008, 2010; Fenn et al., 2009).   
 After these ANOVAs, we then determined the relation between the 
significant memory effects associated with sleep and measures of sleep 
architecture, including sleep spindles.  In these analyses, significance values were 
initially corrected for multiple comparisons between each sleep stage and sleep 
spindles and memory tests (correction was for 12 tests initially).  Follow-up 
correlations had significance values corrected within sets of comparisons. 
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 Finally, we verified whether observations of veridical and false memories 
from the recognition rates for each word type separately were verified by signal 
detection analyses were applied to the data.  It may be the case that effects of 
sleep on false memories, for instance, are a consequence of changes in 
discriminability to memory of these words, or it may be that sleep affects the 
response bias of participants to accept more words as old.  To address this, we 
conducted analyses of true and false recognition rates according to the non-
parametric signal detection measures A’ (sensitivity) and B’’ (response bias) 
(Boice & Gardner, 1988; Donaldson, 1992; Snodgrass & Corwin, 1988) as used in 
Pardilla-Delgado and Payne (2017) for analysing effects of delay between 
encoding and recognition on false memories in order to make our results 
comparable to previous literature.   
 We distinguished measures of true recognition (distinguishing between 
old-seen and old-unseen words), and false recognition (distinguishing between 
old-lure and old-unseen words), computed separately for the LH and the RH, 
where the formulae were as follows (where H is seen-old hit rate, FAF is unseen-
new false recognition, and FAC is unseen-lure false recognition): 
 True recognition: A’ = 0.5 + ((H - FAF)(1 + H - FAF)) / (4H(1 - 
FAF)) assuming H ≥ FAF, and A’ = 0.5 + ((FAF - H)(1 + FAF - H)) / (4FAF(1 - 
H))  assuming FAF > H.  B” = (H(1 - H) – FAF(1 – FAF))/(H(1 – H) + FAF(1 – 
FAF)) when H ≥ FAF, and (FAF(1 - FAF) – H(1 – H))/(FAF(1 – FAF) + H(1 – H)) 
when FAF > H.   
 False recognition: A’ = 0.5 + ((FAC - FAF)(1 + FAC - FAF)) / (4FAC(1 - 
FAF)) assuming FAC ≥ FAF, and A’ = 0.5 + ((FAF - FAC)(1 + FAF - FAC)) / 
(4FAF(1 - FAC))  assuming FAF > FAC.  B” = (FAC(1 - FAC) – FAF(1 – 
FAF))/(FAC(1 – FAC) + FAF(1 – FAF)) when FAC ≥ FAF, and (FAF(1 - FAF) – FAC(1 






3.2 Recognition rate by word type 
 There were no significant main effects of sleep or wake group, F(1, 30) = 
1.296, p = 0.264, ηp2  = 0.041, or hemisphere, F < 1, p = ns, but there was a 
main effect of word type, F(2, 60) = 59.674, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.665, 
demonstrating the standard false memory effect, with unseen-new words (M = 
0.224, SE = 0.025) resulting in significantly fewer false recognitions than unseen-
lure words (M = 0.680, SE = 0.025, p < 0.001) which were recognised as old 
words not significantly different than seen-old words (M = 0.609, SE = 0.025, p = 
0.100).   
 
Table 5.1.  Proportion identified as ‘Seen-Old’ (SE in parentheses) for each word 
type, by hemisphere, and sleep or wake group.  (LVF- Left Visual Field, RH- Right 
Hemisphere, RVF- Right Visual Field, LH- Left Hemisphere). 
Word Type Sleep  Wake  
 LVF/RH RVF/LH LVF/RH RVF/LH 
Seen-Old 0.621 (0.045) 0.678 (0.034) 0.559 (0.045) 0.577 (0.034) 
Unseen-New 0.229 (0.057) 0.125 (0.059) 0.282 (0.057) 0.261 (0.059) 
Unseen-Lure 0.802 (0.057) 0.677 (0.049) 0.572 (0.057) 0.667 (0.049) 
 
  
 Also as predicted, there was a significant word type by group interaction, 
F(2, 60) = 3.229, p = 0.047, ηp2  = 0.097.  Simple main effects analyses revealed 
this was due to the wake group (M = 0.619, SE = 0.046) identifying fewer lure 
words as previously appearing than the sleep group (M = 0.759, SE = 0.037), 
F(1, 30) = 5.438, p = 0.025 ηp2 = 0.156, again replicating previous observations 
of sleep increasing false memories.  There were no significant differences in 
unseen-new, F(1, 30) = 1.544, p = 0.224 ηp2 = 0.049, or seen-old, F(1, 30) = 
3.433, p = 0.074 ηp2 = 0.103, word recognition rates between the wake and sleep 
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groups (see Figure 5.1).  There was no significant hemisphere by group 
interaction, F(1, 30) = 3.497, p = 0.071, ηp2  = 0.104,  or hemisphere by word 
type interaction, F(1, 30) = 1.741, p = 0.184, ηp2  = 0.055. 
 
 There was also a marginally significant 3-way interaction between 
hemisphere, word type, and group, F(2,60) = 2.867, p = 0.065, ηp2 = 0.087.  As 
previous studies have conducted analyses separately for each word type and 
revealed sleep-specific effects on false memories (Diekelmann et al., 2008, 2010; 
Fenn et al., 2009), we also performed these separate analyses in order to 
examine the effect of sleep on each word type.  Unseen-lure words showed no 
significant effect of hemisphere, F < 1, p = ns, but a significant effect of group, 
F(1, 30) =  5.142, p = 0.027, ηp2 = 0.114, with the sleep group significantly more 
likely to identify unseen-lure words as old (M = 0.740, SE = 0.037) compared to 
the wake group (M = 0.620, SE = 0.037).  There was also a significant 
hemisphere by group interaction, F(1, 30) = 4.321, p = 0.016, ηp2 = 0.179.  
Further post-hoc analysis revealed this interaction came from a non-significant 
difference in the LH between sleep (M = 0.677, SE = 0.053) and wake groups (M 
= 0.667, SE = 0.053), F < 1, p = ns, but a significant difference in the RH 
between sleep (M = 0.803, SE = 0.053), and wake group (M = 0.573, SE = 
0.053), F(1, 30)= 8.169, p = 0.008, ηp2  = 0.214, suggesting that sleep led to a 
significant increase in RH unseen-lure word acceptance, but no difference in the 
LH.  The difference between RH and LH recognition was not significant in either 
the sleep group, F(1, 15)= 4.442, p = 0.053, ηp2 = 0.228, or the wake group, 




Figure 5.1.  Proportion of words endorsed as ‘Old’ by word type for sleep and 
wake groups by hemisphere.  Error bars show ± 1 SEM. 
  
For unseen-new words, as expected there was no significant difference 
between group, F(1, 30) = 1.676, p = 0.205, ηp2  = 0.053, hemisphere, F(1, 30) 
= 2.567, p = 0.120, ηp2  = 0.079, or a group by hemisphere interaction, F < 1, p 
= ns.  For seen-old words there was no significant effect of group, F(1, 30) = 
3.433, p = 0.078, ηp2  = 0.100, hemisphere, F(1, 30) = 1.201, p = 0.282, ηp2  = 
0.038 or a group by hemisphere interaction, both F < 1, p = ns. 
3.3 Sleep stage effects 
 We measured total sleep time, time spent in stage 1, stage 2, SWS, and 
REM for the sleep group (see Table 5.2).  We then correlated proportion of time in 
each sleep stage with memory accuracy for each word type, separately for LH and 
RH as well as averaged over the two hemispheres, to determine whether false or 
studied words were affected by particular sleep stages.  REM sleep was excluded 





of sleep time was used to control for total sleep time between participants.  There 
were no significant correlations between proportion of any sleep stage and 
accuracy (See Table 5.3).  Correlations between total sleep time and memory 
accuracy measures were similar. 
 




Table 5.2.  Mean duration stage 1, stage 2, SWS, and REM sleep in minutes ± 1 
SEM. 
Table 5.3.  Correlation coefficients between recognition accuracy, and proportion 
of total time slept in each sleep stage. 
  
 For the sleep spindle analysis, as spindles in different sleep stages have 
been demonstrated to have distinct effects on memory (Cox et al., 2012), 
spindles were measured in both stage 2 and SWS separately.  In order to control 
for variability between participants in total time in each sleep stage, spindle-per-
minute density was measured for each individual electrode site.  The difference 
between LH and RH spindle density was computed to determine the lateralisation 
Sleep Stage Minutes ± SEM 
Total Sleep Time 69.46 ± 3.65 
Stage 1 16.93 ± 1.88 
Stage 2 29.75 ± 2.28 
SWS 20.68 ± 2.39 
REM 2.09 ± 0.65 
Average Wake after Sleep Onset 17.9 ± 2.08 














Stage 1  -0.121 -0.141 0.151 0.019 -0.173 
Stage 2  -0.216 -0.149 -0.029 -0.083 -0.242 
SWS 0.083 0.290 -0.162 -0.066 0.285 
16 
 
effects of spindles in adjacent electrode sites (C3-C4, F3-F4) in order to 
determine lateralised spindles when controlled for overall spindle density, which 
varies between participants and can be related to other performance 
characteristics (such as IQ, Schabus et al., 2006; Ujma, Sandor, Szakadat, 
Gombos, & Bodizs, 2016).  We refer to the difference between LH and RH sleep 
spindle density in terms of lateralisation of spindles, which describes a relative 
lateralisation in terms of imbalance between spindles in the LH and the RH. 
3.3.1 Stage 2 sleep spindles 
 In these analyses, we focused on unseen-lure word recognition as this was 
the key effect in the behavioural results.  There was a significant correlation 
between unseen-lure false recognition and C3-C4 stage 2 spindle density, r = -
0.748, p = 0.004 (corrected), see Figure 5.2 indicating that false memories 
increased as lateralisation of spindles to the RH increased.  Distinguishing 
between performance in the LH and the RH demonstrated a significant correlation 
between C3-C4 stage 2 spindle density and LH unseen-lure recognition accuracy, 
r = -0.593, p = 0.015, (p = 0.045 corrected), but not between C3-C4 stage 2 
spindle density and RH unseen-lure recognition accuracy, r = -0.471, p = 0.066, 
uncorrected), though in each case the lateralisation effects were similar: greater 
RH compared to LH spindle density resulted in greater false memories. 
 
For F3-F4 stage 2 sleep spindle density, there was no significant 
correlation between unseen-lure recognition accuracy and F3-F4, r = -0.066, p = 
0.808, nor for LH unseen-lure recognition accuracy, r = -0.153, p = 0.572, or RH 





Figure 5.2.  Correlation between lateralised spindle density (C3-C4) by unseen-
lure recognition accuracy. 
  
 In order to determine whether density of spindles within each hemisphere, 
rather than the lateralised density measure was driving the memory effects, 
further correlations were conducted with individual electrode site (C3, C4, F3, F4) 
stage 2 spindle densities (see Table 5.4).  None of the correlations were 
significant.  Distinguishing between LH and RH unseen lure false recognition also 
resulted in no significant correlations, after corrections for multiple comparisons 
(see Table 5.4).  These results indicated that the critical effect on lure word 
recognition was due to differences in spindle density measured across sites C3 
and C4. 
Table 5.4.  Correlation coefficients between overall, LH and RH unseen lure false 
recognition with individual electrode sleep spindle density in sleep stage 2.  
* p = 0.024 uncorrected, p = 0.288 corrected. 




RH Unseen-Lure Word 
Recognition 
C3 -0.477 -0.561* 0.012 
C4 -0.083 -0.262 0.283 
F3 -0.417 -0.204 -0.168 
F4 -0.334 -0.082 -0.159 
r = -.748 




Further correlations were also conducted between the lateralised spindle 
measures (C3-C4, F3-F4) and seen-old word recognition and unseen-new word 
recognition.  None of the correlations were significant (See Table 5.5).  Hence, 
the correlations with sleep spindles were only found for the significant behavioural 
changes in memory performance. 
 
Table 5.5.  Correlation coefficients between seen-old and unseen-new recognition 
with lateralised sleep spindle density in sleep stage 2. 




C3-C4 -0.343 -0.067 
F3-F4 0.222 -0.162 
 
3.3.2 SWS Sleep spindles 
 In order to see if the spindle correlations were specific to stage 2, 
correlations were conducted between lateralised SWS spindle density (C3-C4, F3-
F4) and overall unseen-lure word recognition, LH unseen-lure word recognition, 
and RH unseen-lure word recognition.  None were significant, all r < 0.321, p > 
0.226.  Correlations between individual electrode sites (C3, C4, F3, F4) and 
overall unseen-lure word recognition, LH unseen-lure word recognition, and RH 
unseen-lure word recognition were also all non-significant, all r < 0.372, p > 
0.156. 
3.3.3 Slow and fast sleep spindles 
To determine whether differences between C3 and C4 spindle density 
relating to the memory effects were due to slow or fast spindles, we correlated 
C3-C4 spindle density with the slow (11-13Hz) and fast (13-15Hz) filters applied, 
and correlated with overall unseen-lure recognition, LH unseen-lure recognition, 
and RH unseen-lure recognition.   
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 For slow spindles, there were no significant correlations between C3-C4 
and overall unseen-lure recognition accuracy, r = -0.198, p = 0.463, LH unseen 
lure recognition accuracy, r = 0.038, p = 0.888, or RH unseen lure recognition 
accuracy, r = -0.273, p = 0.306.  However, for fast spindles, there was a 
significant correlation between C3-C4 and overall unseen-lure recognition 
accuracy, r = -0.619, p = 0.011, but no significant correlation with LH unseen 
lure recognition accuracy, r = -0.446, p = 0.083, or RH unseen lure recognition 
accuracy, r = -0.469, p = 0.067.  These results suggest that fast rather than slow 
sleep spindles were driving the observed memory effects. 
3.4 Signal detection analyses 
 Signal detection analyses enable distinctions between whether the 
observations of sleep effects for accuracy of unseen lure word recognition were 
due to changes in sensitivity, or whether they could be accounted for by changes 
in response bias as a consequence of sleep.  Table 5.6 reports the descriptive 
statistics for the measures of A’ (discriminability) and B’’ (response bias) by group 
and hemisphere for true recognition (responding differently to old compared to 
new unrelated words) and for false recognition (responding differently to lure 
compared to new unrelated words).  We conducted ANOVAs on A’ and B’’ 
measures separately, with group (sleep, wake), hemisphere (RH, LH) and 
memory type (true recognition, false recognition) as factors.  We first investigated 
the three-way interaction, then, unpacked this due to the sleep effect on different 




Table 5.6.  Discriminability as measured by A’ (SE in parentheses) and response 
bias as measured by B’ (SE in parentheses) by memory type, hemisphere, and 
group.  (LVF- Left Visual Field, RH- Right Hemisphere, RVF- Right Visual Field, LH- 
Left Hemisphere). 
Word Type Sleep  Wake  
 LVF/RH RVF/LH LVF/RH RVF/LH 


































For A’, there was a significant 3-way interaction between group, 
hemisphere, and true or false recognition memory, F(1, 30) = 17.353, p < 0.001, 
ηp2 = 0.366. When split by group, in the sleep group there was a significant 
interaction between hemisphere and memory type, F(1, 15) = 10.859, p = 0.005, 
ηp2 = 0.420.  Post-hoc analysis revealed this to be due to greater discriminability 
for false recognition than true recognition (i.e., greater false memory effects) in 
the RH, F(1, 15) = 9.930, p = 0.007, ηp2 = 0.398, but no difference within the 
LH, F < 1, p = ns.  For the wake group, there was again a significant hemisphere 
by memory type interaction, F(1, 15) = 6.868, p = 0.019, ηp2 = 0.314.  Post hoc 
analysis demonstrated that true recognition was lower in discriminability than 
false recognition in the LH, F(1, 15) = 4.895, p = 0.043, ηp2 = 0.246, but no 
difference in the RH, F(1, 15) = 1.539, p = 0.234, ηp2 = 0.093.  These results for 
the sleep group confirmed the analyses of the word types, demonstrating that 
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lateralised false memory effects were due to changes in discriminability 
associated with sleep.  The effect of increased discriminability for false over true 
recognition in the LH for the wake group was unexpected, but consistent with 
sleep increasing lateralisation of false memories to the RH. 
 For the ANOVA on B’’, there was a significant 3-way interaction between 
hemisphere, memory type, and group, F(1, 30) = 4.571, p = 0.041, ηp2 = 0.132.  
When split by group, for the sleep group there was a memory type by hemisphere 
interaction, F(1, 15) = 5.161, p = 0.038, ηp2 = 0.256.  Post hoc analyses 
demonstrated that judgments were more conservative for true than false 
recognition in the RH, F(1, 15) = 10.848, p = 0.005, but no difference in the LH, 
F(1, 15) = 1.491, p = 0.241.  For the wake group, there was no significant 
interaction between memory type and hemisphere, F < 1, p = ns.  These results 
demonstrated that sleep affected response bias as well as discriminability in the 
RH, particularly for false recognition. 
 
4.  General Discussion 
 Within the current study we had two main objectives.  First, we aimed to 
replicate previous effects of sleep increasing false memory effects for words 
(Diekelmann et al., 2010; Pardilla-Delgado & Payne, 2017; Payne et al., 2009), as 
well as the interaction of these false memory sleep effects with hemispheric 
processing (Monaghan et al., 2017), who observed a hemispheric asymmetry 
after overnight sleep for recognition accuracy in the DRM paradigm.  Second, we 
tested the relation between sleep architecture and false memory, not only for 
sleep stages but also for sleep spindles.   
 For the first objective of the sleep false memory behavioural effects, we 
found that unseen-lure words were more likely to be falsely recognised after a 
nap, than after a period of wake, consistent with the literature of sleep increasing 
false memories compared to an equivalent period of wake (Diekelmann et al., 
2010; Monaghan et al., 2017; Pardilla-Delgado & Payne, 2017; Payne et al., 
22 
 
2009).  The subsequent signal detection analyses demonstrated that the 
enhanced false memories were not only due to changes in response bias, but 
were effects of sleep on discriminability between unseen lure and unseen new 
words.   
 Studies of false memories using the DRM paradigm have used a variety of 
methodologies.  For instance, many previous studies that demonstrated increased 
false memory effects after sleep have used a free recall task (Diekelmann & Born, 
2010; Pardilla-Delgado & Payne, 2017; Payne et al., 2009), while those using a 
recognition task may find no initial effect (Diekelmann et al., 2008; Lutz et al., 
2017; Pardilla-Delgado & Payne, 2017), or even reduction of false memories 
(Fenn et al., 2009) after an interval of sleep.  In a meta-analysis of associative 
memory effects and sleep, Chatburn, Lushington, and Kohler (2014) noted that 
recall tasks are more likely to elicit false memory effects than recognition tasks, 
though this was concluded from only a very small set of studies.  One explanation 
for this behavioural difference is due to the reinstatement of context that results 
from viewing the stimuli again in the recognition task, which can increase source-
monitoring effects (Cabeza, Rao, Wagner, Mayer, & Schacter, 2001; Roediger, 
Balota, & Watson, 2001; Underwood, 1965) and consequently reduce false 
memories.  Recall tasks, however, do not provide such a strong reinstatement of 
context for the participant (for a summary, see.  Chatburn et al., 2014).  
Presenting stimuli visually rather than auditorially (as in Diekelmann et al., 2010; 
Pardilla-Delgado & Payne, 2017; Payne et al., 2009) may also decrease false 
memory effects again due to increased source monitoring from visual 
presentations (Cleary & Greene, 2002; Kellogg, 2001; Smith & Hunt, 1998; Smith 
et al., 2005).   
 However, in our study, we did find that sleep influenced false memories in 
a recognition memory test after a nap, but much of this effect was lateralised to 
the RH.  Lateralising stimuli to the RH may highlight false memory effects, but 
naps rather than overnight sleep may also increase false memory effects 
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(Chatburn et al., 2014).  Indeed, the results of our study, and that of previous 
studies of lateralisation of DRM stimuli (Bellamy & Shillcock, 2007; Ito, 2001; 
Monaghan et al., 2017; Westerberg & Marsolek, 2003) are consistent with the 
possibility that false memories may be generated in the RH.  Dominance of false 
memory generation in the RH would be consistent with the two principal theories 
for sleep-induced processing changes associated with false memories – the gist 
theory (Brainerd & Reyna, 2005; Durrant & Lewis, 2009; Fischer et al., 2006; 
Gomez et al., 2006; Lutz et al., 2017; Wagner, Gais, Halder, Verieger, & Born, 
2004) and the increased spreading activation theory (Cai et al., 2009; Monaghan 
et al., 2013).  In terms of gist, precise memory for items experienced would be 
consolidated with the long-term vocabulary store in the LH (Tamminen et al., 
2011, 2013), whereas the theme or topic of the list would be activated in the RH, 
enabling separation of gist and item memory in the iOtA model (Lewis & Durrant, 
2011).  This separation of precise and generalised semantic memory is also at the 
core of processing advantages for distinguishing focused and diffuse semantic 
associative networks across the LH and RH (Beeman, 1998; Beeman & Bowman, 
2000; Monaghan et al., 2004).  In terms of the spreading activation theory of 
sleep (Cai et al., 2009), false memories are more likely to be generated in the RH 
in response to increased spreading activation as unseen lure words become more 
highly activated in the RH, due to their interconnections to seen old words that 
occurred in the list.  In the LH, the more localised associations between words are 
less likely to promote co-activation between old seen words and unseen lure 
words resulting in reduced false memory effects. 
 These two theories are by no means incompatible: Spreading activation 
could well underlie generation of gist from a list of related information (Howe et 
al., 2012).  However, correlating behaviour with sleep architecture enables 
convergence on the mechanisms that produce the observed behavioural effects.  
This was the goal of our second key objective in investigating sleep stages and 
spindles relating to false memory effects. 
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 We did not replicate the previous observation of a correlation between 
SWS duration and false memory effects in a recall task (Payne et al., 2009).  
Though Pardilla-Delgado and Payne (2017) found a correlation between SWS and 
false memory in a recognition test, they also did not replicate the correlation in a 
recall task.  The effects, then, are somewhat variable, and this may be the reason 
for the absence of the effect in our study.  However, we did find a strong 
correlation between lateralised stage 2 sleep spindles and false memory 
generation in our study, contributing to a growing literature on the role of 
spindles in memory consolidation (Diekelmann & Born, 2010; Rasch & Born, 
2013; Tamminen et al., 2013).  Our results showed that higher density of sleep 
spindles in the RH relative to the LH correlated with higher occurrence of false 
memories.  Curiously, greater RH than LH sleep spindles correlated with both LH 
and RH false memories, though the latter failed to reach significance.  Thus, the 
effects of spindles may be not only to increase false memories as a consequence 
of RH lateralised spindles, but also to reduce false memories as a consequence of 
LH lateralised spindles. 
 These effects were driven by stage 2 fast spindles measured at centro-
parietal electrodes.  These spindles have been linked to hippocampal activity, and 
occur in similar regions to the proposed site of lexical semantic processing in the 
LH (Dumay & Gaskell, 2007, 2012; Ellis et al., 2009) and RH (Beeman & Bowden, 
2000).  Spindle density has also been linked to consolidation of verbal material 
with the LH long-term vocabulary store (Tamminen et al., 2013), and van der 
Helm et al.  (2011) observed that veridical episodic memory was positively 
correlated with stage 2 fast spindles, measured over the C3 (i.e., left lateralised) 
electrode.  Thus, lateralised spindles may highlight consolidation of information 
with the semantic network within that hemisphere.  If this is the case, then sleep 
spindles aid transfer of information from hippocampus to neocortex, where the 
structure of the long-term information in neocortex varies according to the 
hemisphere.   
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 In summary, we found that whereas sleep increased overall false memory 
recognition, this varied according to the hemisphere that was being accessed 
during retrieval, with the RH being more susceptible to unseen-lure acceptance 
while the LH was found to be more resilient to accepting unseen-lure words.  
These effects were correlated with lateralised sleep spindles to the RH compared 
to the LH, which indicate that sleep spindles in the RH may relate to generation of 
false memories whereas sleep spindles in the LH relate to reduced false memory 
effects.   
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6. General Discussion 
 The purpose of the thesis was to further understand the processes and 
factors in formation of bound representations in memory. Previous literature has 
demonstrated that different item modalities such as actions, objects, locations, 
and people, are not equally consolidated either in terms of quantity or fidelity 
(Kersten et al., 2008; Old & Naveh-Benjamin, 2008). Recent literature appears to 
suggest a role of pre-existing conceptual knowledge as a potential influence in 
this (Konkle et al., 2010b) but that was specifically focused upon objects. In the 
current thesis I sought to expand this to see how the different item modalities are 
consolidated and to further understand the role of both conceptual knowledge and 
sleep. 
 
6.1 Thesis Summary 
Within Paper 1 I first sought to validate the existing literature on the 
capacity of the Visual Long-Term Memory (VLTM) in order to establish a baseline 
level performance of recognition of specific bound representations. As a large 
number of studies that report these findings in VLTM have primarily used a mono-
cultural sample (usually western participants) and as culture has been previously 
demonstrated to affect subsequent recognition due to foreground-background 
effects, I sought to see if the previously reported observations of VLTM were a 
universal phenomenon or one specific to western cultures. This had two important 
theoretical contributions, 1) it allowed validation of the results of the previous 
literature within western samples (Urgolites and Wood, 2013b) but also explore 
whether the previously reported cultural differences would be replicated in 
recognition of specific bound representations and as to whether this varied with 
type of stimuli used (action-scene or object-scene). Within the study participants 
from either a western (UK) or an East Asian (Malaysia) culture viewed action-
scene or object-scene composites before completing a 2-alternative forced-choice 
recognition task. The results suggest that there is a cultural difference on 
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recognition of object-scene composites but not action-scene composites, 
providing an important methodological point for subsequent studies; that 
participant-based factors (in this case culture) can significantly affect 
consolidation of bound representations. 
Building upon that result, the second set of experiments (Chapter 3) was 
the first set of studies into the role of sleep in this form of associative memory. It 
was theorised that compared to an equivalent period of wake, action-scene 
recognition after sleep may have benefitted from preferential consolidation as the 
previous literature suggests that sleep can have a compensatory effect on more 
difficult associations (e.g., Sio et al., 2013) while for object-scene recognition 
sleep may have a beneficial effect on consolidation due to promotion of 
associations between pre-existing item representations. As with Experiment 1, 
participants were shown action-scene or object-scene composites but introduced 
a delay of 12h between training and testing, with this 12h containing either a 
period of wake or sleep. Sleep was found to have no significant benefit on action-
scene composite recognition, with accuracy levels at chance levels across all 
groups. However, sleep was found to be beneficial to object-scene composites, 
with accuracy in the sleep group (67.7%) significantly higher than the wake group 
(54.4%). I suggest that there are two factors that affect this, complexity of 
stimuli and prior knowledge supporting encoding and retrieval, with this discussed 
in more detail in the next section. 
The third set of experiments (Chapter 4) sought to apply the previous 
results to a more practical situation, that of eyewitness testimony, as the existing 
literature has revealed that within eyewitness testimony participants are 
susceptible to errors of binding at retrieval. Adopting the same sleep/wake design 
as the previous study participants saw 6 videos of various crimes then completed 
a free recall task as a measure of immediate memory. In the second session 
participants completed a second free recall task without viewing any videos and 
retrieved information of actions/objects/people/locations were scored and 
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compared. It was hypothesised that sleep should lead to a larger number of 
retrieved information compared to an equivalent period of wake, and that in line 
with the previous literature actions would be recalled to the highest degree 
compared to the other item modalities (Old & Naveh-Benjamin, 2008). Across the 
two sessions it was observed a significant difference in details recalled according 
to item modality, with action details recalled to a higher level than object, 
location, and people details but there was no observable effect of sleep/wake.  
Finally, the fourth experiment (Chapter 5) moved away from visual 
memory and instead focused on the role of sleep on memory distortion using the 
DRM paradigm. Previous literature had identified a hemispheric difference in 
recognition of old/new/lure words in the DRM paradigm after sleep (Monaghan et 
al., 2016) but as the study used actigraphy, it was unclear what sleep 
architecture supported this difference. Experiment 4 sought to further clarify this. 
In the study participants were trained on 12 DRM wordlists and then were 
assigned either to a wake group or a nap group monitored with polysomnography. 
At retrieval, participants were presented with old-seen words, new-unseen words, 
or lure-unseen words, with the latter being semantically related to the old-seen 
words. Sleep significantly increased lure-unseen acceptance compared to the 
equivalent period of wake, providing evidence of sleep promoting false memory 
generation in line with previous studies (Diekelmann et al., 2010; Monaghan et 
al., 2016; Pardilla-Delgado & Payne, 2017; Payne et al., 2009). Furthermore, RH 
spindle generation relative to LH spindle generation was significantly correlated 
with false recognition of lure-unseen words, suggesting a central role of the RH in 
false memory generation. In the following sections I will explore the results of 
each study in more detail by looking at the results over the groups of experiments 







6.2 Different Effects of Modality Within Visual Long-Term Memory 
Summary of Chapter 2-4. 
 The primary focus of chapters 2-4 was to further understand the 
differences in consolidation between item modalities within the VLTM. The 
previous literature has observed that the VLTM has a large and detailed storage 
capacity for individual items. In a seminal paper, Standing (1973) observed that 
participants could correctly recognise about 6600 images out of 10000 seen, 
whereas more recent elaborations on this have demonstrated that humans can 
also store high-fidelity representations of items, with Brady et al. (2008) 
observing participants could accurately recognise a previous seen item 93% of the 
time in a 2AFC task, a more challenging task than Standing’s due to it requiring 
specific recognition of the target item as opposed to Standing’s study whereby 
familiarity would be sufficient for a recognition judgement. Moreover, this effect of 
extensive memory capacity isn’t limited to objects, but also scenery (Konkle et 
al., 2010a, 2010b) and actions (Urgolites & Wood, 2013a), demonstrating that 
the VLTM is not just capable of storing many items, but also capable of storing 
them to a relatively high-fidelity. Yet relational memory between the elements is 
more challenging, with Urgolites and Wood (2013b) demonstrating that although 
participants could accurately recognize individual items, they could not recognize 
specific pairs. Urgolites and Wood (2013b) suggested that this was an issue of 
relational binding in multi-item events. As such the purpose of chapter 2-4 was to 
further understand the issue of relational binding within multi-item events. 
In chapter 2 it was demonstrated that there was a significant cultural 
difference in recognition of specific multi-item events. The literature surrounding 
the effect of culture on visual memory is rather contradictory. Early studies in the 
field, such as Masuda and Nisbett (2001) and Kitayama et al. (2003) suggest that 
cultural differences in perception of the self as individualist or collectivist can 
extend to perception of the world with Western cultures engage in analytical 
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processing, attending to each item individually, whereas East Asian culture 
engage in holistic processing, attending to items within the context and noting 
relationships between them. However, subsequent studies have demonstrated 
mixed findings regarding eye movements (Chua et al., 2005, Evans et al., 2009; 
Rayner et al., 2007). One study of note is that of Millar et al. (2013) who 
observed that when presented with object-scene composites, Western 
participants were significantly more accurate in recognising specific items and 
backgrounds than East Asian participants, who were more likely to falsely 
recognise similar items as previously seen, suggesting that for East Asian 
participants, item recognition was promoted at a categorical level rather than at a 
specific item or item-exemplar level.  
Regarding the results of Chapter 2, it was observed that there was no 
significant difference between Western and East Asian cultures in recognition of 
action-scene composites, with proportion of items correctly identified across both 
groups similar to that observed in Urgolites and Wood (2013b). instead, there 
was a significant cultural difference of object-scene composite recognition, with 
the Western culture significantly more accurate than the East Asian culture. 
Focusing on the cultural factor first, the result can fit in with theories of 
culture and of visual processing. If, as suggested, East Asian cultures do engage 
in holistic processing (Masuda & Nisbett, 2003), focusing on the relationships 
between all elements then this may lead to issues regarding attentional splitting, 
suggesting that any mental representation may be a more generalised, low-
fidelity representation of the image and as such more susceptible to a) decay over 
a period of time, and b) more susceptible to interference from the foil option in 
the 2AFC task. In contrast, by engaging in analytical processing Western 
participants were able to benefit in two key ways, a) By focusing on each 
individual item they could encode a high-fidelity representation of the item aided 
by prior categorical knowledge (Discussed in the following section, Konkle et al., 
2010b) that expedited the encoding process and b) allowed them to focus on the 
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relationship between the two items exclusively. However, future research is 
needed to understand how generalisable the result is as within the culture paper 
although we demonstrated a significant difference between Western and East 
Asian cultures, consistent with the existing literature, the participant samples we 
used are not typical of the literature. In previous cultural studies participants were 
usually taken from America and Japan as examples of their respective cultures, 
whereas in Chapter 2 participants were from the UK and Malaysia. Although this 
differs from the previous literature, this was by design. While there is little 
difference between US and the UK in measures of cultural identity, with both 
defined as individualist (Hofstede, 1983), Malaysia is unique amongst East Asian 
cultures as while it is considered an East Asian culture, it is one of the few to 
primarily use the Latin alphabet. For the present task this was an important 
distinction to make as any pictographic language (e.g., Japanese or Chinese) may 
have led to a confounding effect (Bagley et al., 1983; Kühnen et al., 2001). 
Though it is useful in the presented study, it does make it more difficult to extend 
the results to a wider East Asian population. In order to make such claims it 
would be important to replicate the study with East Asian cultures that utilise a 
pictographic language to see if any form of pictographic language would benefit 
consolidation of bound representations. 
 
6.2.1 Differences in Consolidation by Item Modalities 
A consistent result across all studies was that when presented in 
combinations, the different item modalities were not retrieved to equal levels. In 
the specific recognition composite tasks in Chapters 2 and 3, object-scene 
composites were more accurately recognised than action-scene composites, while 
in the free recall task of Chapter 4, this pattern reversed, actions were recalled 
more than any other information type. Focusing on the free recall task from 
Chapter 4 first, the result appears consistent with the current literature; within 
studies of eyewitness testimony actions are typically reported more frequently 
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than people details, with this occurring in both recognition (Kersten et al., 2008; 
Old & Naveh-Benjamin, 2008), and recall tasks (Tollestrup et al., 1994). One 
study, Yuille and Cutshall (1984), noted that free recall of an event typically 
resulted in actions being mentioned the most (56%), then person details (26%) 
while objects the least (17%) and that this interacted with accuracy; participants 
were most accurate for objects (87%), then actions (82%), then people (74%). 
While the current experiment did not measure incorrect details the distribution of 
item modalities was similar across all sessions and conditions to the previous 
literature. The most logical reason for this spread may reflect the type of 
information that is most salient in the video (Akehurst et al., 2003); for example, 
the reason actions are typically reported more than objects or people are that 
people often perform multiple actions, increasing the number relative to other 
modalities where only one object may be present in the scene. Admittedly, while 
this is not a major contribution to the literature it provides further evidence of 
some form of difference in consolidation. 
6.2.2 Differences in Specific Composite Recognition: An Action/Object 
Distinction 
The interesting and novel result of both Chapters 2 and 3 is that of object-
scene being significantly more accurate than action-scene in specific composite 
recognition, the first study to demonstrate this effect. This result was, by my own 
admission, unexpected, with the degree of the difference quite striking. In tests of 
immediate recognition in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 (Experiment 1b, 3b) proportion 
of items correctly recognised for specific action-scene composite averaged 
approximately 56%, which while significantly above chance suggests that there 
are issues with bound representations for action and scenes, with these appearing 
to be more difficult to form into a bound representation of sufficient fidelity for 
later retrieval. In contrast, object-scene proportion of items correctly recognised 
in immediate recognition tasks averaged close to 71% in both sets of studies.  
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To my knowledge, only one study has examined specific action-scene 
composite recognition in the same manner as those presented here, that of 
Urgolites and Wood (2013b). Within their study participants were presented with 
action-scene composite pairs and in subsequent recognition task were presented 
with the target item and a novel foil and were requested to identify which 
composite had been previously seen (a 2AFC task). Proportion of items correctly 
recognised for action-scene composites was close to chance, averaging about 
58% suggesting that participants could maintain this association between the two 
elements but it was fragile, with the results presented in the studies in the thesis 
consistent with their result. The result proved more complex when proportion of 
items correctly recognised for the individual elements of the composite 
(recognition of just the action or just the scene) were close to previously reported 
levels, implying that participants were able to store high-fidelity representations, 
the issue was forming the association. Urgolites and Wood’s explanation for this 
difference was primarily neurophysiological. Within the literature there is evidence 
that action and scene representations are stored separately in disparate locations 
(the premotor cortex and the medial temporal lobe respectively; see Kravitz et 
al., 2011) and Urgolites and Wood suggested that the difficulty in binding action-
scene was due to this.  
Yet the results of the object-scene studies appear to somewhat contradict 
this theory. As previously said, the object-scene recognition was significantly 
higher than action-scene, but objects and scenes are also stored separately from 
one another (prefrontal cortex and medial temporal lobe; Kravitz et al., 2011). As 
such, there must be another factor to account for this difference. Within the 
literature it appears that there are three possible factors that may influence the 
result: the amount of time available for encoding; conceptual knowledge; and 
semantic labelling as a factor. In the following section I will address each of these 
explanations and discuss its suitability for explaining the result. 
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One factor that can be dismissed is encoding time. While object recognition 
is fast, with brain responses associated with visual discrimination of objects 
occurring around 150ms (Allison et al., 1999; Thorpe et al., 1996), action 
recognition within the current study is not possible until 500ms (where the action 
reaches maximum deviation from the neutral standing position, making what 
action it is clearest) yet this did not appear to affect the results. Accuracy for the 
repeat detection task in the training phase was consistently high across all 
experiments regardless of stimuli type, averaging over 90% with no significant 
difference between exposure for 1 second and exposure for 3 seconds. Given that 
the same background-scene stimuli were used for both action-/object-scene 
composites, it suggests that any difference in recognition is due to the foreground 
item but not due to differences in distinctiveness or temporal encoding of the 
stimuli. 
When excluding the temporal factor the key difference between objects 
and actions can be interpreted as differentially accessing pre-existing conceptual 
knowledge (otherwise referred to semantic memory). Within this context, 
conceptual knowledge is what Konkle et al. (2010b) refer to as a “conceptual 
hook”. This refers to a conceptual “item prototype”, a representation of the item 
that has been formed through multiple exposures and serves as a generalisable 
point of reference. The objects used in the studies were objects that were highly 
familiar to participants (e.g., in the food category- Apple, Banana, Cherry). As 
demonstrated in Chapter 2, familiarity was general across cultures: participants in 
the East Asian and the Western cultures both reported high familiarity across all 
items. Within item recognition in the VLTM previous literature has observed that 
having an item prototype representation can be beneficial in early encoding of 
object (Brady et al., 2008; Konkle et al., 2010b), allowing expedited encoding of 
the object as participants do not have to encode the whole item to high-fidelity as 
they can rely upon the prototype to create a representation of the object within 
episodic memory. For the actions this was not possible, all actions within the 
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study were novel to the participants and for each category (bend, crouch, jump, 
and turns) the inclusion of 10 exemplars meant that each action had some degree 
of similarity to other category members. In having no pre-existing conceptual 
knowledge of the action, participants were required to create a high-fidelity 
representation of the item at encoding, a more cognitively demanding task. This 
effect would not be elicited in the repeat detection task where participants 
typically score close to ceiling as within that task participants only have to judge 
whether they had seen the action-scene bound representation before, with 
participants able to make a judgement based on either familiarity or even just the 
background. 
Furthermore, the link to conceptual knowledge may even extend to 
semantic labelling. Wiseman and Neisser (1974) observed that when presented 
with ambiguous faces participants were more accurate in a recognition task for 
items that they had explicitly labelled as a face, suggesting that labelling is 
important for visual recognition. This effect has since been extended by Koutstaal 
et al. (2003) who examined the role of semantic labelling in object recognition. 
Within their Experiment 1 participants were more accurate in recognition 
judgements for ambiguous shapes that had been provided with a semantic label 
than items that were unlabelled. More relevant to the results observed in this 
thesis, recognition of unlabelled real-world objects was significantly higher than 
highly distinct, novel items, suggesting that conceptual knowledge is important 
for item recognition. Thus, it may be that because the objects and scenes already 
have pre-existing semantic labels, this benefits consolidation as the 
representation is no longer purely visual but also part semantic; participants no 
longer have to remember the precise details of the banana on the beach, only the 
semantic pairing of banana-beach. There is an issue with this suggestion though- 
it fails to take into account the observed result of Urgolites and Wood (2013b) 
that even though recognition of composite pairs was relatively low, recognition of 
individual items was consistent with the previous literature (Brady et al., 2008; 
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Konkle et al., 2010a, Urgolites & Wood, 2013a).  As such, there must be a second 
factor in why object-scenes were significantly more accurate than action-scenes. 
A more compatible explanation may be due to the various functions of the 
hippocampus in episodic memory. To briefly summarise, the hippocampus is 
thought to have three primary roles in episodic memory, rapid learning of 
associations; formation of distinct representations of overlapping stimuli (pattern 
separation); and retrieval of a complete representation in response to a partial 
cue (pattern completion). Addressing the functions in order, the hippocampus’ 
role in rapid learning of new associations has been demonstrated in multiple 
studies (See Horner & Doeller, 2017).  fMRI studies have demonstrated that 
hippocampal ‘concept cells’, fire in the presence of stimuli related to conceptual 
knowledge, such as celebrities, animals, or famous buildings (Quiroga et al., 
2005; Kreiman et al., 2000), allowing rapid encoding of visual information. 
Furthermore, concept cells can attune rapidly with literature observing that it can 
form within hours (Monaco et al., 2014; Quiroga et al., 2009), suggesting that 
conceptual knowledge is a pivotal factor in rapid consolidation of learned 
associations.  
This function is thought to work in tandem with pattern separation and 
completion. At encoding, pattern separation allows distinct, non-overlapping 
representations of information taken from overlapping input. Although the early 
literature focused on simple stimuli (Bakker et al., 2008), more recent studies 
have demonstrated that even in complex, multi-item events participants are 
capable of forming distinct representations for each stimulus (Chadwick et al., 
2010). At retrieval pattern completion allows retrieval of the bound representation 
through cued retrieval of one element by presentation of another, a form of 
pattern recognition. Horner et al. (2015) observed that participants who had 
learned person-location-object associations could accurately retrieve both person 
and object details at retrieval. However, the important result in relation to the 
current results was that cueing with location led to reinstatement of just the 
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category, not the exemplar-level item, consistent with evidence for reinstatement 
at retrieval of stimuli categories and low-level visual properties (Bosch, Jehee, 
Fernandez, & Doeller, 2014; Jafarpour, Fuentemilla, Horner, Penny, & Duzel, 
2014; Polyn, Natu, Cohen, & Norman, 2005; Wheeler, Peterson, & Buckner, 
2000; Woodruff, Johnson, Uncapher, & Rugg, 2005).  
Thus, the difference observed between action-scene and object-scene 
recognition may be one of the role of conceptual categories in pattern recognition 
and completion. Objects, by virtue of conceptual knowledge and item prototypes, 
are initially able to be encoded to a high fidelity representation facilitated by the 
item prototype from conceptual knowledge. At retrieval, because the objects are 
to an exemplar-category level (rather than the overall category of fruit, the 
stimuli consisted of exemplar-categories, e.g., apple), retrieval is expedited as 
participants do not need to retrieve the high-fidelity representation, just the 
exemplar-category level item that would be sufficient for recognition judgements 
of the bound representation (e.g., a typical apple was alongside a typical beach). 
As actions can only benefit from a more generalised categorical representation 
(e.g., a jump with a 90º twist to the left may only be retrieved as a jump), 
retrieval of the specific association is much harder due to the interference of the 
foil representation offering competing information at a category level (e.g., a 
jump with a 90º twist to the right). The natural progression of this line of 
research would be to employ exemplar-level object stimuli, so instead of 
presenting a ‘food’ category, instead present an ‘apple’ category but with 10 
exemplar-level apples. If it is a form of conceptual knowledge benefitting 
consolidation through distinct item prototypes this may eliminate this factor as 
the item prototypes for these items would be more distinct. This point is returned 





6.2.3 Role of Sleep in Consolidation of VLTM Based Bound 
Representations 
 The second major contribution from this thesis was that the results of 
Chapter 3 demonstrated that sleep can aid consolidation of the object-scene 
pairing compared to an equivalent period of wake but this was not seen in the 
action-scene pairing, with performance after 12h at chance level for both the 
sleep and wake group- the first study to do so in this controlled comparison. The 
result adds to a growing literature on the role of sleep in consolidation of learned 
associations as previously sleep has been demonstrated to aid consolidation of 
episodic memory in item-context tasks (van der Helm et al., 2011), related and 
unrelated word pairs (Gais & Born, 2004), and face-location associative pairs 
(Ruch et al., 2012). Much previous research has observed that sleep primarily 
benefits the contextual elements of episodic memory. For example, van der Helm 
et al. (2011) noted that although word recognition did not differ between a nap 
and no-nap group, the nap group were significantly better memory for the poster 
associated with the word (See Chatburn et al., 2014 for a summary on sleep’s 
role in associative memory). 
As such, the beneficial effect of sleep on consolidation of the object-scene 
pairs may be due to sleep’s beneficial role on contextual consolidation and 
hippocampal reactivation during sleep. Within the active systems consolidation 
model of sleep, during SWS there is additional interaction between the 
hippocampus and the neocortical sites, with hippocampal firing observed during 
this period (Bergmann et al., 2012; Peigneux et al., 2004; Wilson & McNaughton, 
1994). These hippocampal reactivations aid consolidation of the representations 
to the neocortical and striatal sites. This additional hippocampal activation acts to 
further bind the separate item representations, forming a stronger association 
between the two and reducing the effect of any interference (Ellenbogen et al., 
2006). Future studies should use polysomnography to determine the sleep 
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architecture associated with the memory binding effects and see if there is a link 
between sleep architecture and consolidation. 
The second benefit of sleep may relate to the previously observed benefit 
of prior knowledge promoting rapid consolidation of new information. Recently, 
Hennies et al. (2016) observed that information that relates to prior knowledge is 
not only remembered better but is also consolidated more rapidly than 
information that is irrelevant, with Hennies and Colleagues also linking spindle 
density to this effect. The study is the latest in a large literature on the role of 
assimilation of information into conceptual knowledge, with evidence of rapid 
consolidation observed in both rodents (Tse et al., 2007) and humans (van 
Kesteren et al., 2010, 2012, 2013, 2014). Recent models of sleep consolidation, 
such as Stickgold and Walker’s (2013) Memory Triage model or Lewis and 
Durrant’s (2011) information Overlap to Abstract (iOtA) model emphasise that 
pre-existing schemas are the basis for this rapid consolidation. For example, in 
the iOtA model if the hippocampal reactivation shares overlapping elements with 
the neocortical representation it can lead to a greater interaction between the 
neocortical and hippocampal structures, leading to a quicker assimilation process. 
It may be that the fact that as the object-scene composites had pre-existing 
conceptual knowledge for both elements this led to greater hippocampal-
neocortical interaction, resulting in a strengthened object-scene bound 
representation. One way to examine this further would be to try and replicate the 
current study with the stimuli alongside novel, unseen objects. If it is really a 
factor of pre-existing conceptual knowledge then there should be an observable 
difference between familiar object-scene composite recognition (e.g., banana-
beach) and novel object-scene composite recognition (blicket-beach).  
The difference between action-scene and object-scene recognition and the 
role of sleep may further reflect the impact of conceptual knowledge on forming 
associations. Sleep was able to have a beneficial effect on the object-scene bound 
representations due to the initial association of object-scene being strong enough 
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to survive a delay from encoding to sleep while the action-scene association, 
although able to be encoded as a bound representation (as seen in the immediate 
testing task), was already fragile and thus, did not survive the delay to 
recognition testing.  
6.2.4 The Role of Sleep in False Memory Generation 
Within the final study (Chapter 5), it was observed that RH sleep spindles 
relative to LH sleep spindles significantly correlated with false memory 
generation; the greater the RH spindles relative to LH spindles, the greater the 
false recognition. The result adds to a growing literature on the role of sleep on 
false memory generation. In summary, the previous false memory literature has 
been relatively contradictory; while some studies have demonstrated that sleep 
can increase false memories (Diekelmann et al., 2010; Pardilla-Delgado & Payne, 
2017; Payne et al., 2009), others have observed no effect of sleep (Diekelmann 
et al., 2008), or even a reduction in false memories (Fenn et al., 2009). Part of 
the reason for this difference is the type of task used, false recall typically elicits a 
sleep-based false memory effect, but recognition doesn’t (See Chatburn et al., 
2014; Pardilla-Delgado & Payne, 2017), with this difference partly due to 
recognition task acting as additional source-monitoring, cueing memory  
Why was the study able to demonstrate a sleep-based false memory effect 
in recognition when previous studies (e.g., Fenn et al., 2009; Pardilla-Delgado & 
Payne, 2017) could not? I suggest the key difference lies in the recognition task 
itself, employing a hemispheric recognition task ensures processing is located 
within one hemisphere and allowed us to observe differences in semantic 
networks. As covered in the literature review, one of the suggested functions that 
occurs within the hippocampus is that of pattern recognition and completion; after 
initial encoding humans are able to “fill in the blanks” and complete the pattern 
using conceptual knowledge. In the case of hemispheres, this may explain the 
hemispheric difference in false recognition and links nicely to established models 
63 
 
of hemispheric semantic processing. The dominance of the LH over the RH in 
word processing is well established (for a summary, see Hellige, Laeng, & 
Michimata, 2010), theorised to occur in part due to the LH containing the long-
term vocabulary store (Ellis et al., 2009). This hemispheric bias has been 
observed within the false memory literature (Bellamy & Shillcock, 2007; Ito, 
2001; Westerberg & Marsolek, 2003) with the RH being more susceptible for false 
recognition than the LH, suggesting that at least for processing of stimuli in the 
DRM paradigm there is some form of hemispheric division of labour. Prominent 
theories for this effect is the difference in hemispheric language processing as 
proposed by Beeman’s (1998) coarse and fine coding theory; the RH processes 
input in a coarse manner, weakly activating many associated words while the LH 
processes in a fine manner, strongly activated a few associated words. When 
combined with hemispheric-based hippocampal pattern completion this would 
mean that words being presented to the RH at testing prompt retrieval from the 
broad semantic network, thus making it more likely to falsely recognise a critical 
lure.  It is this form of prompting specific semantic networks that can explain the 
difference between the current study and those previous findings with regard to 
sleep and false memory recognition. In standard recognition tasks (whereby the 
word is presented centrally and until a judgement is made, e.g., Fenn et al., 
2009), the dominance of the LH in facilitating word processing would override any 
form of RH activation, thus any false recognition within the RH would be masked 
by the LH correctly making a judgement. It is only in presenting words to specific 
hemispheres that the effect can be elicited. 
6.2.5 Sleep Architecture in False Memory Generation 
 One of the aims of the nap study (Chapter 5) was to determine the sleep 
associated mechanisms in false memory generation. While previous studies on 
false memory generation have found links between SWS and false memories 
(Payne et al., 2009) none had looked at the role of spindles in false memories, 
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despite a large literature demonstrating that spindles are strongly correlated with 
consolidation of associative memory.  
First, I wish to address the lack of finding of the previously observed 
correlation between SWS and false memory generation (Payne et al., 2009). 
Within the nap study there were no significant correlations between any measure 
of sleep stage and consolidation yet this is not that much of an issue when 
considered within the wider literature. At the time of writing, only two studies 
have examined sleep stages and false memory, that of Payne et al. (2009) and 
Pardilla-Delgado and Payne (2017). Within the former, Payne et al. observed a 
significant negative correlation between SWS and accurate recall, suggesting that 
SWS promoted a gist-based consolidation of memory, consistent with 
contemporary theories of sleep-based consolidation (Lewis & Durrant, 2011; 
Stickgold & Walker, 2013). However, Pardilla-Delgado and Payne were unable to 
replicate this, observing no significant correlation between SWS and accurate 
recall, but instead observed a negative correlation between SWS and false 
recognition, but this was only apparent for low performers (participants whose 
performance fell below a median split for true recall).  
Why was our result different? There are numerous possible factors ranging 
from study design and type of data analysis. Beginning with the methodology, 
although the study in Chapter 5 and the Pardilla-Delgado and Payne (2017) paper 
use a recognition paradigm, Pardilla-Delgado and Payne presented a free recall 
task before the recognition task, with this previously demonstrated to act as a 
potential confound (Roediger & McDermott, 1995). Staying with methodology, the 
current study used a nap paradigm while Pardilla-Delgado and Payne’s used a 
overnight/48hr paradigm, again this can lead to qualitatively different results. 
Although data analysis was consistent across both papers (non-parametric A’), 
Pardilla-Delgado and Payne only found the significant correlation between SWS 
and false memory generation is low performance participants (those whose 
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accuracy fell below the group mean) and as this form of distinction was not made 
in the Chapter 5 paper this too may have led to the differences in results. As 
such, it may be that the correlation between SWS and false memories is one that 
is too fragile to reliably replicate when changes are made. 
Despite the lack of any correlation between sleep stages and false 
memories, there was a significant correlation between sleep spindles and false 
memories- the greater the spindle density in the RH relative to the LH, the 
greater the false recognition. The result adds to a growing literature on the role of 
sleep spindles in consolidation. Past research has linked spindles to a number of 
cognitive features, including IQ (Nader & Smith, 2001; Schabus et al., 2004), and 
performance in both procedural (Meier-koll et al., 1999; Fogel & Smith, 2006; 
Fogel et al., 2007; Nishida & Walker, 2007; Tamaki et al., 2008; 2009) and 
declarative tasks (Clemens et al., 2005; Gais et al., 2002; Ruch et al., 2012; 
Tamminen et al., 2010, 2013; van der Helm et al., 2011), but this is the first 
study to link spindle density to false memory generation. The result is consistent 
with a recent study by Hennies et al. (2016) who observed that spindle density 
was linked to prior knowledge. Within their study Hennies et al. established a 
schema for participants and then presented facts that were either schema-
consistent or schema-unrelated. After a period of sleep it was observed that sleep 
spindle density predicted an increase of the scheme benefit to memory across the 
interval, with spindle density associated with reduced decay of schema-consistent 
memories.  
When applied to the current study it may be that the link between spindle 
density and false recognition may reflect a similar mechanism of prior knowledge 
benefit. As the DRM paradigm relies upon pre-existing semantic associations in 
order to elicit false recognition, much like the link between schema-consistent 
information and spindle density the same mechanism may be in effect here. This 
theory may also explain why the increase in false recognition was linked to 
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hemispheric-based spindle density; an increase in RH spindles compared to LH 
spindles resulted in greater false recognition. The observation of a hemispheric 
bias in spindle activity is not novel in itself; In a procedural task Nishida and 
Walker (2007) found that spindles in the RH related to performance. Within 
associative memory, van der Helm et al. (2011) noted that S2 fast spindles at C3 
strongly correlated with context-memory retention after sleep. Perhaps most 
pertinent to the nap study is that of Tamminen et al. (2010) who demonstrated 
that consolidation of novel words into existing semantic networks correlated with 
LH sleep spindles. Tamminen et al. suggested that this LH spindle bias was in part 
due to consolidation of vocabulary being lateralised to the LH, the proposed site of 
the long-term vocabulary store (Ellis 2004, 2009). As discussed in the above 
section on hemispheric false recognition, the RH is theorised to be more 
susceptible to DRM based false recognition due to it processing language within a 
broad semantic network, weakly activating many associative words rather than a 
few strongly associated words (Bellamy & Shillcock, 2007; Ito, 2001; Westerberg 
& Marsolek, 2003), with the RH akin to a schema. Therefore, much like the 
Hennies et al. (2016) study spindle density in the RH may reflect a similar process 
of schema/gist consolidation within a semantic network. In situations whereby the 
spindle density within the RH is greater than the LH, thus greater consolidation of 
a gist form of semantic consolidation, this would reflect in greater false 
recognition. In contrast, when the LH is more dominant, this would reflect 
consolidation within semantic networks that only activate a few closely associated 
words, reducing the chance of false recognition. 
 
6.3 Methodological Limitations 
Although each chapter addresses methodological limitations individually for 
each study, it is worth highlighting the more global limitations. One potential 
limitation of the experiments involving sleep was the use of the Stanford 
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Sleepiness Scale (SSS). Although the SSS is widely used in the literature and 
deemed to be accurate, it is not perfect. Critics of the SSS highlight the 
judgement required in the SSS (1-7 Likert scale, from Very alert through to 
Completely exhausted, cannot function efficiently), is not necessarily a measure 
of sleepiness but rather one of fatigue or boredom levels (Akerstet, Anund, 
Axelsson, & Kecklund, 2014), and requires participants to be consciously aware of 
their fatigue levels. Unfortunately, it was only after the completion of all 
experiments that I learned of the Karloniska Sleepiness Scale (KSS). Advocates of 
the KSS emphasise it’s a more direct measure of sleepiness, with sleepiness 
rating on the KSS linked to shift work, jet lag, driving, attention, and it has even 
been correlated with sleep physiology and behaviour measures (Kaida et al., 
2006). As such I’d recommend that if any future work wishes to extend the work 
within the current thesis it should use the KSS as the measure of sleepiness. 
A second limitation was that with the exception of the study in Chapter 5 all 
sleep studies were ran with actigraphy rather than polysomnography. Although 
the use of actigraphy as a measure of sleep is prominent within the literature, it 
lacks the precision of polysomnography that would allow any links between 
specific sleep stages and the observed results. Given the interesting result of 
Chapter 3 whereby object-scene recognition was affected by sleep a deeper 
understanding of the sleep stages and sleep architecture that led to such a result 
would be beneficial. 
Although already highlighted in Chapter 4 it is worth noting again that there 
was a particular methodological problem with the sleep and item modality study, 
that of immediate testing. While it is important to gain a measure of immediate 
recall of information to account for individual differences within the current study 
it may have hindered what we sought to test. There is a large literature that 
demonstrates that immediate testing of information can benefit subsequent 
retrieval even up to a month after initial exposure (Roediger & Karpicke, 2006a, 
2006b), as such trying to find an effect of sleep after 12h may have been 
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optimistic at best. In retrospect, the study may have been more complete if it 
included two more experimental groups who were exposed to the stimuli but did 
not complete the first recall task until after a delay containing sleep or wake, with 
a subsequent recall task 24h after the initial exposure. Within this design we 
could measure the role of sleep/wake on recall within the first recall task but also 
gain a measure of individual differences in memory.  
 
6.4 Future Directions 
6.4.1 Role of Culture- Does a Pictographic Language Help? 
 One of the key methodological decisions in the Cultural Binding memory 
paper (Chapter 1) was the decision to test a Malaysian population rather than a 
more typically researched East Asian population, such as Chinese or Japanese. 
There were methodological reasons for this. First the study could be run in 
Malaysia’s Sunway University due to a partnership between Sunway and 
Lancaster. The importance of being able to test in the ‘home country’ cannot be 
understated; Previous literature has demonstrated that participants from one 
culture living in another (e.g., East Asian living in America) can modify perceptual 
processing to accommodate the new culture relatively quickly (Kitayama et al., 
2003), as such in order to get representative data it was important for the data to 
be collected within the culture. Second, Malaysia’s use of the Latin alphabet 
widespread adoption of English makes it unique across East Asian cultures and a 
great population to study to account for any potential confound effects of a 
pictographic language benefitting visual memory (Kühnen et al., 2001). While 
there was an observable difference between Western and East Asian cultures the 
natural progression would be to now include one of the East Asian cultures with a 






6.4.2 Binding of Objects and Actions: Why The Gap? 
 Based on the results of both Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 there is a significant 
difference in recognition of object-scene composites and action-scene composites. 
One possible area to explore is to look at the effect of language on this form of 
task. There’s a large literature that demonstrates that language can play a crucial 
role in non-verbal cognitive tasks (e.g., Dessaglegn, & Landau, 2008; Spivy, 
Tyler, Eberhard, & Tanenhaus, 2001, Pyers, Shusterman, Senghas, Spelke, & 
Emmorey, 2010). Specifically, in VLTM research several studies have 
demonstrated that memory for visual images is better when images are 
semantically labelled compared to those that are not (Wiseman & Neisser, 1974; 
Koustaal et al., 2003; Bower, Karlin, & Dueck, 1975). For example, Wiseman and 
Neisser noted that in a face recognition task, participants were more accurate in 
subsequent recognition tasks in images they had judged to be faces, despite all 
images containing faces to various levels of distortion, suggesting that just being 
able to label an item can aid recognition. In the thesis the recognition tasks were 
unequal in this sense- objects already have a label while the actions may not 
have. Therefore, it may be interesting to see what may happen if modified so that 
either completely novel objects were used in the object-scene task or that actions 
were given a label within the task. An alternative design may be to introduce 
some form of language interference during the task, such as a verbal shadowing 
task. If language does play a role in successful binding then a verbal shadowing 
task should have a noticeable effect on binding ability. 
 A second expansion on this could be changing the variance within 
categories. One of the suggestions in Chapter 3 was that this difference between 
the two tasks may have been the result of reduced variety across actions within 
each category compared to objects (e.g., food- banana, cherry, apple, chocolate 
bar), with Konkle et al. (2010b) previously demonstrating that greater variance 
within a category can aid encoding/retrieval. If in the object-scene task variance 
within a category was reduced to a similar level to that of the action-scene task 
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(e.g., rather than a food category, a cup category with similar cups), it may 
reduce accuracy, allowing a better understanding of what can affect retrieval 
binding.  
 
6.4.4 Role of Schema in Visual False Memories 
 One study that could bridge the gap between the two areas of the thesis is 
that of a study on the role of sleep in visual false memories. From the Item 
modality study of Chapter 4 I suggested the result was in part due to gist 
memory leading to a null result- in recall tasks such as that participants can 
answer adequately with a gist-based answer, so rather than saying the man 
punched the victim with a left hook (as may be shown in the action-scene 
composite task of Chapter 2-3), simply saying the man hit the victim is sufficient.  
 Although mentioned briefly in Chapter 4, one possible way of exploring this 
would be similar to the work of Lew and Howe (2016). Within their study 
participants viewed visual scenes (e.g., a kitchen) that were manipulated for 
schema-consistent (e.g., frying pan on the cooker top), schema-inconsistent 
(e.g., plate in the oven), or schema-unrelated (e.g., toilet brush on the cooker). 
They observed that participants were more likely to falsely recognise the schema-
consistent information for the schema-inconsistent stimuli (e.g., for the above 
example, false recognition of plate on a table), while the schema-unrelated 
information was highly accurate, due to the item being ‘outside’ of the schema. 
Given the literature suggesting that sleep can aid integration of information that is 
schema consistent (e.g., Hennies et al., 2016; Lewis & Durrant, 2011; Stickgold & 
Walker, 2013), it may be interesting to see if this may extend to visual false 
memories. 
 
6.4.5 Replicate the Nap Study in an Overnight Paradigm. 
 Based on the nap study (Chapter 5) the natural progression of the result is 
to try to replicate the result in an overnight sleep design. Although a result was 
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observed in the nap design overnight sleep is qualitatively different. Within 
overnight sleep there is an effect of hemispheric lateralisation: the RH compared 
to the LH is more active during the early half of the night before the LH equalises 
the activity (Casagrande & Bertini, 2008a, 2008b, Natale et al., 2007; 2010). This 
is of particular relevance as it is also during this period of RH dominance that SWS 
is the most prominent before reducing as the night goes on. As Monaghan et al. 
(2016) observed similar behavioural results (in fact acting as the precursor to the 
current study), it would be interesting to see if the results would be replicated and 
extended with measurement of sleep with polysomnography.  
 
6.5 Conclusion 
 In conclusion, this thesis has provided theoretical contributions within two 
key domains- the literature on bound representations within episodic memory and 
the literature on sleep’s role in consolidation. Building upon the results of the 
chapters I suggest that within bound representations there are two key factors 
that ultimately affect the memory- participant effects and item effects that 
interact with each other and affect both encoding and retrieval. Moreover, sleep 
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Appendix 1. DRM Wordlist used in Chapter 5, taken from Stadler et al.  (1999) 
BREAD: butter, food, eat, sandwich, rye, jam, milk, flour, jelly, dough, crust, 
slice, wine, loaf, toast 
CAR: truck, bus, train, automobile, vehicle, drive, jeep, Ford, race, keys, garage, 
highway, sedan, van, taxi 
CHAIR: table, sit, legs, seat, couch, desk, recliner, sofa, wood, cushion, swivel, 
stool, sitting, rocking, bench 
DOCTOR: nurse, sick, lawyer, medicine, health, hospital, dentist, physician, ill, 
patient, office, stethoscope, surgeon, clinic, cure 
FRUIT: apple, vegetable, orange, kiwi, citrus, ripe, pear, banana, berry, cherry, 
basket, juice, salad, bowl, cocktail 
KING: queen, England, crown, prince, George, dictator, palace, throne, chess, 
rule, subjects, monarch, royal, leader, reign 
MOUNTAIN: hill, valley, climb, summit, top, molehill, peak, plain, glacier, goat, 
bike, climber, range, steep, ski  
MUSIC: note, sound, piano, sing, radio, band, melody, horn, concert, instrument, 
symphony, jazz, orchestra, art, rhythm  
NEEDLE: thread, pin, eye, sewing, sharp, point, prick, thimble, haystack, thorn, 
hurt, injection, syringe, cloth, knitting 
RIVER: water, stream, lake, Mississippi, boat, tide, swim, flow, run, barge, creek, 
brook, fish, bridge, winding 
SLEEP: bed, rest, awake, tired, dream, wake, snooze, blanket, doze, slumber, 
snore, nap, peace, yawn, drowsy 
THIEF: steal, robber, crook, burglar, money, cop, bad, rob, jail, gun, villain, 
crime, bank, bandit, criminal 
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